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Abstract
The Federalist Society was organized in 1982 by conservative law students to counteract
what they perceived to be a liberal bias in law schools, the courts, and government
administration. Forty years later there is an acknowledgement of a rightward turn in the Supreme
Court which scholars have attributed in part to the efforts of the Federalist Society. However,
there is still little understanding of just how that change came about. This dissertation
takes a step toward understanding that question. Viewing the Federalist Society as the center of a
network of lawyers, think tanks, and legal institutions, I examine the influence the Federalist
Society Network has on voting rights and public sector unionization. I analyzed these cases South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, and Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) to assess the
Federalist Society Network’s influence on voting rights. I also examined these additional cases Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), Knox v. Service Employees
International Union, 567 U.S. 298, (2012), Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616,(2014), and Janus v.
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 585 U.S. (2018) to
assess the impact the Federalist Society Network has on public sector union agency fees. I use
content analysis to compare the themes asserted in petitioners’ and amicus curiae briefs with the
themes expressed in the majority opinions in these cases. I find that the Federalist Society
Network has influenced the majority opinions in these cases.
Keywords: Federalist Society; Supreme Court; Constitution; voting rights; labor rights; network
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Over the past four decades a transformation in legal jurisprudence has taken place. The
Federalist Society has shifted American constitutional law in a conservative direction.1 The
Federalist Society is the hub of a network that reaches all levels of the legal community
providing them many access points to spread conservative and libertarian constitutional
principles into law.2 The creation of the Federalist Society of Public Policy at elite law schools
established a meeting ground for legal conservatives previously loosely connected and scattered
around the nation. The activist hub created by the Federalist Society consists of conservative and
libertarian law students, lawyers, law professors, and faculty members, conservative and
libertarian judges and law clerks, as well as conservative and libertarian law firms and think
tanks.3 The Federalist Society (“FS” or Federalist Society throughout) is the institution that links
and drives this vast network through assembling conservative and libertarian minds for a
common cause in a setting that inspires intellectual discussions and theory formation to advance
a conservative viewpoint. By establishing a presence in law schools, recruiting students, hosting
activities, debating first principles, and creating academic scholarship and many other activities,
the Federalist Society created the “conditions” ripe for constitutional change.4 Additionally, by
achieving acceptance of their once deemed radical legal ideas from those authoritative voices

1

Avery and McLaughlin 2013; Beutler 2015; Cokorinos 2003; Hollis-Brusky 2015; O' Harrow Jr., et al. 2019; Riehl
2007; Scherer and Miller 2009; Teles 2008; 2009; Zengerle 2018
2
Avery and McLaughlin 2013; Beutler 2015; Cokorinos 2003; Hollis-Brusky 2015; Riehl 2007; Scherer and Miller
2009; Teles 2008; 2009
3
Rosen 2005; Hollis-Brusky 2015; Teles 2008
4
Hollis-Brusky 2015
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that determine “what the law is and should be or what the proper legal ideas and theories are”5
the Federalist Society created the “intellectual capital for Supreme Court decision makers” to
institute constitutional change.6
The conditions readied for transformation, the Federalist Society altered the direction of
constitutional law from the course of the Civil Rights Movement and the Rights Revolution.
The Federalist Society transformed the law by building a conservative network to counter the
liberal legalism they saw embedded in all of society’s legal institutions. The Federalist Society is
a “society of ideas”7 united around shared principles and shared grievances. It also functions as a
talent agency that recruits and educates young lawyers in conservative/libertarian philosophy and
as an employment agency that matches its best and brightest with conservative judges and elite
conservative lawyers to keep the conservative pipeline flowing.8 The Federalist Society is also a
network that keeps conservative and libertarian intellectuals connected to continue developing
their ideas and encouraging activism among its members to disperse and implement its
conservative view.9 The Federalist Society has something for everyone: Student Chapters,
Faculty Chapters, Lawyers Chapters, and even specialized legal Practice Groups. The Society
has its own academic law journal, distributes newsletters to keep members informed, and
includes a speaker’s bureau. The Federalist Society’s many facets help to maintain continued

“The judges need scholarship and arguments extending Federalist principles into new areas. Where new legal
theories depart from the status quo, they need them to be vetted and legitimized through public debate. They require
targeted cases raising questions that provide an opening to move the law. Without professors and lawyers in the
network filling that demand, Teles says, ‘you’re not going to maximize what you got through the electoral process.’”
(Montgomery 2019)
6
Hollis-Brusky 2015, 4; Teles 2008, chap. 5
7
Montgomery 2019
8
Avery and McLaughlin 2013; Beutler 2015; Hollis-Brusky 2015; Montgomery 2019; Riehl 2007; Scherer and
Miller 2009; Southworth 2008; Teles 2008
9
Hollis-Brusky 2015; Montgomery 2019; Riehl 2007; Southworth 2008, 134; Teles 2008
5
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interactions between students, lawyers, judges and other legal professionals to keep them
engaged while simultaneously acting as a check against ideological drift.10
The Federalist Society provided the “foot soldiers,” the intellectual legal rationale, and
importantly, the medium where ideas and strategies are debated and stripped of their defects.
They have been key in selecting judicial nominees for Republican presidents beginning with
Ronald Reagan, and their influence has only increased in subsequent Republican administrations.
Membership in the Federalist Society has simplified judicial selection for Republican
Administrations by indicating conservative bona fides while also providing members a
conservative career “pipeline.”11 This career track was established very early as the first
generation of Federalist Society members graduated from law schools during President Ronald
Reagan’s first term in office and were quickly scooped up for key positions in the
Administration. Their influence and involvement in the Reagan Department of Justice was so
profound it was said to be a “Federalist Society shop.”12 By 2000, the Federalist Society had an
ample pool of ideological conservative law graduates ready to be appointed by President George
W. Bush.
Significance of this Study
The consequences of decades of the Federalist Society’s legal activism are becoming
more apparent and more widespread.13 The Society’s legal activism is ongoing, leaving many
areas of settled law susceptible to upheaval with unknown consequences and implications for

10

Hollis-Brusky 2015; Teles 2008
O'Harrow Jr., et al. 2019; Toobin 2018
12
Hollis-Brusky 2008
13
Beutler 2015; Quinn 2018; Toobin 2018; Zengerle 2018
11

3

everyone.14 Supreme Court decisions extend beyond the individual litigants in a particular case.
These decisions set principles that carry over to subsequent legal matters. They guide lower court
rulings and shape the rules we live under.15 Supreme Court decisions affect people’s lives in
ways we understand and in ways we may not.16 Additionally, Supreme Court decisions have
distinct impacts on different segments of the population.17 Therefore, the ability of an ideological
organization such as the Federalist Society to insert principles into Supreme Court decisions has
widespread repercussions for a society based on democratic rule. Not only are there important
implications for a democracy, but this also raises important questions in a purported equal
society that bases social mobility on merit, but through its laws, maintains an economic status
quo.18
One of the ways the Federalist Society has been able to influence the shape and trajectory
of the laws that guide our lives is through the top court in the nation. The Federalist Society has
successfully inserted its principles of law into Supreme Court decisions. This has resulted in a
halting of the Rights Revolution and limiting the power of the federal government to remedy
society’s failures and in particular those failures that impact certain segments of society.
The Federalist Society’s control over Republican presidents’ judicial nominees’ places
power in the hands of one organization comprised of social and economic elites, based on an
agreed conservative viewpoint, concentrated in one political party, and an aligned majority on

14

Avery and McLaughlin 2013; Beutler 2015; Cokorinos 2003; Hollis-Brusky 2015; Riehl 2007; Scherer and Miller
2009; Teles 2008; 2009
15
Feldman 2017
16
less obvious effects are rulings on federal agency regulations, state licensing, regulations on corporate advertising
17
Gilman 2014; Schorpp, Hoffmann and Kassow 2017 (for example criminal justice decisions are far more
consequential for those in the lower-income brackets just as abortion decisions disproportionately affect access for
low-income women.)
18
Baldwin 2008; Gilman 2014; Nice 2008

4

the Supreme Court. This would appear to contradict the very concentration of power
conservatives claim to fear. It certainly diminishes the “Advise and Consent” role of the Senate
in confirming nominees. It also indicates that the Federalist Society may not truly believe that
judges in practice merely “say what the law is, not what it should be.”19
Purpose
The Federalist Society as the “facilitator” has created a vast conservative/libertarian legal
network that has altered the trajectory of the law. Its aim, which has been largely successful, was
to reshape the entirety of legal culture. One part of its strategy has been to develop the
intellectual basis for conservative and libertarian constitutional theory that could be adopted by
justices in Supreme Court opinions, thereby transferring theories into law. Since these decisions
affect individuals’ lives, it is important to understand the mechanisms for transference as well as
the principles guiding its ideology. This project will explore the path of idea diffusion, the
underlying principles of these ideas, and the impact on the Supreme Court. This will entail an
examination of the Supreme Court as a collective unit through majority opinions. Previous
research has revealed the Federalist Society’s impact on campaign finance regulations,20
federalism and state sovereignty,21 and also on affirmation action and remedial programs.22 To
this scholarship, I add the Federalist Society’s impact on voting rights and union organizing
through its influence on Supreme Court majority opinions.

19

Our Background | The Federalist Society https://fedsoc.org/about-us#Background
Hollis-Brusky 2015; Southworth 2018; Teachout 2014
21
Hollis-Brusky 2015; Teachout 2014
22
Avery and McLaughlin 2013; Cokorinos 2003; Cummins and Belle Isle 2017
20
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Background
The Federalist Society
“Founded in 1982, the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies is a group of
conservatives and libertarians dedicated to reforming the current legal order. We are committed
to the principles that the state exists to preserve freedom, that the separation of governmental
powers is central to our Constitution, and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be. The Society seeks to promote awareness
of these principles and to further their application through its activities.”23
When the founders of the Federalist Society entered law school in 1980, they faced what
they believed to be a liberal dominance in legal education “which advocates a centralized and
uniform society.” 24 The aim was to insert conservative principles into legal education based on
the Federalist Society’s core founding principles. These principles were (and still are) “that the
state exists to preserve freedom, that the separation of governmental powers is central to our
Constitution, and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the
law is, not what it should be.” 25 These conservative law students believed the Constitution
strictly limited the powers of Congress to those enumerated in Article I Section 8 and also
constrained judges to interpret the text.26 The Court, they believed, had been derelict in its duties
to adhere closely to the text by finding rights not explicitly written, and therefore judges were

23

Our Background | The Federalist Society https://fedsoc.org/about-us#Background
Id. “Law schools and the legal profession are currently strongly dominated by a form of orthodox liberal ideology
which advocates a centralized and uniform society. While some members of the academic community have
dissented from these views, by and large they are taught simultaneously with (and indeed as if they were) the law”
25
Id.
26
Avery and McLaughlin 2013; Hollis-Brusky 2015; Devins and Baum 2017; Teles 2008
24
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saying “what it [the law] should be” i.e., implementing a social agenda. In the preceding decades
the Court had been taking a more active role in desegregation and protecting the rights of
criminal defendants. In addition, the so-called conservative Burger Court had granted the right of
privacy, which allowed women to obtain an abortion. Therefore, conservatives saw liberal
reformers, aided by the Supreme Court, using the Courts to expand rights not explicitly stated in
the Constitution and contrary to the conservative viewpoint. This was being done in the name of
social justice, a role not within the Court's jurisdiction and contrary to their vision of the
Constitution, which primarily protects property rights and upholds individual rights, not group
rights.27 The conservatives’ complaint was that the civil rights and civil liberties granted to
African Americans, women, and criminal defendants were based on group membership, not due
to a personal harm or a current and direct violation. The Constitution, they argued, was not
meant to address disparities due to discrimination based on group status, but rather intentional
discrimination of a specific individual.
It was with this view of the current environment that the Federalist Society for Law and
Public Policy Studies was formed to challenge legal liberalism and insert a conservative
understanding of constitutional law into legal education. The Federalist Society aimed to create a
space for and legitimize conservative legal thought and to interject into legal discourse
conservatives’ view of proper constitutional interpretation. This began with the establishment of
student chapters in law schools throughout the nation. The first student chapters were founded at
Yale Law School and the University of Chicago School of Law, but quickly spread to others.
Law students across the country created student chapters to teach and learn conservative legal

27

Avery and McLaughlin 2013; Cokorinos 2003; Riehl 2007

7

theories and maintain connections to these ideas throughout their legal education. The Federalist
Society was also supported by high profile conservative professors, big-money conservative
donors, and conservative political leaders. This support served to endorse the Society and aided
in recruiting other conservative professors, faculty and legal theorists to build student, lawyer,
and faculty chapters throughout the nation. What began as a conference to connect fellow
conservatives found an audience and soon became the nexus for legal change.28
A large-scale change in legal culture meant starting where the law is taught, and legal
theories are formed, that is, in elite law schools.29 The Federalist Society Student Law School
Chapters quickly increased following the success of the first symposium. Spreading across many
campuses, the student chapters recruit law students to educate on conservative principles and
groom the next generation of legal professionals. This training arms graduating members with
the legal tools to carry forth and disperse as they enter their legal career.30 The student chapters
assure a steady supply of new lawyers ingrained with the same conservative principles ready for
appointments in Republican administrations or selection as judicial clerks.31 The on-campus
chapters are an essential first step in attracting students at the start of their legal training, starting
from the ground level, grooming the students throughout their legal education and at completion
supplying credentialed conservative lawyers ready to put what they learned into action.32

28

Avery and McLaughlin 2013; Beutler 2015; Cokorinos 2003; Hollis-Brusky 2015; Riehl 2007; Scherer and Miller
2009; Teles 2008; 2009
29
Aron 1994; Landay 2000; Teles 2008
30
Aron, 1994; Avery and McLaughlin 2013; Cokorinos 2003; Hollis-Brusky 2015; Root 2010; Teles 2008
31
Hollis-Brusky 2008; Scherer and Miller 2009; Teles 2009, 140, 179
32
Hollis-Brusky 2008; Rosen 2005; Scherer and Miller 2009; Teles 2008
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Lawyer divisions were added in 1986 “to bring together attorneys, business and policy
leaders, judges and others interested in examining and improving the state of the law.”33 There
are currently ninety lawyer chapters across the nation. The lawyer divisions function to keep
alumni wedded to the Federalist Society’s principles while building a network of conservative
practicing lawyers who could “coordinate conservative activity within the ABA [American Bar
Association]” and other facets of legal culture.34
In 1995, the Federalist Society created its Practice Groups to counter the perceived liberal
bias of the American Bar Association’s “Sections” and the absence of discussions of traditional
legal values in existing bar organizations.35 The Practice Groups were organized by legal topic,
which paralleled those in the ABA, to allow conservative lawyers to coordinate with others in
their specialty to develop legal arguments and legal strategies, and to be intellectually armed and
ready to take advantage of political and legal opportunities that arise.36 The Practice Groups
connect conservative lawyers by “mutual interest” to develop alternative conservative legal
arguments to “counterbalance negative trends that are developing due to government action,
judicial overreaching, or leftward pressures by the organized bar.”37 The Practice Groups were
also designed to impact public policy by allowing conservative lawyers to network with public
policy leaders within their area of expertise and focus on specific policy issues.38 The practice

33

Lawyers Division | The Federalist Society https://fedsoc.org/divisions/lawyers
Teles 2008, 167-168
35
Id. at 169-170
36
Aron 1994; Bach 2001; Teles 2008, 172
37
Teles 2008, 169-170)
38
Teles 2008, 172
34
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groups also promote pro-bono opportunities through connecting Federalist Society lawyers in
private practice to the various conservative public interest law firms.39
The Faculty Division was started in 1999 with its own inaugural event and a mission
similar to the other groups, connecting “…law professors interested in limited government, the
separation of powers, constitutional theory, the original understanding of the Constitution, and
the importance of property rights and free markets.”40 The Federalist Society’s Faculty
Conferences encourage professors to “advance traditional legal principles in the legal academy
and beyond.” Additionally, since the Federalist Society perceives legal academia as mired in
political correctness, the Faculty Conferences would also “energize those professors most
dedicated to offering students a strong counter to political correctness.”41
Of special importance to the conservative and libertarian movement is the Federalist
Society’s role in identifying individuals who shared core legal principles. Membership signals
information about the content of, the quality and ideological validity of an individual and aided in
identifying those who would more likely maintain true Federalist Society principles throughout
their legal career. This was especially helpful in the second term of the Reagan Administration as
they looked for potential judicial nominees and confronted a short supply of ideologically
compatible prospects. Ideological drive and shared principles were essential to maintaining the
long-term commitment necessary to displace the post-New Deal legal consensus and the
institutions that supported “legal liberalism.”42 Federalist Society credentials coexist with a set of

39

Teles 2008, 169-170
Faculty Division | The Federalist Society https://fedsoc.org/divisions/faculty
41
The Federalist Society Annual Report 2006
42
Riehl 2007, 45; Teles 2008, 70
40
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principles conservative judges and Republican administrations want in their officials and judges
and clerks. An example of the significant strength of this credentialing power was the ability of the
opposition led by the Federalist Society to replace a nonmember’s (Harriet Miers’) nomination to
the Supreme Court with the nominee they favored, Samuel Alito. The Federalist Society
questioned the conservative credentials of President George W. Bush’s nominee because she had
not been "certified" by membership in the Federalist Society.43 Miers' replacement by Alito was a
defining moment of their power over judicial appointments. The Federalist Society asserted itself
as the “de facto monopoly on credentialing of rising stars…on the political right.”44
Constitution Interpretation
Central to the influence of the Federalist Society itself and the Network has been the
ability to insert its preferred method of constitutional interpretation, “Originalism,” into the
mainstream. “Originalism” as a fully articulated legal theory had not yet been conceived prior to
the 1980s. It was not until 1985 that the name “original intention” was given to the ideas being
expressed by conservatives as they openly and frequently attacked the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court in the Civil Rights era. Thus, the principles of Originalism developed throughout
the 1960s, 1970s and into the 1980s as conservative opposition to the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence.45 Increasingly, critics of the courts began to invoke “strict construction,” history,
and the framers’ intention in reactions to the decisions upholding affirmative action,

43

Teles 2008, 1-2
Hollis-Brusky 2015, 152
45
Teles 2009 (“Conservatives needed an idea that could provide intellectual legitimacy for those areas where
conservatives thought that the courts should not simply defer to the elected branches of government, as well as those
where it should. While conservatives were becoming increasingly interested in, for example, putting teeth in the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, judicial restraint pointed in the opposite direction. Even more important,
conservatives needed an idea that could be taken seriously by legal intellectuals and the profession as a whole, a task
for which judicial restraint did not measure up.”)
44

11

desegregation measures, abortion rights, and the rights of the criminally accused.46 “Strict
construction” was not defined but recognized as a position of opposition to the Warren and
Burger Court’s jurisprudence grounded in the understanding of the Constitutional framers.47
Both Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan elevated the Courts to a priority on the conservative
agenda, campaigning for “strict construction,” “law and order” and “judicial restraint.”48 These
phrases guided conservatives as they developed a more sophisticated legal philosophy in the
1970s and 1980s.
A 1971 journal article by Robert Bork is viewed as the origin of a framework for
organizing these loose ideas into a principle of constitutional interpretation.49 Bork’s call for a
“neutral principle” to determine a “valid theory” for constitutional interpretation laid the
groundwork to guide the development of a formal concept of originalism.50 It was not until 1985,
in a highly publicized speech to the American Bar Association (ABA), that Attorney General
Edwin Meese’s announcement that the Reagan Administration’s legal policy had “…been and
will continue to be… a jurisprudence of original intention” gave a name to the developing

O’Brien 2008, 73; Teles 2009; Whittington 2004
Whittington 2004
48
Riehl 149; Teles 2009
49
Teles 2009 (“Originalism, an idea that had been either created or resurrected (depending on one’s point of view)
in the 1970s, seemed to admirably serve both goals Starting with Robert Bork’s 1971 “Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems,” and accelerating with Raoul Berger’s Government by Judiciary, scholars critical of the
Warren Court began to develop a critique of the courts that rested on an essentially historical methodology, arguing
that the legitimacy of the judicial role rests on the original understanding of specific constitutional provisions. Until
the scholarly interventions of Bork, Berger, and their successors, conservatives lacked an intellectual framework in
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theory.51 Justice Brennan’s subsequent counter to Meese’s view kicked off the “Great Debate”
over the role of the Supreme Court and constitutional interpretation.
Conflict over the role of the Supreme Court in the American Constitutional system is as
old as the Constitution itself, beginning shortly after the constitutional convention ended and the
state ratifying conventions began.52 However, unlike the debates of today, the central conflicts
were over the Constitution’s creation, structure, and distribution of powers. The Anti-Federalists
and the Federalists were sharply at odds over the powers vested in the new federal government
including those granted to the one Supreme Court created by the Constitution. The power of the
Supreme Court divided Anti-Federalist advocates and Federalist adherents. The power of the
judiciary, judicial review itself, and who is the final authority on the law remained in dispute
even after Marbury v. Madison appeared to provide an answer.53 Rather than disagreements over
interpretative methods, the debates concerned the fundamental questions of governing, i.e., the
distribution of power and the structure of government that had been created.54 The question was
not how but rather who should interpret the Constitution, and even if judicial review itself, is a
rightful power of the Court. These differences that divided the Federalists and the AntiFederalist groups evolved into the United States’ first two political parties, the Federalist Party
and the Democratic-Republican Party.55
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The interpretative method was not the concern because most agreed with the legal theory
of the times, which viewed judges as acting mechanically and neutrally to simply apply the law
as written to the facts of the case.56 There was no perceived danger of a judge's interpretation in
line with his preference, for judges “may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but
merely judgment;” that is they merely declare the law.57 This theory expressed by Hamilton in
The Federalist, No. 78, was generally accepted by both the Federalist Party and the DemocraticRepublicans.58 Therefore, constitutional interpretation simply followed a “plain meaning rule”
articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in which “the spirit [of a constitution] is to be
collected chiefly from its words.”59 Plain meaning was derived from a commonsense
understanding “according to the sense of the terms and the intentions of the parties.”60
The idea that judges simply discover the law without preference or context was
challenged in the late nineteenth century most notably by Justice Holmes and further contested in
the early twentieth century by the appearance of the “American legal realist.”61 In contrast to the
prior legal formalism, legal realism posited that judges in the process of interpretation do make
laws and look to norms in their current context rather than at the time of the original authors. In
this way, “the Court … has shaped the living Constitution to the needs of the day as it felt them.”
This “jurisprudence of a living Constitution” gained adherents on the Supreme Court in the early
part of the twentieth century by both legal progressives and legal conservatives.62 It was in
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reaction to the idea of a living Constitution and the belief that judges were construing new rights
beginning in the late1950s that conservatives began to articulate the features that would develop
into a theory of originalism.63
Meese’s 1985 speech to the ABA was followed by the same speech at the Federalist
Society D.C. Lawyers Chapter. Meese’s meaning was clear: DOJ legal policy “will endeavor to
resurrect the original meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes as the only reliable guide
for judgment.”64 The clear implication of the language of “resurrection” was that the Court had
strayed far from the “original meaning” that the authors intended and instead were substituting
their own meaning or preferred social values.65 Meese’s speech articulated the position of
movement conservatives on constitutional interpretation and claimed anything other than this
interpretation was an illegitimate insertion of subjective social values. This early version of
“originalism was designed to promote judicial restraint and criticize the judicial innovations of
liberal judges in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.”66 The ideas that undergird “originalism” began in
response to the Warren and Burger Courts to express opposition to the Courts’ decisions.
Conservatives charged the court with straying from the “original intent” or “original meaning” of
the framers and raised objections to decisions by calling for a “strict construction” of the
constitution to contrast with the flexibility they viewed in the current jurisprudence. Originalism
became a successful political tool to mobilize conservatives in the electorate and also to unite
conservatives of different philosophical bents under the Federalist Society.67
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The Federalist Society Network (“the Network” or “the Federalist Society Network
throughout) unite around the philosophy of “Originalism” as the only valid method of
constitutional interpretation. The doctrine of originalism can refer to “Original Intent” or a form
that came later “Original Meaning.” “Original Intent” is a method of constitutional interpretation
that calls on judges to look to what the framers meant or intended when they wrote the text.
“Original Meaning” is related but differs in that the standard is the common understanding of the
words written in the author’s time. Holding this view naturally compels looking to historical
documents, some written centuries ago, or historical meanings to apply to the world as it exists
today. The purpose is ostensibly to limit a judge to merely “say what the law is, not what it
should be.”68 A key component of original intent as initially formulated was “judicial restraint.”
Since conservatives were opposed to the Supreme Court’s actions, calling for “restraint” aptly
expressed opposition to the court's overturning state and federal laws to expand civil rights and
civil liberties. Restraint could be contrasted with its opposite, “judicial activism.” What
conservatives called “judicial activism” was the overturning of laws as unconstitutional in keeping
with principles of social justice instead of prioritizing the protection of individual rights, property
rights, and economic rights.69
Over time, the debates within the Federalist Society revealed intent was problematic. The
Network members increasingly recognized the difficulty in interpreting a person’s intent. The
meaning of the text arose as an alternative method of interpretation introduced by then D. C.
Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia at a D.C. meeting of the Federalist Society Lawyers’ Division.70
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Original intent then evolved into original meaning. Original meaning brought with it a
“distinctively” different conception of judicial of restraint.71 Conservatives had long been calling
for “judicial restraint,” however, the younger generation believers were not so inclined. They
were graduating at a time when Reagan was in the White House and conservative ideas were
ascending. For them, this was not a time for judicial restraint but a time for judicial activism.
The founding generation of the Federalist Society worked to convince the older generation that
the traditional conservative doctrine of judicial restraint had to be revised to suit current
realities.72 What has been referred to as “new originalism” as distinct from the older version
developed in order “to defend the innovations of an empowered conservative judiciary.”73 The
younger conservative members of the Federalist Society were much more accepting of judicial
“activism” as necessary, but only their type of activism.74 They contended it was not “judicial
activism” if a judge was returning to the original principles that were ignored by previous judges
in their opinions but still an exercise of judicial restraint.75 The “old” original intent and “old”
judicial restraint faded into the background as a “new” original meaning emerged and was paired
with an updated judicial restraint armed with a justification to overturn previous decisions.76
Gradually, this “new” originalism became the preference of most of the Network including
affiliated Supreme Court justices. The Network redefined judicial restraint to serve conservatives’
goals once assuming governmental power.77 Judicial activism, under the guise of “judicial
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restraint,” was the justification that allowed them to claim they were the true holders of the
values of the U.S. Constitution.
Today, the Network has accomplished a sleight of hand.78 A call for “judicial restraint”
came in handy for an opposition movement’s attack on the perceived “judicial activism” of the
Supreme Court. However, once in control of the federal government, conservatives found that
judicial restraint would not support an agenda to reverse decisions of the Warren Court and
return to a pre-New Deal legal environment.79 This agenda to radically change standing law
would require overturning numerous precedents and thus called for an active judiciary, precisely
what conservatives had opposed for five decades.80 The new generation of conservative lawyers,
whose legal careers began during the advent of the Federalist Society in the 1980s, were not tied
to the older generation’s “judicial restraint.” Now that justices aligned with the Federalist Society
were beginning to be placed on the courts, conservatives were now in a position to “turn back”
the Warren Court81 and Burger Court decisions.82 In the mid- 80s, some members began making
an explicit call for “judicial activism.” The Federalist Society members and law professors,
Richard Epstein and Randy Barnett, were among the first. Clint Bolick,83 Chip Mellor and also
Michael Carvin84 were also early advocates and formed conservative public interest law firms to
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argue this in the courts.85 These figures made their arguments at Federalist Society events and
were influential in the acceptance of a “new originalism.”86
Following the election of Ronald Reagan, the doctrine of judicial restraint became
inconvenient for conservatives. Now in charge of government, conservatives were no longer in
opposition, therefore restraint did not fulfill movement conservative goals. With Reagan in the
White House, conservatives’ goals shifted from defense (halting and narrowing liberal legalism’s
advancement) to offense (reversing legal liberalism) and setting precedents for a set of “counterrights” that appealed to conservatives.87 This would require overturning precedents and
established doctrines, practices consider “judicial activism” and long condemned by
conservatives. Once Reagan was able to appoint judges, overturning decisions such as Roe v.
Wade88 and Engel v. Vitale89 was thought to be within reach. However, it was first necessary to
counter entrenched liberal legal doctrine by opening a space and ultimately securing acceptance
for conservative legal theory among the legal elites. The Federalist Society was central to the
development of a fully matured conservative doctrine that could challenge legal liberalism and
also provide a conservative understanding of law.90 Beyond the development of a coherent
theory, these new conservative legal ideas had to gain acceptance with the legal community’s
intellectual elites before judges could reference these novel ideas in judicial opinions.91 In
general, any new theory in law must be vetted and accepted as legitimate by the profession’s

85

Avery and McLaughlin 2013 9-10, 54, 64, 72; Rosen 2005; Teles 2008, 80
Beutler 2015; Hollis 2015, 19-20; Whittington 2004
87
Teles 2009
88
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
89
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
90
Avery and McLaughlin 2013; Hollis-Brusky 2015; Teles 2008; 2009
91
Avery and McLaughlin 2013; Baum and Devins 2010; Hollis-Brusky 2013; 2015; Teles 2008
86

19

elites. In the legal realm, this was largely done through law schools and professional bar
associations. Law schools are the most influential in shaping the culture of law through
controlling the education process. Universities are the entryway into a legal career. Universities
recruit and determine admission policies thereby determining who enters. Universities also
control the hiring of professors and faculty who directly shape legal thought through their
selection of teaching materials. Professors and faculty decide what legal theories to teach and,
just as important, what is not chosen to teach. In this way, universities can design the norms of
legal thought for the profession (Hollis-Brusky 2015; Teles 2008). When the founders of the
Federalist Society entered law schools, these institutions were dominated by legal liberalism that
accepted the jurisprudence of the Warren Court. Therefore, the aim was not only to focus on
students but to thoroughly reform higher legal education from within the academy by attacking it
at its root.
The Network also includes lawyers who must introduce these arguments in court briefs to
produce a legal record. The Network’s associated conservative public interest law firms (CPILF)
would select specific cases that would address a perceived egregious legal doctrine to frame it in
a way that foregrounded the conservative argument. Network lawyers, either when winning or
losing their cases, established a record of conservative and libertarian legal arguments that aided
in instituting these ideas. Once established in case law, arguments can be used by future litigants
and be incorporated as the rationale for judicial decisions.
In general, judicial opinions explain, in various degrees of detail, the principles and
rationale used to reach their decision. A court ruling that departs from established law in
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particular is expected to provide a justification for the decision.92 Movement conservatives once
in charge of government power intended to disestablish prevailing doctrine disrupting existing
law.93 Therefore, conservative justices needed a conservative constitutional rationale that could
justify a sharp departure from the legal status quo to the legal establishment.94 These legal
arguments were provided by The Federalist Society.95 Providing conservative lawyers and
judges with the necessary constitutional arguments to reach conservative decisions may be the
Network’s most important function.96
Providing the intellectual language for Supreme Court opinions conceals much of the
Network’s influence, which is not as readily apparent as changing a justice’s vote in a court case.
The Federalist Society relies on its members to do the work to influence government, judges,
lawmakers, or in proposing doctrine. The Federalist Society itself is the conduit through which
the necessary components for revolutionary change are developed. The Federalist Society
enabled constitutional change through creating the ideas that underlay departures from
established doctrine and creating the network that could reach into all areas of the legal and
political establishment to legitimate and promulgate these new ideas until they were ultimately
accepted.
The Network’s reach meant members were positioned to take advantage of access points
in the legal system: a brief submitted by a Network member as litigator, an amicus submitted by
a Network member in support of a position, an opinion in a lower court written by a Network
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member judge, or publishing in academic journals.97 Through these methods and others, the
Federalist Society has been successful in shaping the substance of legal decisions. The Federalist
Society was also essential in uniting all factions of the conservative movement by advocating for
the broader areas of agreement and disenchantment with the current legal status quo. Also
critical was their construction of a newer “judicial restraint” distinct from the traditional “judicial
restraint,” that could justify overturning specific decisions or laws while maintaining that judges
must not interpret the law in their own social vision but strictly “say what the law is.”98 Many
Supreme Court decisions now contain the language of the Network.99 This is where their
influence is most meaningful and where it affects all citizens. By limiting interpretation by text
and time, the judge will not be applying anything outside the “four corners” of the written words,
such as current norms, to the law.
In a majority of cases, this endorses a constitutional interpretation that is tied to the world
of a new nation with a population of approximately 4 million people, confined to the eastern
seaboard, and a world view 300 years old.100 Furthermore, this also confines interpretation to
what was at the time an untested and unique system of government. Also, when we look to
“public meaning” at the time the Constitution was written, the “public” was only understood to
be a small segment of the population: Anglo-Saxon, male, owners of property including land,
slaves, and wives, educated and Protestant. Another one of the Federalist Society’s core founding
principles: “that the state exists to preserve freedom” is as narrow as is it malleable. "Freedom"
generally revolves around property rights, economic freedom, and free markets. Further, by
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“reordering priorities within the legal system to place a premium on individual liberty, traditional
values, and the rule of law,” the Society simultaneously defines the content of "individual
liberty" and "traditional values" by limiting judges to the "public meaning" in the framers'
generation and allowing only historical sources in the time written for interpretation. The
Federalist Society also decides what is “premium"” as it pertains to the “rule of law.” These
interpretations and definitions of constitutional principles are extremely important when making
legal decisions. However, while “new originalism” may be dominant, some conservative
political and legal leaders still claim to stand for “restraint.” Perhaps, this is because they have
redefined what is considered “activism.” Indeed, there is evidence that justices affiliated with the
Federalist Society have adopted the redefined “judicial restraint.”101
Through the Network, conservative and libertarian principles of constitutional
interpretation made their way into Supreme Court opinions. By 2020, six Supreme Court justices
were known members of the Federalist Society; that was not always the case. Additionally, legal
change does not operate in a straight line from ideas to law. New legal ideas must first go
through a process of legal vetting in order to gain acceptance and be deemed legitimate by those
who are respected as legal authorities to be of use in judicial decisions. The legitimacy of the
Supreme Court requires its opinions to be accepted as valid reasoning. This dissertation
emphasizes the importance of new ideas and how they move through the Network to alter the
trajectory of legal rights and legal remedies in our society through laws.
An external support network can also watch for and act upon “insiders” signals. In the
legal arena, outside activists are always vigilant to signals justices may send to them in court
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opinions alerting readiness to move the law new direction. The Network must be ready to present
the right case, with the right facts, and framed in a suitable way to allow that movement. Janus v.
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 585 U.S. __
(2018) presents a clear example of a response to Alito's signal to Network members that he was
ready to review and likely overturn a 40-year-old precedent. Similarly, before Shelby County v.
Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), Roberts signaled his willingness to revisit the constitutionality of
the Voting Rights Act. In both instances, the Network was ready to respond to those signals.
Their response resulted in the two cases central to this dissertation, Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 585 U.S.__ (2018) and
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
“The Federalist Society” versus “The Federalist Society Network”
The Federalist Society is the unique institution that connects conservative lawyers,
students, professors, and conservatives of various professions, along with the diverse ideologies
within the conservative movement: social conservatives, libertarians, and business
conservatives.102 The Federalist Society is the center of a “Network” where these factions meet,
interact, and plan legal strategy. Through its various activities, the Federalist Society creates a
network of conservative activists throughout the U.S. acting in different roles to spread influence
broadly. The Federalist Society is not shy about revealing the existence of its network. This is
stated proudly on its website: “In working to achieve these goals, the Federalist Society has
created a conservative and libertarian intellectual network that extends to all levels of the legal
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community.”103 What is notable about this network is its expansiveness. It truly does reach to
“all levels of the legal community” and has nearly complete control over Republican presidents’
judicial nominees.
Therefore, throughout this dissertation, I will refer to the Federalist Society (“FS” or
“Federalist Society” throughout) and the Federalist Society Network (“Federalist Society
Network” or the “Network”). The use of the Federalist Society or FS refers to the specific
activities of the group itself or actions taken by an executive in the name of the Federalist
Society. Federalist Society primarily refers to its formative period before the “Network” as such
coalesced into the institution it is today. The Federalist Society Network or the Network consists
of individuals that have repeated associations with or have participated in more than one
sponsored activity as a speaker. Additionally, since the Federalist Society does not publish a
membership list, I will include and augment previous research that has identified key actors
associated with the Federalist Society.104 Network members have been identified in prior work
either through their participation as speakers at Society events105 or media references.106 The
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy publishes the speakers and speeches from the annual
National Student Symposium in the year following the event. It is considered a high honor to be
a presenter at this annual conference. Presenters are considered to be the “true believers.”107
Describing individuals active in the Federalist Society as Network members rather than
members of the Federalist Society conveys the extensive reach and the high volume of
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participants involved.108 It also conveys the wide range of activities conducted by the
conservative legal network that are facilitated by the existence of the Federalist Society. I aim to
capture the changes enabled by the Federalist Society itself. Therefore, the emphasis is placed on
activities and participation rather than being a “card-carrying” member.109
Overview of Methods and Research Questions
The Federalist Society has an enormous influence on our whole legal system. Previous
research has deemed the Network as the supplier and transmitter of the "intellectual capital"
necessary for the conservative turn in Supreme Court jurisprudence.110 This dissertation adds to
this salient issue by documenting how the Federalist Society has meticulously coordinated the
conservative legal structures necessary to narrow the protections afforded by Congressional
legislation under The Voting Rights Act and The National Labor Relations Act. These two
pieces of legislation were passed to aid the disempowered members of our society.
Chapter 1 introduced the Federalist Society, its institutions, and its Network. The
Federalist Society's theory of originalism is also described in this chapter. Chapter 2 reviews
previous research on the Federalist Society and reveals its significant influence. Chapter 3
presents the research question and the Supreme Court cases I have chosen. In particular, I focus
on the legal doctrine surrounding the Voting Rights Act and the National Labor Relations Act.
Chapter 4 explains the methodology, content analysis, underlying the examination of the
Federalist Society’s influence on our current jurisprudence. Chapter 5 explores Shelby County
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and the cases that spawned it and presents the content analysis I use to compare the Supreme
Court majority opinions and Network members’ amicus briefs and Network members’ petitioner
briefs. Chapter 6 examines Janus and the cases that generated it and also presents the content
analysis comparing the Supreme Court majority opinions to the Network members’ amicus briefs
and Network members’ petitioners’ briefs. This comparison shows how the ideas of the
Federalist Society are dispersed and incorporated into Supreme Court opinions and thus into law.
I focus on the Supreme Court majority decision, comparing the opinions to the amicus briefs and
petitioners’ briefs of members of the Network identified through their participation at National
Conferences and other Federalist Society events. It is their scholarship that is compared with the
majority opinions.
I analyze two recent Supreme Court cases that overturned long-standing precedents.
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 585 U.S.
__ (2018), in eliminating “agency fees” assessed by public sector unions, struck down what was
a forty-year precedent set in Abood, cutting off an important source of financial resources for
unions and it is presented in Chapter 5. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) held
unconstitutional the formula used to implement the protections afforded by the Voting Rights
Act of 1964, a law passed by Congress more than four decades earlier and reauthorized with
bipartisan support ever since.111 This decision eliminated the main mechanism for preventing
voting changes that had discriminatory effects and is presented in Chapter 6.
Both cases were controversial at the time of their decisions; both cases were narrowly
decided (5-4) along what is considered ideological lines; and both cases overruled long-
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established precedents. Also, in both cases the Network members worked for decades to limit the
reach of the legislation involved in each case: legislation passed by Congress to expand
protections to voters and workers. Additionally, both decisions directly implicate a particular
demographic of society. Elections, and participation in elections, are key to upholding
democracy.112 The Civil Rights Movement, which included access to the ballot, was a long and
hard-fought battle.113 Unionization too has been a long, often violent struggle.114 Collective
bargaining between unions and employers aims to equalize power by providing workers with
knowledgeable and experienced negotiators to offset the employer’s power.
These decisions were victories for the Network. This was not an abrupt change but rather
a protracted struggle. In both cases, these victories were part of a comprehensive long-term plan
to transform the whole of legal liberalism. It was a case-by-case incremental change that took
decades to come to full fruition and required a team of committed ideologically driven, and
properly trained network members. Tracing the line of cases prior to Shelby County v. Holder
and Janus shows the legal strategy that produced the outcome that the Supreme Court eventually
handed down. This project will outline that process to reveal the strategy.
Most importantly, as others have emphasized, specifically to the Federalist Society115
and more generally in reference to interest groups116 is the importance of ideas. Essential to these
decision outcomes are the ideas or “intellectual capital” that underlay the decisions that, if not
for, made the doctrinal changes possible. This dissertation picks up that emphasis on ideas and
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follows the road taken by the “intellectual capital” produced in the Network. As others have
demonstrated, I will show that replacing judges alone is not adequate to explain changes in
jurisprudence direction.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

The Impact of the Federalist Society on Law
The Federalist Society’s interpretation of the United States Constitution has been
fundamentally adopted into law, which transformed what had once been established doctrine.
Academic writings and the language of Network members have frequently been called upon by
justices to support the legal rationale of Supreme Court decisions.117 This influence has reshaped
the relationship between the federal government and the states, the relationship between the
federal government and its citizens118 and fundamentally changed the position of corporations in
American society under the First Amendment.119 The “Network’s legal theory undergirded the
Supreme Court’s transformation of the traditional understanding of the Second Amendment as a
collective right to an individual right “to keep and bear arms”120 Additionally, Network-affiliated
law firms have won cases that have reversed long-established judicial doctrine regarding labor
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unions121 and voting rights.122 The transformation of anti-trust123 law and frequent use of costbenefit analysis in federal court opinions is a result of the work of Federalist Society affiliated
Law and Economics Scholars.124
In addition to idea diffusion, the Federalist Society has impacted the shape of law in other
ways. The Network members have taken a significant role in the selection, confirmation, and
ideological fortitude of judicial nominees. Starting with the Reagan Administration, this role has
only strengthened in each subsequent Republican administration and has expanded to include
publicity campaigns organized through conservative judicial advocacy groups.125 The Network
has also transformed legal education and public discourse.126 Network members have been
successful in legitimizing their preferred constitutional method of interpretation, Originalism, in
legal circles and have likewise effectively inserted Originalism into mainstream discourse.
Supreme Court justices and even the media often respond to constitutional questions through the
framework of Originalism.127 The shift in focus from the intent of lawmakers or constitutional
authors to the text of the Constitution or statutes128 can also be attributed to the influence of the
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Federalist Society.129 In fact, it may not be too far of a stretch to say that an originalist
framework dominates most constitutional discourse and that in some ways, as Justice Kagan
stated in her confirmation hearing, “…we are all originalists.”130
Ideas Need a Network
The Federalist Society has mostly operated out of the public’s view. As legal scholars,
lawyers, judges, and political actors, Network members do not act on behalf of the Society, but
rather in their professional capacity. To the outside, this gives the appearance of dispersed,
unconnected groups in the legal sphere, and hides the meticulous coordination that goes on
behind the scenes. However, researchers are now beginning to understand that at the center of
these conservative and libertarian legal activists sits the Federalist Society creating the conditions
for conservative legal change.131 The news media and journalists have done extensive reporting
on the Federalist Society’s involvement and the influence it has exerted on legal culture.
Scholars have also begun to note the weight the Federalist Society carries in legal circles.
However, legal change is hard to attribute to the Society directly since it insists it does not take
policy positions itself and is merely facilitating the activism of its members.132 Additionally,
durable legal transformation is more complex than simply replacing the courts with ideological
cohorts. Before new legal interpretations are adopted by judges, they must gain credibility within
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the legal profession. Judges must remain committed to the new philosophical vision and not stray
from core principles. Additionally, a single justice in the U.S. Supreme Court is only one of at
least five needed to form a majority. The change wrought by the Network is not discrete, rather,
the Network has succeeded in implementing a comprehensive change in legal culture, which
complicates direct attribution. As founder David McIntosh readily admits, “There are going to be
untold ways in which notions of Originalism, of limited government, of the rule of law, are being
implemented in thousands of decisions at various levels of government and the community
outside of government.”133
To overcome the difficulty of linking the organization the Federalist Society to Supreme
Court opinions, scholars have introduced variants of network theory to explain the institutional
structure of the legal community and the networks that support those institutions. Recognizing
the importance of “support structures” to legal change, scholars have begun to understand the
reach that the Federalist Society has throughout the conservative legal movement.134 Thus,
scholars have begun to regard the Federalist Society as the hub of a network of conservative
legal activists and ideas, a sort of fueling station for conservative ideas. In the area of economics,
recent research has stressed the importance of ideas and how status quo beliefs can be disrupted
during times of uncertainty.135 To understand the influence of the Federalist Society, we must
trace how new ideas are developed, spread, and ultimately become the foundation of a Supreme
Court majority opinion. However, before these radical new ideas can be used to displace the
status quo, they must first gain acceptance within the community of elites. In other words, ideas
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that were once considered “off-the-wall” must first move to “on-the-wall.”136 The goal of this
dissertation is to explain the movement of ideas from “radical” to law. Therefore, this
dissertation builds on recent scholarship that has examined the pathways and consequences of
ideas.
The Federalist Society as the Conservative Legal Movements’ “Facilitator”
A variety of scholars have begun “connecting the dots” to demonstrate the many ways
that the Federalist Society drives the conservative legal movement. The Federalist
Society connects conservative and libertarian legal educators, students, lawyers,
members of the judiciary, activist law firms, and other conservative think tanks and
advocacy groups to create the opportunity for its members to make constitutional
change and shape the language and content of legal opinions.137
Teles (2008) describes the obstacles conservatives faced in their attempt to
deinstitutionalize the legal network that coalesced to support the liberal consensus that followed
the New Deal and continued through the Civil Rights Era. Teles draws on Charles Epp’s work to
demonstrate that transformative legal change requires more than a changeover of justices but
also needs the backing of a strong “support structure” that can displace the existing paradigm and
sustain the new one. In addition to judges on the courts, Teles notes, this support structure
consists of legal elites who validate legal theory, i.e., law professors and members of bar
organizations, as well as the gatekeepers to the legal practice and its intellectual substance such
as law school faculty, staff, and again the professors who teach law. This structure also includes
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litigants that advance legal issues in court framed in a specific way. Also important are
ideologically compatible funders willing to forgo immediate rewards for the larger conservative
and libertarian goals.138
Teles argues that the Federalist Society is this organizing structure for the conservative
legal movement. As he claims, the Federalist Society is the “network linking conservatives in
advocacy organizations, government, private practice, the Republican Party, legal academy, and
courts.”139 Teles considers the Federalist Society’s most critical contribution to the conservative
legal movement is not direct involvement in policy, but its focus on “facilitating the activism of
its members and influencing the character of intellectual debate.”140 This narrow mission has
been instrumental in creating the critical “support structure” needed to instigate legal
transformation. The Federalist Society is the central clearinghouse for conservative ideas and the
link between the dispersed components of legal conservativism. By connecting the parts, the
Federalist Society facilitates opportunities for conservatives to politically active to serve the
conservative cause.141 Through its many activities and divisions, the Federalist Society keeps
legal conservatives connected, engaged, and ready to act and work at various levels to insert
themselves in a variety of portals to diffuse information broadly.142 In short, Teles sees the
Federalist Society’s mission as “fostering debate to actively organizing conservatives for
political and legal activism.”143 While the Society itself does not advocate for a particular policy
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or candidate, it does ally itself closely with conservative and libertarian organizations that are
directly involved in political and legal advocacy.144
Teles’ (2008) framework describes the Federalist Society’s role in creating the support
structure for the conservative legal movement. First, the Federalist Society recruits law students
and attorneys, and second invests in the “human capital” of those it has recruited. Also, he
indicates that the Federalist Society through its activism, created the cultural capital and social
capital necessary to sustain the movement.145 Of course, all movements need people who
share similar interests and are trained and educated to aptly articulate those interests. In sum,
Teles’ framework enables an understanding of the many distinct strands of the conservative
movement that are connected through the Federalist Society and how information spreads.
Expanding on the support-structure framework, Hollis-Brusky (2013; 2015) focuses on the flow
of ideas, or “intellectual capital,” beginning within the Network and ending in Supreme Court
opinions. Hollis-Brusky (2013; 2015) characterizes the Federalist Society as a “political
epistemic community” that shares principles and normative beliefs about how society should
organize, how that society is realized, and shares a common understanding of political
disputes.146 These features unite the movement behind a uniform objective and a uniform legal
language while giving individual members the freedom to tackle divergent issue all in service of
toppling legal legalism.
By following individual members’ activities, Hollis-Brusky (2013; 2015)
reconstructs the pathways taken by the Federalist Society’s intellectual resources and traces how
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these conservative interpretations are transferred by members into the legal process and
ultimately into law. Hollis-Brusky (2013; 2015) shows how legal theories, having been vetted
within any number of Federalist Society activities, are ready for usage by the conservative
public-interest law firms (CPILFs) and other network lawyers in their private practices. HollisBrusky explains how Network-affiliated members transfer the arguments constructed within
Federalist Society activities throughout the legal community via case briefs, oral arguments,
amicus briefs, classrooms, and academic journals.147
Since Teles (2008; 2009), other scholars have placed the Federalist Society at the center
of the conservative legal movement.148 The decision by the Society’s founders to organize
around legal debate and unite under broad principles rather than issues has been the key to the
Federalist Society’s success.149 Likewise, Southworth (2008) describes the Society as an
important “mediator group” that functions to unite the different strands of conservatism: social
conservatives, libertarians, and business interest. Other authors note that the early recognition
received from important conservative legal and political figures as well as conservative
foundations was instrumental to its success.
The Power of Persuasion
Similar to other research, Jonathan Riehl’s (2007) study of the Federalist Society
demonstrates “how conservatives have translated theory into practice” through educating
members on shared principles and aiding career placement to ensure results.150 However, Riehl
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(2007), distinctively takes the view of a rhetorical critic and looks directly at what previous
scholars only viewed indirectly. Riehl (2007) views the Federalist Society's influence through the
rhetorical strategies employed by the Society in their quest to persuade others. As a rhetorical
critic, he looks at the communication style of the Federalist Society and the text, the words, the
symbols, and the images used to connect to their audience with the intent to persuade. His
method points to the importance of rhetoric as an approach of the conservative movement in
general as it attempted to persuade two different audiences: the mass public as well as
intellectual elites. Viewing the Federalist Society as the institution for intellectual legal
persuasion, Riehl discusses its use of words, language, and symbols of American ideals to
construct a narrative that resonated with its audience. Like Southworth (2008) and Teles (2008),
Riehl (2007) reveals how the Federalist Society was able to bridge conservative factions through
constructing a narrative about shared grievances and the same broad principles. Riehl argues that
law by its nature is rhetorical. Riehl claims that law is part persuasion; and judges must justify
and explain their decision as authoritative to an audience of similarly situated legal elites.151 He
contends that the emphasis the Society puts on debate is a rhetorical tool, as a way of listening
and including its audience in the enterprise of change. The Federalist Society created a group of
independent thinkers socialized in debate to serve a political ideology.152 Riehl argues that
choosing to structure itself around debate was an extension of its goal of persuasion because
debate engages with alternative perspectives and forces one to listen. Listening allows the
Federalist Society to frame its argument in ways that resonate with opponents and reshape
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popular conventions.153 As Riehl states, “Skillfully deployed rhetoric has allowed conservatives
to reshape the terms of the debate in our national political life, enacting policy that has literally
changed our lived realities.”154
Like the other scholars, Riehl shows that language and ideas matter, and conservatives
have been very adept at reframing legal common sense. They have delegitimized liberal ideas
and legitimize conservative ideas and have made “activist judges” and “legislating from the
bench” common language.155 Riehl explains that the Federalist Society operates at the
intellectual side of the rhetorical continuum, rather than the bombastic polemics of radio and
television pundits. Thus, the Network has upended the liberal consensus in part through its
ability to persuade. He reasons that the Federalist Society is built on persuasion through reasoned
debates and arguments, attacking their opponents through the engagement of ideas.156 Riehl
states, “Like the profession of law, the Society is an institution built on debate and argument—
but plugged into a network of political conservatism. Like NR [National Review], the Federalists
function as a forum, the debating chamber of the right. And as with Buckley’s magazine, the
Federalists operate their debating chamber for the benefit of a politically and ideologically
interested project.”157
The Pathway of Ideas
In line with the aforementioned scholarship emphasizing the power and necessity of ideas
along with their consequences, this dissertation also highlights the ideas behind the conservative
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turn in constitutional interpretation. As these studies have demonstrated, ideas need networks to
be dispersed and implemented. Ideas also need to be framed in a way that will resonate with a
target audience. In other words, people are necessary, but people must be armed with ideas and
supported by a structure that gives legitimacy to the people and their ideas. This structure must
also connect ideas to their audience, move people and ideas throughout the professional
institutions it seeks to transform and a structure to hold the people and their ideas to account.
Finally, the support structure is also necessary to maintain the new ideas and institutions once
implemented.
The Federalist Society was aware that true transformative change would take more than
just placing the "right" people on the courts. The legal "gatekeepers," such as legal professionals
and judges, would have to accept their radical new ideas.158 Therefore, the Federalist Society
provided the venue for intellectual debate for the development of conservative and
libertarian thought with which to educate and socialize its members and constructed a
network to disperse its ideas and its legal actors throughout the legal, political and social
systems. The Federalist Society’s many activities foster continuous interaction between
members within the academy, government, and society to work together to ready the intellectual
resources required for a drastic legal change. These intellectual resources are then carried by
members into academia and litigation. Network affiliated professors teach these principles in law
schools and Network affiliated lawyers transfer these arguments to judges through case briefs,
oral arguments, and amicus briefs.159 In short, the Federalist Society has created a network of
legal conservatives that promote idea production, continuous interaction, engagement, and
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disciplined activists to be ready to take advantage of political and legal opportunities that
appeared.
Components of the Network
The (the Right) People, (The Right) Ideas, and (the Right) Results The “Right” People:
Judicial Nominations.
Appointing judges and legal policy officials who maintain a dedication to shared beliefs
about the Constitution are crucial to reshaping legal culture. As many scholars demonstrate, the
Federalist Society has been successful in keeping its members faithful to the mission. Teles
(2008) contends that the Federalist Society’s decision to commit to broad concepts of agreement
rather than specific issues maintains unity between the conservative factions. He further argues
the Federalist Society moniker also creates bonds of knowledge and trust among associates in the
network based on ideological commitment. Hollis-Brusky (2015) posits this pledge to principles
over issues not only unites factions but also reinforces the core beliefs in individual members and
enables members to serve as a “check” on judicial appointees to also commit to these principles
once appointed to the bench. Scholars also argue that Federalist Society credentials signify a
specific judicial philosophy and reduce uncertainty in the search for ideological hires.160
Ringhand and Collins Jr. (2018) describe how through this reduction in uncertainty, the Network
has changed the content of judicial confirmation hearings while Scherer and Miller (2009)
provide evidence that member judges exhibit more conservative voting behavior.
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Journalists have also dug into the effect the Network has had on legal culture.
Washington Post reporters, O’Harrow and Boburg (2019) report that five out of nine of the
current Supreme Court justices are closely associated with the Federalist Society. In fact, Toobin
(2018) attributes the confirmation of the last four Republican presidents’ nominees,161 to
Leonard Leo, the Executive Vice President of the Federalist Society. Both scholars and
journalists have noted that Justice Clarence Thomas has been and continues to be a frequent
speaker and supporter of the Federalist Society.162 Not coincidentally, as Devins and Baum
demonstrate, these five are more conservative than previous conservative justices.
The philosophical assuredness provided by Network membership along with the
Network’s monopoly on selecting Republican judicial nominees threatens the “Advise and
Consent” role of the Senate according to Ringhand and Collins Jr. (2018). Leonard Leo is not
shy about acknowledging the Society’s role in stacking the judiciary with ideological judges
when he states, “You know, the hearings matter so much less than they once did. We have the
tools now to do all the research. We know everything they’ve written. We know what they’ve
said. There are no surprises.”163 In their studies of the Supreme Court confirmation process,
Ringhand and Collins Jr. (2018) note that hearings for justices have been vital in revealing
information about a nominee’s stance on important legal questions. Hearings function to publicly
“affirm our shared constitutional commitments” and are crucial “in providing public validation
of previously contested, but now well-settled constitutional cases and controversies.”164 The
selection of judicial nominations from the ranks of the Federalist Society has put this function to
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the test. Given Federalist Society's credentials, the nominee's adherence to certain conservative
principles and a specific understanding of the Constitution are already known, therefore, the need
for vetting by Republican Senators is significantly diminished. Ringhand and Collins Jr. (2018)
describe the changes that have taken place since the Federalist Society has taken over the role of
vetting. In general, all judicial nominees refuse to answer some questions but do answer others.
These authors indicate that the trend has been an increase in willingness to answer Senators’
questions. However, Neil Gorsuch, President Donald Trump’s Federalist Society selected
nominee for the Supreme Court, broke from that pattern aided by the Senate Republicans.
Ringhand and Collins Jr. (2018) note that Republican Senators’ opening statements indicated
they were not going to push Gorsuch on questions of substance, and Gorsuch readily followed
their lead. The Republican majority in the Judiciary Committee gave Gorsuch a pass allowing
him to refuse to answer questions on heretofore mainstream case law,165 refusing to answer more
questions than any previous nominee.166 Collins Jr. reports that Democrats could not even
manage to get a firm response on an iconic case such as Brown v. Board of Education. Even
though Gorsuch failed to “offer much of anything of substantive value” and little to no new
information was gained in his confirmation hearing, his Federalist Society credentials provided
all that was needed.167At the same time, these credentials elicited concern and prompted probing
questions from Democratic Senators, which were mostly left unanswered.
As Ringhand and Collins Jr. describe, confirmation hearings have become lopsided
partisan events with the non-nominating party asking tough questions, and the president's party

“Gorsuch stands out quite a bit in the sense that he really got a pass from the Republicans on the Senate
Judiciary Committee in terms of what he was allowed to refuse to answer” (Collins; Grossman 2018).
166
Grossmann 2018
167
Grossmann 2018
165

43

asking the so-called “softballs.” They warn that by allowing judicial nominees to bypass answers
concerning foundational case law “we lose an important tool in ensuring that the individuals
selected to serve on the Supreme Court accept the constitutional settlements reached by each
generation of Americans.”168 Balkin (2005) explains that many of our “constitutional
settlements” are not shared by all Federalist Society members. Therefore, Collins Jr. contends
that this non-responsiveness is “hiding the fact that these are extremely conservative justices that
have been vetted by an interest group that is incredibly good at what it does.”169
The “Right” People: Law clerks
Before the formation of the Federalist Society, conservative judges were limited in their
selection of law clerks. Nevins and Baum (2017) find that since law clerks emerge from the same
law schools that were perceived to be predominantly liberal, law clerks were also perceived to be
predominantly liberal. The Federalist Society changed this situation as well. The student chapters
now provide conservative justices with a supply of potential clerks trained in conservative legal
principles. Clerkships often lead to low-level government jobs and ultimately a federal judgeship
or other influential positions inside the government.
Baum (2014) demonstrates how this change impacted the selection of law clerks. Since
the 1970s, the selection of law clerks by the Supreme Court has become increasingly tied to
ideology. The ideology links between the Justices and their clerks have grown even stronger
starting in the early 1990s. The percentage of clerks selected from lower court judges of the same
party appointing president has increased substantially over time and is greatest for the Roberts
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Court’s justices.170 Baum also shows that conservative justices almost exclusively select clerks
based on ideology (2014). Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Samuel Alito did not hire any
clerks from judges appointed by a Democratic president from 2010 to 2014. One hundred
percent of Justice Scalia and Justice Alito's clerks came from Republican-appointed judges
compared with 70 percent for Kagan and Sotomayor the most among Democratic-appointed
justices.171 In fact, Bach (2001) reports that some conservative judges have considered Federalist
Society membership as a “plus” in their consideration for clerks in that it signals “a particular
philosophy” and these judges “tend to give an edge to people I agree with philosophically.” From
the beginning, the Federalist Society has served as a conservative career “pipeline.”172
Employment, based on group membership, as Bach (2001) noted “smacks of affirmative action
for conservatives,” the very practice that conservatives have attacked for decades. Even more
ironic, conservatives still view themselves as a long-suffering minority fighting the dominant
liberal majority for a place and influence in legal society.173
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The “Right” Ideas: Spreading Ideas to Influence Policy
The Supreme Court's written opinion establishes the law for the parties to the case but
also future litigants. Feldman (2017) tells us that the language of a Supreme Court
decision is important because these words give direction to the lower courts, the other
two branches of government, as well as other legal and political actors. Feldman further
notes that opinions also signal to interested parties outside of the court what issue or issue
dimension the court would be receptive to for future cases or a framing that would gain a
favorable opinion. The content of concurring and dissenting opinions is also vital. Rice (2017)
finds that dissents force the majority to respond to issues raised in the dissenting opinion
broadening the scope of the decision. Thus, both of these scholars provide evidence that court
opinions contain much that future judicial participants consider valuable and are fertile
grounds for interest groups to influence the direction of law. By examining the language and the
content of majority opinions, we can discover the influence of the Network on court decisions.
Interest Groups and The Supreme Court
The Federalist Society is explicit in its mission of “reforming the current legal order”
according to its own set of principles.174 Absent a Supreme Court majority of Federalist Society
affiliated justices, reform is only possible through persuading the justices of the validity of their
arguments. Hollis-Brusky (2015) demonstrates in detail how the Network members aggressively
lobbied the Supreme Court to adopt the constitutional interpretation they put forward. She also
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describes how the Network members’ campaign to persuade entailed the submission of amicus
curiae briefs along with a litigation strategy pursued by its associated lawyers. Thus, one way
that interest groups attempt to shape the law through judicial opinions by submitting amici
curiae. What is more, as reported by Collins Jr., (2018), amicus briefs do have an impact on case
outcomes and justice’s votes.
Early studies of the influence of amicus curiae on judicial behavior focused on the
number of submissions and what types of cases were correlated with a larger number of amicus
curiae. Collins Jr.’s (2018) survey of the literature reports that types of cases receiving the
largest number of amicus curiae are those carrying the potential for substantial impact, those
involving judicial review, and those addressing important issues regarding civil rights, civil
liberties or constitutional law. He indicates that amicus briefs may also be used to supplement
information in cases argued by a relatively inexperienced attorney, a resource-poor litigant, or
when the legal question(s) before the court is more complex. A large number of amicus briefs
signify the importance of the case to the justices, the public and the media. Likewise, cases with
a larger number of amicus briefs are more likely to have concurring and dissenting opinions.
Litigants also benefit from the number of briefs submitted for their cases. Collins Jr. (2018)
notes that the side with the larger number of briefs is more likely to win their case and the
number of amicus is a key factor in the granting of certiorari. Collins Jr., (2018) further notes
that amicus curiae is also widely used to counter the arguments of opponents and to call attention
to the legal actions of groups to aid with fundraising and gaining other support. This was the
early strategy of the conservative public interest law firms.175 Finally, Collins Jr. notes that briefs
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signal to the justices as to which societal interest is aligned with one side or the other and which
group or groups will be affected by the outcome.176
Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt (2013) step away from the traditional study of
the number of amici to examine the role interest group power plays in shaping federal judicial
policy. As to "who" participates, many different types of organizations file amicus briefs, and
while each participates at different rates, no single type of group dominates. Moreover, BoxSteffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt (2013) find that both liberal and conservative positions have
a relatively equal number of advocates participating and most cases have a balanced number of
amicus briefs submitted on each side. They also demonstrate that amicus briefs signal ideological
direction to the justices, increasing the probability justices will decide in a liberal (conservative)
direction as the quantity of liberal (conservative) amicus briefs’ submissions increase.
However, participation may be relatively democratic, but when it comes to outcomes,
powerful interest groups have an advantage in both case outcomes and the content of opinions.
Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt (2013) find that not only do justices respond more
favorably to high-power interest groups in general, but the ideological leaning of interest groups
also affects the direction of the justices' votes. The justices are more likely to vote in the liberal
direction in cases when the liberal interest groups have more power compared to the conservative
interest groups. The alternative scenario is true also, justices are more likely to vote in the
conservative direction when the power of the conservative interests are higher.177 Box-
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Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt (2013) further find that the ideological preference of a
justice is determinative of a justice’s decision, independent of interests involved.178 That is, a
conservative justice is less likely to find in favor of liberal litigant while, a liberal justice is more
likely to vote favorably for a liberal litigant. Interestingly, Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and
Hitt (2013) also find that the impact the interaction between interest group power and justice's
ideology has on the behavior of justices is not uniform across ideologies. All else equal, the
presence of a powerful liberal interest group increases the probability a liberal justice will vote in
the liberal direction, while decreasing the probability that conservative justices will vote in favor
of a liberal litigant.179 However, a liberal justice facing more powerful conservative groups
relative to liberal power also decreases the probability that a liberal justice will vote in favor of
the liberal position. Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt (2013) note this finding appears to
indicate that conservative justices and liberal justices respond to interest group signals in distinct
ways.
Content of Opinions
Quite a few studies have applied plagiarism detection software to compare the language
of the majority opinion to that of the documents submitted by parties to the case,180 friends of the
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court,181 and lower court decision,182 and to compare all three sets of documents together.183
When it comes to the content of amicus briefs, about 33 percent of amici curiae simply reiterate
the legal argument of the litigant it supports, about 25 percent contain new information and 42
percent are a combination of both repetition and new information.184 Corley (2008) finds that
majority opinions borrow the most language, 9.8 percent, from party briefs.185 Corley, Collins
and Calvin (2011) find majority opinions borrow 4.3 percent from lower federal courts opinion
and Collins Jr., Corley, Hammer (2015) report that an average of 2.7 percent language comes
from amicus curiae, while only about 1.1% language from cases cited in the opinion.186 Collins
Jr., Corley, Hammer (2015) additionally find that the Supreme Court majority opinion borrows
the most language from an amicus brief that repeats the arguments in the litigant’s brief,187
followed by those that reiterate the lower court opinion and finally those that repeat the language
found in other amici curiae.188 Collins Jr., Corley, and Hamner (2015), also discovered justices
borrow a greater proportion of language from amicus briefs that are ideologically compatible, are
high quality, i.e., clearly written and written in plain language, are filed by the solicitor general’s
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Dependent Variable: % of language majority opinion adopted from amicus brief (Collins Jr., Corley and Hamner
2015)
182
Corley, Collins, and Calvin 2011
183
Feldman 2017
184
About 25 percent of amicus exclusively provide new information, 33 percent exclusively repeat arguments of
litigants and 42 percent of amicus briefs contain a mix of additional new information and a reiteration of litigants’
arguments (Collins Jr. 2018).
185
9.5 % opinions borrow from respondents’ briefs, 10.1 % appellant brief, average of 9.8% (Corley 2008)
186
Corley 2008
187
Majority opinion adopts more language from amicus that repeat arguments made by other parties: litigant briefs
(30%) lower court (9%), other amici (5%). An increase in an amicus brief's repetition of the litigant brief it supports
produces a 30% increase in language the majority opinion incorporates from the amicus brief. Increase in an amicus
brief's repetition of lower court opinion results in a 9% increase in language adoption; 5% increase from those that
repeat other amicus briefs on the same side.
188
Majority opinions rely most on the arguments of the parties to the case then lower court opinions before amicus
curiae. When the court does rely on amicus curiae those have mostly reiterated the arguments made by the litigant
the amicus is supporting.
Thus, it appears parties and amicus working in tandem have the potential to impact the court opinion and thus the
law substantially (Collins Jr., Corley, Hammer 2015).
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office, or filed by an elite interest group.189 However, they also found that majority opinions
adopt less language from amici curiae if a case is considered salient as measured by the number
of words spoken at oral arguments by the justices.
When it comes to how much language the Supreme Court majority opinion borrows from
the merit briefs, Corley (2008) found the majority opinion will adopt more language from either
parties’ brief190 that is represented by the more experienced attorney, filed by the solicitor
general’s office, and ideologically compatible with the Court.191 A lower percentage of adoption
from a party’s brief results for a political salient case.192
Similarly, Corley (2008) sought to examine to what extent the Court relied more on an
appellant’s merit brief over a respondent’s brief.193 Corley discovered that the Court is more
likely to adopt a larger percentage of language from the appellant’s merit brief when written by
the solicitor general, or a more experienced lawyer than the respondent’s lawyer. An appellant’s
brief that is ideologically compatible with the Court also increases the probability the Court’s
majority opinion will adopt more language from appellant’s brief.194
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Majority opinion adopts 135% more language from Solicitor General, 13% more from state government;
Ideological match to the position in the brief 4% increase in language adoption; 24% more language adopted from
elite interest group
190
Dependent Variable percentage "plagiarized." Independent Variable: Respondents vs. Appellant Attorneys
Experienced, Solicitor General as counsel of record, Attorney from a private firm in Washington, D.C. (Corley
2008)
191
Ideologically compatibility measured by comparing the ideological direction of the lower court decision with the
appellant's brief, then matching the brief's ideology with the ideological direction of the Supreme Court's opinion
(Corley 2008)
192
Political salience measured by whether the case was covered on the front page of the New York Times the day
after the decision (Corley 2008)
193
This measures the probability the court will adopt a larger percentage. The dependent variable is binary (1,0).
The other measures were what percentage of the document the majority will be adopted. The dependent variable was
the percent adopted in the majority opinion.
194
There is a 98 percent probability that the majority opinion will incorporate a higher percentage of the appellant’s
merit brief rather than the respondent’s when the appellant’s merit brief is: 1) written by an attorney from solicitor
general's office, 2) the appellant’s merit brief is ideologically compatible with the Court, 3) appellant is represented
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Recently, Adam Feldman (2017), also using plagiarism software, compared the overlap
in the number of words in the majority opinions written by the Roberts Court compared to the
words in merit briefs, amicus briefs and lower court opinions. Overall, with an increase in amici
curiae, majority opinions will share less language with lower court opinion and party briefs, but
more language from amicus briefs. However, when it comes to the number of amici filed, Collins
et al. discovered, more is not necessarily better if your goal is to have your particular argument
adopted. Collins et al. (2015) found that the justices adopt less language from one particular brief
as the number of submissions increase.195 Relatedly, Feldman (2017) noted that less language is
shared between party briefs and the majority opinion in cases that are politically salient196 and in
cases regarding a question about civil liberties.197 Conversely, in legally salient cases, those that
overrule a precedent or rule a federal law unconstitutional, majority opinions borrow more from
amicus curiae.
In sum, as Corley (2008) reported for litigant briefs, Corley, Collins and Calvin (2011)
discovered for lower court decisions and Collins Jr., Corley, Hammer (2015) for amici curiae,
Supreme Court majority opinions do incorporate language from the different information it
receives albeit in varying degrees: merit briefs foremost, followed by lower court opinions, then

by the more experienced attorney and 4) the respondent's brief is not written by an elite firm in Washington D.C.
The 98 percent probability of using more of the appellant’s merit brief compares to 59 percent probability leaving all
independent variables at their means (Corley 2008).
195
“increase in the number of amicus briefs filed in a case produces a 19 percent decrease in the amount of
information the justices integrate from any one amicus brief”
196
Political salience: opinions share less language with parties' briefs in politically salient, the front page of New
York Times
197
Increase amicus filings lead to less overlap with parties' briefs, less lower court overlap, more amicus overlap.
More party filings decrease words shared with amicus briefs; less language from party briefs in politically salient
cases and civil liberties cases; more words from amicus in legally salient cases
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amicus briefs. Each of these, is a potential portal for an interest group’s influence. Additionally,
as there is more language overlap between the majority opinion and amicus curiae that repeat
that language of the merit briefs, Collins Jr., Corley, and Hammer (2015) conclude there is ample
opportunity for litigants to influence the substance of Supreme Court opinions through their
briefs and in coordination with other amici.
Ideology also plays an important role in judicial decisions. Collins Jr. (2018) indicates in
his review of the literature, that both merit briefs and amici curiae are influential when
ideologically compatible with the Court or an individual justice. Further, Collins Jr. (2018)
reports that the ideology of the litigants or amicus signatory sends a signal to justices about the
interests involved and can serve as another portal of influence for ideologically motivated
interest groups. Additionally, he also finds that large numbers of amici curiae for one side
increases that side’s likelihood of being granted cert or receiving a favorable outcome. BoxSteffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt (2013) show that among interest groups that submit amici
curiae the most influential interest groups that are those with more relative power. Finally,
Feldman (2017) discovers that more language is adopted from amici curiae in legally salient
cases. Thus, the court system features many opportunities for an ideological network of interest
groups, lawyers, law firms, professors, and “friends of the court,” among others to exert their
influence.
(The Right) Results: Supreme Court Decisions
The previous section reviewed the literature to demonstrate how interest groups
participate in the judicial process to sway judges toward a particular position. This next section
will explore some of the ways, through its participation in legal cases, the Network has changed
the shape of the law.
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Avery and McLaughlin (2013), Teles (2008;2009) and Hollis-Brusky (2008; 2013; 2015)
have demonstrated that the Network’s influence on the courts works indirectly through
developing legal theories that judges use to justify an opinion and also through fostering
relationships between other conservative legal actors. The Network’s influence can also be
exerted directly through the appointment of Federalist Society affiliated judges as demonstrated
by Scherer and Miller (2009) for appeals courts’ judges. The goal, of course, was to have the law
match their legal vision, which meant acquiring legitimacy for the conservative and libertarian
interpretation of the Constitution on the courts as well as outside the court and ultimately
adopted by the Justices in their majority decisions. “Ideas need networks through which they can
be shared and nurtured, organizations to connect them to problems and to diffuse them to
political actors, and patrons to provide resources for these supporting conditions.”198 The next
section will discuss how ideas have flowed through the Network to become the basis for a
judicial opinion.
Hollis-Brusky (2008; 2013; 2015) examines the impact of the Network in areas of law
that have seen large doctrinal transformations in the past decade. She traces the Network’s
“intellectual capital” as it moves from members’ written texts and speeches through the Network
into Court decisions to become law. Network members make their arguments for legal
transformation to the broader legal academy and the legal community through published
scholarship in academic journals, and they present their arguments to other network members in
speeches given at national symposiums, individual chapter events, speaker series, and other
Federalist Society events. They also attempt to influence the legal community including their
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Teles 2008, 4
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members through Federalist Society newsletters and other publications. Finally, members
attempt to get their views adopted into law through the submission of amicus briefs and litigants’
briefs in court cases.
These written and spoken words are all expressions of members’ constitutional
interpretation. Federalist Society members share foundational beliefs, and these common
principles unite the conservative factions. The texts and speeches of Network members can,
therefore, be considered representative of the shared underlying principles held by the broader
network and a documentation of their viewpoint. Hollis-Brusky (2013; 2015) applies content
analysis to measure the level of reliance on ideas expressed by the Network in the Supreme
Court majority and concurring opinions. Scores range from “High,” to “Medium,” or “Low” to
describe the degree of idea diffusion from Network to opinions.199 Comparing the content
between Network members’ writings and speeches and Supreme Court decisions under the
Second Amendment, the First Amendment’s speech clause, and federalism, Hollis-Brusky finds
the largest amount of idea diffusion comes when “doctrinal distance is greatest.” That is,
in a line of cases, that case in which the Supreme Court makes a significant break from
established constitutional doctrine, the justices are more reliant on Network legal
reasoning. This was evident in the cases that resulted in abrupt jurisprudential shifts for
the Second Amendment, District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), for the Commerce Clause,
United States v. Lopez (1995) and the First Amendment, Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission (2010).
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Hollis-Brusky 2013
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Reviewing the Network activity around the First Amendment, Hollis-Brusky (2015)
traces many of the theories underlying the majority and concurring opinions’ rationale in
Citizens United directly to the Network.200 Citizens United built on previous cases to expand
what constitutes speech as well as who or what is granted protection under the First
Amendment.201 Hollis-Brusky (2015) reveals, that the Network spent nearly two decades writing,
arguing, and speaking against financial regulations of election spending.202 She discovers that
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion as well as Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion, were
formulated with resources courtesy of the Network.
The Supreme Court’s decision upholding the Michigan Campaign Finance Act in Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990)203 combined with Congress’s attempt to pass
campaign finance reform propelled the Network members into action. Hollis-Brusky found that
Network members began litigating cases to challenge the constitutionality of campaign finance
legislation while simultaneously boosting their arguments in conference panels,204 academic
writings, and newsletter.205 They rejected the decision in Austin and a subsequent case upholding
a federal campaign finance law, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2010),206 and
urged the justices to abandon stare decisis, and overrule these two decisions. They called for a
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Hollis-Brusky 2015, chap 3.
According to the majority, corporations must speak as freely and without restriction in political discourse just as
human citizens. To not allow corporations the same freedom of speech constitutes a type of discrimination (Brown
2015, 155-156, 164-166; Teachout 2014)
202
Hollis-Brusky 2015, chap 3.
203
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) Supreme Court upheld a state law that banned
corporate independent expenditures in support or in opposition to a state candidate.
204
Since 2000, the Federalist Society Free Speech and Election Law Practice Group has hosted a panel at the annual
National Lawyers Convention (Hollis-Brusky 2015, 67).
205
First Newsletter: Free Speech and Election Law Practice Group Newsletter - Volume 1, Issue 1, Fall 1996
206
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 40 U.S. 93 (2003) Supreme Court upheld Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BICRA) Network member Ted Olsen was counsel in McConnell; Citizens United
201
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return to the Court’s 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valleo that first expanded First Amendment
protections to campaign expenditures and from that starting point expand First Amendment
protections to other areas of campaign finance laws and corporate spending. This casting aside of
stare decisis was not deleterious judicial activism but rather necessary to return campaign
finance laws to core First Amendment principles. Hollis-Brusky finds substantial network
members’ participation including lead counsel,207 in the campaign finance case FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life (2007). She reports that the majority opinion adopted the Network’s
amici’s argument to overrule Section 203 of BCRA as applied only to the specific type of issue
ads in this case. However, Federalist Society mentor, Justice Scalia’s concurrence (joined by
Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas) went further and adopted lead counsel James Bopp’s
argument to overrule McConnell and abandon stare decisis as “unworkable.”208 As HollisBrusky points out, Justice Roberts and Justice Alito opted to maintain the traditional definition of
judicial restraint reflecting the debate still between conservative and libertarian factions of the
Federalist Society. However, Justice Alito did indicate in a separate opinion his willingness to
readdress McConnell if later proved to be “unworkable.”209
Hollis-Brusky theorizes that by the time of Citizens United (2010), 210 Federalist Society
affiliated justices Alito and Roberts were ready to join the other Federalist Society affiliated
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Network participation: James Bopp Jr. lead counsel for Wisconsin Right to Life (2007), argued to overrule
Section 203 of BCRA. Ten additional Network members argued to overrule Section 203 as applied; Charles Cooper,
Thompson, Erik Jaffe, Jan Witold Baran, Jay Alan Sekulow, Laurence Gold, Joel Gora, Steven J. Law, Steven
Shapiro, Theodore Olsen. District Court Judge David Sentelle joined lower court’s opinion in favor of WRTL; 12
law clerks: Roberts (majority opinion), Thomas and Scalia wrote separately. (Hollis-Brusky 2015, 78-80)
208
Network member James Bopp lead counsel for Wisconsin Right to Life (2007), FEC v. The Christian Coalition,
No. 96-1781 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1999); FEC v. Beaumont (2003); Randall v. Sorrell (2006) (Hollis-Brusky 2015, 81).
209
Hollis-Brusky 2015, 81
210
Network participants: James Bopp lower court, Ted Olsen at Supreme Court. 13 others in amicus, Meese,
Bradley A. Smith, Charles Cooper, David H. Thompson, Floyd Abraham, James Bopp Jr., Joel Gora, John Eastman,
Laurence Gold, Steven J. Law, Steven Shapiro, Reid Allen Cox, Alison Hayward; 11 clerks (Hollis-Brusky 83).
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justices in full abandonment of judicial restraint in a decision that overturned a century of
precedent.211 The Network’s intellectual capital was presented to the Court by thirteen members
via amicus curiae and as counsel for the petitioner, Citizens United.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, adopted the Network’s arguments
expressed in the litigant brief and echoed in three other amicus curiae. 212 As Hollis-Brusky also
reveals, in addition Justice Kennedy relied on academic articles written by Network members to
justify the Court’s reasoning213 to dispel the common understanding that regulating corporate
speech was based in historic practice.214 Justice Roberts215 wrote “separately to address the
important principles of judicial restraint and stare decisis implicated in this case…” echoing
Network members’ priority of maintaining fidelity to the Constitution over precedent. HollisBrusky (2015) concludes that Chief Justice Roberts had come to fully embrace the Federalist
Society version of judicial restraint, which favors principle over process.216 Additionally, HollisBrusky argues that the dueling between Justice Scalia’s concurrence and Justice Stevens’ dissent
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Hollis-Brusky 2015, 87
Ted Olsen argued to overrule Austin because wrongly decided. His brief cited First National Bank v. Bellotti
(1980) 12 times; Kennedy cited Bellotti 24 times to argue Austin wrong and departed from First Amendment
principles, Ruled First Amendment protects speech no matter the speaker (Hollis-Brusky 84).
213
Richard H. Fallon Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning 2006 cited by Kennedy to
justify ruling on the larger issue rather than the narrow issue initially stated by the parties,
214
Bradley A. Smith Unfree Speech and Brief Amici Curiae of Seven Former Chairmen and One Former
Commissioner of the Federal Election Commission (James Bopp Jr., counsel of record; also signed by Smith) cited
twice; Allison Hayward “Revisiting Campaign Reform” Harvard Journal of Leg 2008 cited twice and Brief of
Amicus Campaign Finance Scholars in Support of Appellant, Citizens United (Alison Hayward, Counsel of Record)
(Hollis- Brusky, 2015 85)
215
“I write separately to address the important principles of judicial restraint and stare decisis implicated in this
case…stare decisis is not an end in itself… Its greatest purpose is to serve a constitutional ideal—the rule of law. It
follows that in the unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more to damage this
constitutional ideal than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that precedent” (Roberts Citizens
United)
216
Hollis-Brusky 2015, 86, 148-9
212
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under an Originalism framework, signals another victory for the Federalist Society in
mainstreaming their legal theory.
The Federalist Society declares that it “is dedicated to the principle[s] that…the
separation of governmental powers is central to our Constitution.”217 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence under federalism and the Commerce Clause has been the subject of sharp
criticism by the Network. Hollis-Brusky (2013, 2015)218 outlines the high priority afforded the
subject of federalism (the topic of the first National Student Symposium) within the Network and
highlights the many subsequent Federalist Society conferences and Network members’ academic
papers dedicated to the Court’s failure to protect the states from federal encroachment and
bypassing the Tenth Amendment.219 Since the 1930s, the Supreme Court had established a
cooperative federalism between the states and federal government and granted Congress broad
authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Hollis-Brusky (2013; 2015) argues that when
the Supreme Court shifted to enforce a federalism in favor of the states, the rationale for this
clear doctrinal turn in federalism jurisprudence was provided by the Network.220 She notes two
prior cases first laid the ground before the abrupt move in United States v. Lopez,221 which struck
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fedsoc.org
Hollis-Brusky (2013; 2015, chap 4)
219
Network alleges that the Court has aided the expansion of the Federal government to the detriment of state
sovereignty and have shifted away from the text and original understanding of the Commerce Clause (Hollis-Brusky
2015, 97). Barnett (2001), Epstein (1987) claim the original meaning i.e., the correct understanding of the
Commerce Clause limits federal power, not enable its growth (Hollis-Brusky 2015, 99). Originalist claim
manufacturing and agriculture are not commerce (Buetler 2015; Hollis-Brusky 2015, 96-102; Rosen 2005). This
view “exist mostly in the speech acts and scholarship of Federalist Society actors” (Hollis-Brusky 2015, 107).
220
Hollis-Brusky 2013; 2015, 103-107; 149
221
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) limited Commerce Clause power; New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992) revived the Tenth Amendment, both bases on federalism and originalism scholarship of the Federalist
Society. Gregory and New York relied on Michael W. McConnell, a Federalist Society member and a recommended
authority on Federalism. Michael W. McConnell, “Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design”, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev.
1484, 1491-1511 (1987). New York also cited J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 197 (2d ed. 1863); The
Federalist No. 42, p. 268 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) and Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 21 (M. Farrand
ed. 1911).
218
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down, for the first time in nearly sixty years, a federal statute as an overextension of Congress’s
commerce power.222 Further, Hollis-Brusky finds not only were the Network’s intellectual
resources central to the rationale of the majority opinion, but also were particularly relied upon
by the two separate concurring opinions. Similarly, these two cases smoothed the way for an
abrupt shift in another area of heretofore settled Supreme Court doctrine under the Tenth
Amendment in Federalist Society affiliated Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Printz v. United
States (1997). Hollis-Brusky (2013; 2015) demonstrates that these decisions that display the
greatest “doctrinal distance” between this new interpretation and the previous interpretation but
also exhibits the highest degree of diffusion of ideas from Network.223
Hollis-Brusky (2013; 2015) has demonstrated through content analysis how the
“intellectual capital” produced by the Network became important to the rationale of Supreme
Court decisions regarding federalism and state sovereignty.224 Hollis-Brusky (2013) rates New
York225 (1992), which laid the groundwork for the distinct shifts in court doctrine as “medium”
for idea diffusion from Network members. Hollis-Brusky (2013) rates Lopez (1995) 226 and

Lens 2001; O’Brien 2008, 588 Volume 1
Justice Rehnquist’s majority quoted Federalist 45, a favorite Federalist Society source of originalism. Justice
Kennedy and Justice O’Connor also referred to originalist sources the Federalist Society views as authoritative.
Justice Kennedy and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence and Justice Thomas’ separate concurrence argued for dual
based on FS Network principles. Federalist Society-affiliated Justice Thomas’s federalism argument invoked
prominent Federalist Society member professor Richard Epstein’s article and Originalism to advocate for “the
original understanding the Commerce Clause” (Hollis-Brusky 2013; 2015, 108-110; Rosen 2005).
224
Hollis-Brusky 2013; 2015
225
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The majority opinion was written by Justice O’Conner. Medium
diffusion via scholarship (Michael McConnel 1987). Network participation: 2 clerks, 2 Justices: Thomas, Scalia
226
United States v. Lopez high diffusion via scholarship, low network participation: 4 amici curiae-Randy Barnett,
Henry Mark Holzer, Daniel Polsby, Charles E. Rice Academics for the Second Amendment brief- 1 litigator Carter
Phillips, 8 clerks, 2 Justices Scalia, Thomas. Rehnquist majority “We start with first principles. The Constitution
creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers” benefits of federalism and limited government cites Gregory
v. Ashcroft.
222
223
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Printz (1997) 227 as “high” in idea diffusion228 in which Network intellectual resources were
central to the rationale of the opinion. As was the case with Lopez for the Commerce Clause,
Printz brought an abrupt change in the Tenth Amendment doctrine.
However, importantly, once these new doctrines had displaced what was once settled
law, the Court could rest on its own precedents in subsequent cases. Indeed, as Hollis-Brusky
(2015) demonstrates, when the Supreme Court invalidated the Violence Against Women Act
under the Commerce Clause in Morrison v. United States (2000), it relied heavily on its own
ruling in Lopez which, of course, had been formulated with the Network’s intellectual tools.229
By this time, the Network’s ideas were well embedded in earlier decisions to allow the Supreme
Court to rest upon its own precedents to overturn the law.230 Likewise, Hollis-Brusky (2015) also
shows how once Justice Scalia incorporated the Network’s coercive federalism into his opinion
to create an “anti-commandeering” doctrine, it was later successfully employed by Federalist
Society affiliated lawyers to challenge the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 567 U.S. 519 (2012).231 The Court was
then able to cite these earlier cases (New York and Printz) to support its ruling in Sebelius. Chief
Justice Roberts’ majority opinion adopted the “anti-commandeering” framework that had been
constructed based on the Network’s scholarship to explain that the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion
was coercive to state sovereignty.232
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Printz v. United States low network participation; high FS network idea diffusion via published scholarship
Medium (New York) high (Lopez, Printz), low (Morrison)
229
Hollis-Brusky (2015, 113)
230
Hollis-Brusky 2013; 2015, 113
231
Brusky 2015, 139
232
Hollis-Brusky 2015, 133-138
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The Federalist Society, formed in 1982, hit the ground running. Teles (2009) explains
that senior members in President Ronald Reagan’s Administration, including high-ranking
officials in the Department of Justice, immediately saw the value of the Federalist Society to the
newly elected Reagan’s project of realigning the Courts. Teles (2009) further demonstrates that
the Department of Justice and the White House hired many graduated members of the Federalist
Society, including the founders,233 who worked closely with top officials to push the President’s
legal agenda. Hollis-Brusky (2008) reviews the speeches, op-eds, and policy prescriptions
written by Society members for senior attorneys in the DOJ and finds that the Network members
were able to spread their judicial philosophy throughout the Reagan Administration from their
positions as assistants to the Assistant Attorneys in the Department of Justice. Additionally,
Hollis-Brusky (2008) points to a series of reports to the Attorney General234 outlining the
guidelines for DOJ policy, which are the same principles espoused by the Federalist Society,
principles such as federalism, limited government, state sovereignty, and constitutional
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Lee Liberman Otis, Special assistant to the assistant attorney general, civil division, Department of Justice, 19841986; deputy associate attorney general, DOJ, 1986; associate deputy attorney general, DOJ, 1986; law clerk to
Justice Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court, 1986-1987; assistant professor of law, George Mason U., Arlington, VA,
1987-1989; associate counsel to President George W. Bush, Executive Office of the President, 1989-1992; associate,
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, 1993-1994; chief judiciary county, Sen. Spence Abraham, 1995-1996;
chief counsel subcommittee on immigration, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate David McIntosh,
Reagan administration as special assistant to Attorney General Edwin Meese III, and as special assistant to President
Reagan for Domestic Affairs. George W. Bush executive director of the President's Council on Competitiveness and
assistant to the Vice President, co-founder of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy and serves on the
Board of Directors. He remains active with several free market and conservative think tanks and grassroots
organizations. David has also had stints at the Hudson Institute and as a Professor of Economics at Ball State School
of Business. Stephen Calabresi Chairman since 1986 of the Federalist Society's Board of Directors, worked in the
West Wing of President Ronald Reagan's White House; was a Special Assistant for Attorney General Edwin Meese
III; clerked for Justice Antonin Scalia on the Supreme Court and Judges Robert H. Bork and Ralph K. Winter on the
federal courts of appeals.
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Report to the Attorney General: Original meaning jurisprudence: a sourcebook / Office of Legal Policy.
[Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, [1987]
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015019842932; Report to the Attorney General: Redefining Discrimination:
“Disparate Impact” and The Institutionalization of Affirmative Action.[Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Office of Legal Policy:1988]http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015015460879; Report to the Attorney General: The
Constitution in the Year 2000: Choices ahead in Constitutional Interpretation / Dept. of Justice, Office of Legal
Policy. United States. [Washington, D.C.] [1988] http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015014943511;
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interpretation based on originalism. Beginning in the Reagan Administration, the Federalist
Society graduates were already making their mark, especially in the area of Civil Rights.
Cokorinos (2003) has argued that many of the “veteran opponents of civil rights and the
young trainees of the ‘permanent revolution’” were hired by the Reagan Administration,235
“many of whom would go on to lead the attack on civil rights over the next two decades.” Other
scholars have documented that Civil Rights was a key area for judicial overhaul in the Reagan
Administration.236 Berman (2015) details the Civil Rights Division’s, under William Bradford
Reynolds and Attorney General William French Smith, objection to the reauthorization of the
Voting Rights Act in 1982. The special assistant to the attorney general that Reynolds and Smith
put in charge to lead the opposition to reauthorization was John G. Roberts,237 future Chief
Justice and the author of one of the Supreme Court opinions this dissertation examines. Another
notable Reagan DOJ alumnus is Associate Justice Samuel Alito,238 the author of the second
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Senior level: Edwin Meese, William French Smith, Ted Olsen, William Bradford Reynolds, Charles Cooper,
Terry Eastland (Cokorinos 2003, 7). “Reagan Justice Department benefited from a large cadre of bright
conservatives, many of them in their 20s and 30s.” Assistant attorney general level - John Bolton and Henry
Habicht. Below assistant AG - James M. Spears, Carolyn Kuhl, Michael McConnell, Roger Clegg, Michael Carvin,
Mark Disler, John Harrison, Gregory Walden, Steve Matthews, Gary McDowell, Steven Calabresi, Robert Syncar,
Patricia Bryan, Fred Nelson, and Lee Liberman. “No department in the administration had such a large number of
able, committed young people, and none was as important in the administration-wide effort to implement the
president's social and political philosophy" (Cokorinos 2003, 8, quoting Eastland, Terry from "Reagan Justice:
Combating Excess, Strengthening the Rule of Law" Policy Review; Fall 1988; 0, 46; pg. 16)
236
Avery and McLaughlin 2013; Cummins and Belle Isle 2017
237
2005 - Present: Chief justice, Supreme Court of the United States; 2003-2005: Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; 1993-2003: Partner, Hogan & Hartson LLP; 1989-1993: Principal
deputy solicitor general, United States Department of Justice; 1986-1989: Attorney, Hogan & Hartson; 1982-1986:
Associate counsel to the president, White House Counsel's Office; 1981-1982: Special assistant to Attorney General
William French Smith, United States Department of Justice (https://ballotpedia.org/John_Roberts_(Supreme_Court);
Decker 2016, 134). 1980-1981: Law clerk, Hon. William Rehnquist, Supreme Court of the United States
238
2006 - Present: Associate justice, Supreme Court of the United States; 1990-2006: Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the 3rd Circuit; 1987-1990: United States Attorney, District of New Jersey, 1985-1987: Deputy assistant
attorney general, United States Department of Justice, 1981-1985: Assistant to the United States Solicitor General,
United States Department of Justice (Ballotpedia https://ballotpedia.org/Samuel_Alito
Samuel Alito cosigned the brief in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 476 US 267 (1986); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 476 US 267 (1986) (No. 841340), 1985 WL 669739 (Avery and McLaughlin 2013, 111; 255 footnote 66)
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Supreme Court case under study in this dissertation. These two men exemplify the “pipeline”
begun by the relationship between Reagan Administration and Federalist Society.239 Avery and
McLaughlin (2013), Cokorinos (2003), and Cummins and Belle Isle (2017)240 argue that the
Federalist Society legal work to limit Civil Rights and affirmative action programs began in
conjunction with the Reagan Administration Department of Justice. Cummins and Belle Isle
(2017) trace the Society’s influence in Civil Rights to an Office of Legal Policy report written by
a young Federalist Society affiliated lawyer in the Department of Justice. The report opposed the
Supreme Court’s “disparate impact” standard for discrimination cases.241 Following the
guidelines in this and other OLP Reports, DOJ lawyers argued in amici curiae that a showing of
intent or purpose was the only appropriate standard to apply to discrimination cases. Many of the
cosigners from Reagan’s Solicitor General Office were Federalist Society graduates, future
leaders of a Federalist Society Practice Group and future Board Members.242 Cummins and
Belle Isle (2017) demonstrate that the Supreme Court ultimately did adopt the Network’s
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Avery and McLaughlin 2013, 111; Berman 2015
Avery and McLaughlin 2013, 121-127, Cokorinos 2003; Cummins and Belle Isle 2017
241
Report to the Attorney General: Redefining Discrimination: “Disparate Impact” and the Institutionalization of
Affirmative Action” (1987) discriminatory act must be narrowly defined as intent and not merely statistical
disparities (CY2002 1988 ch.5).
242
Charles Cooper (https://fedsoc.org/contributors/charles-cooper); Roger Clegg Amici curiae filed for the United
States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Clint
Bolick, Jerald L. Hill, and Mark J. Bredemeier filed a brief for the Center for Civil Rights as Amicus Curiae.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 644, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2118, 104 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1989)
Ted Olson, former Federalism and Separation of Powers practice group Hopwood v. Texas ended affirmative action
at the University of Texas; former head of the Office of Legal Counsel under Reagan 1981-1985, replaced by
Charles Cooper (Cokorinos 2003, 60). 2012 Executive Committee of the Civil Rights Practice Group included
Roger Clegg (Center for Equal Opportunity), William Maurer (Institute for Justice), Curt A. Levy (Committee for
Justice), Sharon L. Browne (Pacific Legal Foundation), and Todd F. Gaziano (Heritage Foundation) (Avery and
McLaughlin 2013, 121); Michael Carvin, chairman-elect Civil Rights practice group Reno v. Bossier Parish School
District limited DOJ's ability to create majority-minority districts, restricted use of race in local redistricting (Bach
2001; Teles 2008, 220). Carvin 1983 to 1985 Reagan Justice Department as special assistant to Charles Cooper,
deputy assistant attorney general in Civil Rights Division, moved to OLC with Cooper in 1985 as his deputy
assistant attorney general in OLC (Cokorinos 2003, 60); William Bradford Reynolds (Board Member)
240
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positions invalidating disparate impact and replacing it with an intent standard in two cases
decided in 1989.243
Avery and McLaughlin (2013) further show that the Network has continued to attack
affirmative action programs in public education244 and public universities,245 and have also
destabilized the validity of “diversity” as a goal in public higher education.246 The Center for
Individual Rights (CIR), a network affiliated law firm that includes former Vice Chairman of the
Federalist Society’s Civil Rights Practice Group, Michael Roseman247 has successfully
challenged affirmative action in higher education admission in three precedent-setting cases:
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Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989) Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States
by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Clegg, Richard
G. Taranto, David K. Flynn, and Lisa J. Stark; for the American Society for Personnel Administration by Lawrence
Z. Lorber and J. Robert Kirk; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Glen D. Nager, Andrew M.
Kramer, David A. Copus, Patricia A. Dunn, and Stephen A. Bokat; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council
by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Edward E. Potter.
Clint Bolick, Jerald L. Hill, and Mark J. Bredemeier filed a brief for the Center for Civil Rights as Amicus Curiae.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 644, (1989)
City of Richmond v. Croson Co. (1989). Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States
by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Clegg, Glen G. Nager, and David K. Flynn; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation
by Constance E. Brooks; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley; for the
Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., by G. Stephen Parker; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al.
by Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 475, 109 S. Ct. 706,
713, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1989)
244
Harry J.F. Korrell, for Petitioner; Paul D. Clement, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the
Court, supporting the Petitioner; Harry J. F. Korrell, Daniel B. Ritter, Eric B. Martin, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP,
Seattle, WA, for Petitioner. Teddy B. Gordon, Louisville, Kentucky, for Petitioner Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 707 (2007)
245
Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.
1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) Fisher v. University of
Texas, 579 U.S.__(2016)
246
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) ended the use of affirmative action in all states in the Fifth
Circuit (Teles 2008, 220)
247
CIR 1998; Michael Rosman is general counsel at CIR, won a challenge to Violence Against Women Act in
United States v. Morrison (2000). Rosman argued the VAWA which allowed sexual assault victims to sue in federal
court exceeded Congress’ commerce power. CIR’s stated long term strategy is to change the law “by building
precedent on precedent (its own [CIR’] accomplishments, and those established by others)…in addition to the
Hopwood “clones” in Washington and Michigan, CIR's role as plaintiffs' counsel in DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S.
Department of Defense, an attack on federal race-based contracting set-asides, seeks to apply and extend the
Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Adarand v. Pena, which held that race-based set asides are virtually always
unconstitutional” ((CIR) Annual Report 1997 – 1998). Mostly focuses Politically correct speech, affirmative action,
religious liberty Religious liberty landmark case Rosenburg v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia
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Hopwood (1996), 248 Gratz v. Bollinger (2003), 249 Grutter v. Bollinger (2003).250 Avery and
McLaughlin (2013, 110-112) detail how Network arguments251 enabled Chief Justice Roberts, to
end the school district's use of race in school assignments, which were instituted to attempt to
balance the underrepresentation of minority students due to racial housing segregation.252 The
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Michael E. Rosman, Vincent A. Mulloy, Ctr. for Individual Rights, Washington, DC, for Cheryl Hopwood et al.
Theodore B. Olson, Washington DC, Michael E. Rosman, Ctr. for Ind. Rights, Washington, DC, Joseph A. Wallace,
Elkins, West VA, for Hopwood and Douglas W. Carvell. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)
249
Kirk O. Kolbo, Minneapolis, MN, for petitioners. Theodore B. Olson, Great Falls, VA, for the United States as
amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioners; Michael E. Rosman, Hans Bader Center for
Individual Rights, Washington, D.C., Kerry L. Morgan, Pentiuk, Couvreur & Kobiljak, P.C., Wyandotte, MI, David
F. Herr, Counsel of Record, Kirk O. Kolbo, R. Lawrence Purdy, Michael C. McCarthy, Kai H. Richter, Maslon,
Edelman, Borman & Brand, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for petitioners Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 247–48,
(2003). Gratz limited affirmative action usage in undergraduate admission at Michigan University (Teles 2008,
220).
250
Kirk O. Kolbo, Minneapolis, MN, for petitioner; Theodore B. Olson, for United States as amicus curiae, by
special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioner; Michael E. Rosman, Hans Bader Center for Individual Rights,
Washington, D.C., Kerry L. Morgan Pentiuk, Couvreur & Kobiljak, P.C., Wyandotte, MI, Kirk O. Kolbo, Counsel
of Record, David F. Herr, R. Lawrence Purdy, Michael C. McCarthy, Kai H. Richter, Maslon, Edelman, Borman &
Brand, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for petitioner Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 310, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2331, 156 L.
Ed. 2d 304 (2003). Gutter challenged affirmative action usage in law school admission at Michigan University, only
onvote away from winning a majority (Teles 2008, 220).
251
Harry Korrell represented the Parents association in litigation and argued the case to the U.S. Supreme Court with
Daniel Ritter, both are partners in the Seattle office of the national law firm Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP.
Harry J.F. Korrell “Civil Rights No Big Surprise: A Review of the Seattle Schools Case” Engage Volume 8, Issue 4,
October 2007 “Equal protection rights are individual, personal rights, (Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (“the Fourteenth
Amendment ‘protect[s] persons, not groups’”) (emphasis in original, quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227). Therefore,
each student affected by the operation of the preference suffered an injury under traditional equal protection
analysis: an infringement of her personal right to be free from race-based decision-making by government, and the
denial of an otherwise generally available benefit (the opportunity to choose her high school) solely because of her
race. The en banc majority abandoned this bedrock principle of constitutional law and treated equal protection
rights as group rights This group rights analysis was contrary to the established understanding of the right to equal
protection as a personal right (Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (“At the heart
of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens
as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 230 (“any individual suffers an injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the
government because of his or her race, whatever that race may be.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (“the fact
of equal application [of a miscegenation statute] does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of
justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.”)
(16 Engage Vol. 8, Issue 4)
252
Avery and McLaughlin 2013, 110-112 citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, (2007) “…our precedent, which makes clear that the Equal Protection Clause ‘protect[s] persons,
not groups,’ Adarand, 515 U. S., at 227 (emphasis in original). See ibid ‘[A]ll governmental action based on race—
a group classification long recognized as ‘in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited,’ Hirabayashi v.
United States (1943) should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal
protection of the laws has not been infringed” Metro Broadcasting (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur Constitution
protects each citizen as an individual, not as a member of a group” Bakke (Powell, J.) (The Fourteenth Amendment
creates rights “‘guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights'”). This fundamental principle
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Supreme Court majority opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, et al., (2007) written by Chief Justice Roberts adopted the Network’s stance that
the only legitimate use of racial criteria is to counter intentional and specific discrimination not
to remedy historical or societal discrimination.253 Roberts also adopted the Federalist Society
Network’s redefinition of Civil Rights leaders’ concept of “colorblindness.”254
Summary
The Federalist Society’s founding mission is to reform the law. To accomplish this, it has
invested in a long-term strategy that entails training judges and justices, lawyers, clerks, amicus
curiae, scholars, and many others to contribute their individual part to the Network’s drive for
legal change. Teles (2008) assembled the pieces of the conservative legal network and
positioned the Federalist Society as the “facilitator.” Scherer and Miller (2009) demonstrated
how Federalist Society member judges in the Appeals Court are uniquely more conservative in
comparison to nonmember judges. Avery and McLaughlin (2013), Cummins and Belle Isle
(2017), Hollis-Brusky (2008; 2013; 2015) and Hutchison (2017) focused on a specific area of
law and traced the impact of the Network. Avery and McLaughlin (2013) examined the legal
rulings in “takings clause” cases and property rights as well as affirmative action. Cummins and

goes back, in this context, to Brown itself. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99
L.Ed. 1083 (1955) (Brown II) (“At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools ... on
a nondiscriminatory basis” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742–43, (2007).
253
Avery and McLaughlin 2013, 110-112; Cummins and Belle Isle 2017
254
Avery and McLaughlin 2013, 99; Berman 2015; Riehl 2007. For an opposing view on the Court see Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent in Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 829–30 (2007).
(“There is reason to believe that those who drafted an Amendment with this basic purpose in mind would have
understood the legal and practical difference between the use of race-conscious criteria in defiance of that purpose,
namely to keep the races apart, and the use of race-conscious criteria to further that purpose, namely to bring the
races together…Although the Constitution almost always forbids the former, it is significantly more lenient in
respect to the latter … I can find no case in which this Court has followed Justice Thomas’ ‘color-blind’ approach.
And I have found no case that otherwise repudiated this constitutional asymmetry between that which seeks
to exclude and that which seeks to include members of minority races.” )
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Belle Isle (2017) documented the opposition to the “disparate impact” standard held by
Federalist Society members that was revealed in their work for the Reagan Department of
Justice. Hollis-Brusky (2008; 2013; 2015) and Hutchison (2017) each dug in further to analyze
the content of Supreme Court majority opinions to reveal the overlap in language borrowed from
members of the Network. Hollis-Brusky (2015) documented the relationship between the
Network’s legal ideas as adopted in the language of the Court under the “Commerce Clause” and
federalism along with state sovereignty (2013). Hutchison (2017) applied a content analysis to
reveal the connection between Law and Economic scholars and the change in anti-trust doctrine
that occurred in the 1980s. As this literature review outlines, scholarly research substantiates that
the Network’s legal language has been incorporated into many judicial decisions.255 More
importantly, the Network’s conservative interpretations having been adopted, have changed the
law and in doing so, changed the relationships between individuals and the federal government,
individuals to each other, and individuals to the state.256
Additionally, prior research reveals that interest groups frequently attempt to transform
the law by challenging specific issues and by writing amici curiae to convince the justices to
adopt their perspective in the opinion.257 Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt (2013)
demonstrated that interest groups can and do hold influence through the submission of amicus
curiae, while Corley (2008) finds that the Court also relies on litigant briefs in writing its
opinion. Teles (2008) also shows us that the members of the Network have been and continue to
be actively involved in litigating before the courts and in writing amicus curiae. In sum,
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submitting amicus curiae and challenging specific laws in court, provides an opportunity for the
Network to exert influence on the law through Supreme Court opinion, either working alone but
especially in coordination with Federalist Society affiliated interest groups and law firms.
This chapter reviewed the literature on interest group participation and influence in the
judicial process. I also discuss the impact of the Network in specific areas of law such as
federalism, the “Commerce Clause,” and Civil Rights to begin developing the thesis that the
Network, through amicus curiae and litigation, has been influential in shaping the law in key
areas. This dissertation builds on these two areas of judicial policy research. Following the
scholars reviewed in this chapter, I show the Federalist Society as an incubator of conservative
and libertarian ideas and the mechanism for their diffusion. The Federalist Society, per se, claims
not to weigh in on issues but instead has created a Network to connect its members to carry out
this function.
Judicial policy research primarily focuses on the winners and losers in cases rather than
on the legal rules established. It is important to consider not only who is affected by the Court’s
decision but how those groups are affected. The answer to how a group is affected is not always
clear by knowing who wins and who loses. The Supreme Court may rule narrowly on an issue,
rendering a ruling that applies only to the actual litigants and not as broad policy. Conversely, the
Court may issue a ruling that applies broadly to large swaths of people. Knowing only who won
and who lost does not tell us how far the effects of the decision spread. Secondly, the outcome
does not tell us how the ruling will be implemented, or how the law is affected and does not alert
observers to the presence of “time bombs” within the opinion that may be employed in a later
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case.258 Additionally, outcomes do not reveal if the decision contains dicta which can be seized
by a future justice or litigant. For this information, we must look to the language of the opinion.
For example, the language stated in dicta in Northwest Austin became the rationale for the
decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) while the language in the opinions just
prior to Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31
585 U.S. (2018) clearly indicates a majority of the Court was ready to review its earlier
precedent. In both instances, this language is missed when only focusing on winners and losers.
Finally, if the Network has an outsized influence on judicial opinions, this is relevant to the
language of the law and implicates the rule by the people in a republic. This dissertation expands
the research of interest group activity on Supreme Court decisions by focusing on the substance
of its decisions rather than on the outcome of these decisions.
Scholars have provided evidence of the Network’s influence on the legal community and
other scholars have documented a shift to the right in the Court’s jurisprudence. While
acknowledging a rightward shift in court doctrine, most judicial studies concentrate on justices’
“votes” (liberal vote or conservative vote) or the winner and loser (business winner or individual
winner) in a case rather than on the new or different ideas presented in the language of the
opinion. Thus, it is well recognized that the Court has lurched rightward in a broad sense
prompted by the replacement of the more liberal justices with a more conservative cohort.
However, beyond the changeover in personnel resulting in more consistent “conservative”
outcomes, to what extent has the substance of the law changed? Does a “conservative” decision
mean the same thing that it meant in the past? For example, are all of the Court’s current justices
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- appointed by Democratic and Republican presidents alike - more conservative than those
justices were in past Courts?259 The Republican appointees have moved much further to the right
than their earlier cohorts. What a more conservative court with an even more conservative
majority means for the actual language of the law is less examined. What does this more strident
conservatism under justices that have now adopted the Network’s version of judicial restraint
tied to Originalism mean for the substance of the law now and in the future?
Recently, scholars have begun to connect the Network with the Federalist Society as its
hub to the rightward shift in the courts. Scholars and the media alike are beginning to understand
just how far the Network reaches. However, it is even more recently that we are beginning to
recognize that the Federalist Society is not merely replacing judges but is also developing the
legal rationale for unsettling established law. In order to dig deep into the extent of the Society’s
influence, researchers are increasingly focusing on specific areas of the law it is influencing.
Avery and McLaughlin (2013) examine five different areas of the law in which the Network has
had significant impact, and while they provide valuable insight, they give a general overview but
do not dive deeply into overlapping language between the Network’s provided arguments and
Supreme Court opinions. Hutchison’s (2017) content analysis of anti-trust law does compare the
language of Supreme Court opinions with Law and Economic scholarship but is specific to
antitrust and he does not connect his research with the Federalist Society. To date, it appears that
Hollis-Brusky (2013; 2015) may be the only scholar to do a deep analysis of the conservative
turn in law that is tied to the Federalist Society and based on the language of the opinion in
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comparison to the writings of Network members. Her study was limited to the areas of
federalism, campaign finance, and the Second Amendment.
I examine two areas of law that have been transformed but not yet connected to the
Network. Neither the challenges to Voting Rights Act nor challenges to unions’ funding
mechanisms have been studied in connection to the Network. This dissertation expands the scope
of legal areas impacted by the Network. Additionally, I expand on the emerging judicial studies
that apply content analysis to Supreme Court opinions. However, rather than plagiarism software
often employed, I use atlas.ti which allows for a deeper analysis of text documents. The next
chapter will elaborate on these points further as I develop my research questions.
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Chapter 3
Research Questions and Cases Introduction
The central question of this dissertation is to what extent has the Federalist Society
impacted the laws of the United States of America. The specific hypothesis is that the Network
has influenced the direction and articulation of the law on voting rights and unionizing. For four
decades, the Network has promoted conservative and libertarian interpretations of the
Constitution in an attempt to have those principles accepted by judges, legal educators, the legal
community as well as the media.260 Network members also initiated litigation and participated
as amici curiae to directly influence judges’ decisions. Their activism has paid off. Chapter 2
reviewed the literature demonstrating that the Supreme Court has indeed adopted the positions
put forth by the Network generally. This dissertation aims to expand the realm of studied legal
areas to voting rights and union organizing. I focus on the extent to which the Supreme Court has
adopted the language, the rationale, and the principles of the Network in two distinct lines of
cases one of which culminated with Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) and the other
in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 585
U.S. __ (2018). I apply a content analysis of these two Supreme Court majority opinions and the
preceding cases upon which they built to ascertain the influence of the Network. This chapter
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Avery and McLaughlin 2013, 5; Deparle 2005; McCauley 2017. The Federalist Society hired a public relations
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explores this process further, explains how I identify Network members, and also introduces the
two Supreme Court cases I have chosen to analyze.
Changes in constitutional jurisprudence develop gradually over time through the
combined actions of political, legal and social movements. Balkin (2005)261 argues that what is
understood as “off-the-wall” or “on-the-wall” in Constitutional jurisprudence changes through
the combined actions of the courts, educators, politics, and elections, as well as social
movements and the legal culture. Social and/or legal conventions may deem prior practice as
outdated or no longer acceptable and the courts adapt.262 Judicial studies acknowledge a shift in
the Supreme Court from a “liberal” era to a “conservative” era starting around the mid to late
1970s.263 To explain this shift, researchers initially focused on the presidential appointments and
the replacement of a Supreme Court justice with a more/less liberal/conservative.264 These
studies generally focus either on individual justices’ “votes” to classify as liberal or conservative
or the overall outcome, which party won/loss, which is labeled as liberal or conservative. For
instance, Segal and Spaeth (2005) demonstrated the link between a justice’s ideological
preference and his or her ruling in a case. Other studies focus on the ideological direction of the
case’s outcome265 or which side wins.266 Coates III (2015) examines outcomes to find that

Balkin 2005, 2, “…the conventions determining what is a good or bad legal argument about the Constitution,
what is a plausible legal claim, and what is “off-the-wall” change over time in response to changing social, political,
and historical conditions. Although at any point in time legal materials and the internal conventions of constitutional
argument genuinely constrain lawyers and judges, these materials and conventions are sufficiently flexible to allow
constitutional law to become an important site for political and social struggle. As a result, legal materials and
conventions of constitutional argument change in response to the political and social struggles waged through them.
The internal norms of good constitutional legal argument are always changing, and they are changed by political,
social, and historical forces in ways that the internal norms of legal reasoning do not always directly acknowledge or
sufficiently recognize”
262
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business and corporations are the biggest winners under the First Amendment displacing
individuals and group rights. Ash, Chen, and Naidu (2018) find that after attending a judicial
seminar hosted by Law and Economics scholars, “judges significantly increase their use of
economic language…render conservative verdicts in economic-relevant cases…are more likely
to rule against regulatory agencies.”267 Further, attendance at a Law and Economics seminar “is
associated with harsher prison sentences imposed.”268 What’s more, attending judges circulate
these economic analyses throughout the judiciary. Ash, Chen, and Naidu (2018) find that nonattending colleagues also begin to use more economic language in their opinions.269
However, while the influence of ideology on a justice’s decision and who wins and who
loses is important, it does not tell the whole story. A focus on ideological direction of decisions
or the winners and losers does not further our understanding of how legal theories once deemed
radical or “off-the-wall” became not only acceptable and legitimate but were elevated to serve as
the legal foundation for a Supreme Court decision. Nor does this focus explain how a justice
constructs an opinion or what resources are influential on that judge. As Feldman (2017)
explains, the judicial behavior literature “often does not inquire into the written decisions or
more specifically into the justices’ range of options for how these decisions are constructed.”270
The content of the majority opinion aids in our understanding of the intellectual thought and
intellectual influences behind the law. “The ‘construction’ of an opinion is said to be ‘the core of
appellate judging.’ ‘[W]hat judges say is even more important than how they vote. A case's legal
reasoning ‘can have more far reaching consequences [than the outcome] by altering the existing
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state of legal policy and thus helping to structure the outcomes of future disputes.’”271 Since “it is
the content of the opinion that ‘constitutes the core of the Court's policy-making process’… it is
important to examine the language of Supreme Court decisions and not just the ideological
direction of their results.”272
Content analysis has been increasingly applied to studies in public law. A content analysis
can compare two sets of documents to measure their similarity and the overlap in language and
principles. Applied in this dissertation, content analysis comparing documents from the Network
with majority opinions can reveal that the ideas of the Federalist Society have migrated into
Supreme Court opinions and ultimately became law. Laver, Benoit, and Garry (2003) introduced
an approach to analyzing the content of texts that used words as data. Their technique differed
from previous approaches “by treating texts not as discourses to be read, understood, and
interpreted for meaning…but as collections of word data containing information about the
position of the texts’ authors on predefined policy dimensions.”273
One of the earliest to apply content analysis to Supreme Court opinions was McGuire and
Vanberg’s 2005 study. McGuire and Vanberg (2005) applied Wordscore to examine the
ideological content of opinions regarding the First Amendment’s religion clauses and Fourth
Amendment search and seizure guarantees. Wordscore does not interpret the meaning of text but
counts the occurrence of words in texts to look for similarities. Cross and Pennebaker (2014)
measured not the content but the linguistic style of the Roberts Court opinions using Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC). They looked to assess the sentiment expressed in Court
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opinions. Cross and Pennebaker found that concurring and dissenting opinions have more words
of certainty than do majority opinions, but the three types of opinions demonstrated little
difference in use of anger or positive words. Rice (2017)274 employed content analysis to study
the strategic use of dissents to shape the content of the majority opinion. Rice found the presence
of dissents increases the number of topics addressed by the majority forcing the majority to
address an alternative issue. As reviewed in Chapter 2, scholars have increasingly applied
plagiarism software to analyze the similarity between the language in court opinions and legal
resources. 275In general, however, text analysis is still relatively new in the study of court
opinions.
While the language contained in Supreme Court opinions is increasingly being examined,
less attention has been given to the intellectual thinking that underlies the decisions or where the
ideas originate. Hidden is the conservative turn of the Court is the Federalist Society. The
Federalist Society itself claims to be nonpartisan and nonpolitical. However, scholars have
demonstrated that it is the networking structure for the conservative legal movement276.
Moreover, as the statement of principles declares, the Federalist Society was clearly created to
advance the conservative and libertarian ideology.277 Much of the Court’s movement to the right
of the ideological spectrum has its foundation in the theories developed by the Federalist
Society.278

topic models use a probability distribution of the words in a text grouped into “topics.”
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Identifying the Federalist Society Network
I compare the briefs written by members of the Network to the majority opinions in
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) and Janus v. American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 585 U.S. (2018). Specific members are identified
as some of the most active participants at the annual National Conferences, prolific writers in
Federalist Society publications, and those who are involved in one or more of the Federalist
Society Practice Groups. To identify Network members, I search the Federalist Society’s
activities to locate members who are frequent participants. I review the list of speakers at the
national meetings, those who regularly contribute to the practice groups’ newsletters, and
participants in the practice groups’ forums, the student chapters’ talks, and lawyer divisions’
meetings. The goal is to reveal the Supreme Court’s adoption of Network principles in these two
opinions.
There are a few sources that were used to identify the members of the Network. Each
year, the Federalist Society hosts its National Student Conference and its National Lawyers
Conferences. Invited speakers signal the top tier in the Federalist Society hierarchy -- the “‘rock
stars’…of the network.”279 These members are usually those most active among the Network in
their legal activism and hold elite positions in academia, the legal profession, government or the
judiciary.280 Since 1982, the National Student and the Lawyers Conferences publish their
programs annually in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy along with other various
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legal academic journals. The program includes a list of that year’s speakers. I identify members
by examining the list of speakers at each event between 1982 and 2013. I chose 2013 as the final
year since that is the year each case was heard. The Practice Groups organize discussion panels
in its legal specialty at the annual National Lawyers Convention. The Practice Groups
particularly pertinent to this dissertation are the Labor and Employment Practice Group and the
Free Speech and Elections Practice Group. Therefore, in ascertaining members, I pay particular
attention to events which concentrate on labor and union activity and on voting rights.
Practice Groups also publish a biannual journal that updates members on legal
developments by practice group area and contains articles written by members of the Practice
Groups.281 First called the Practice Groups Newsletter (1996-2000), it became Engage: The
Journal of the Federalist Society's Practice Groups (2001-2015) and today is called The
Federalist Society Review (2016- present). Additionally, individual Practice Groups host in
person events and Teleforums, and members write blog posts and speak at student chapters
across the nation. These Practice Group events feature the most high-profile leaders in the
Network. These events are listed on the Federalist Society’s website and further aid in
identifying members of the Network. The above sources serve as a guide to determine the
members of the Network. From these sources, I identify the writers of the amici curiae and
attorneys in the cases as Network members.
Having identified which brief writers are Network members, I turn to the legal arguments
presented to the Court. I review the legal briefs filed by network members as a litigant to the case
and also as amicus curiae on behalf of an interest group, a think tank or conservative public
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interest law firm connected to the Federalist Society. It is here where Network members present
arguments to the Court in an effort to persuade. I note individual members’ participation as
amicus curiae, litigant or lawyers, a Supreme Court law clerk and even as a Supreme Court
justice.
A Network member may participate as either a Supreme Court justice, a Supreme Court
clerk, a lower court judge, amicus curiae, a litigator or as an academic source cited in the
majority opinion. In all of these ways, ideas travel from inception to judicial outcome through a
legal network. As previous research substantiates, the Network has applied this strategy with
much success.282 Identifying Network members’ activity in the judicial process highlights how
their ideas are transferred; a content analysis demonstrates the diffusion itself through noting the
incorporation of the Network’s language, principles, core concepts and ideas by the Supreme
Court majority opinion writer.
The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion is the written explanation of the Supreme Court’s ruling, its
justifications and a statement of the law henceforth. The majority opinion explains the ruling to
the public and is binding on future actors. It contains the underlying constitutional and legal
principles that justify the ruling. Therefore, the language and the legal justifications chosen are
important in understanding the ruling as well as its origins and how or if, the basis of law has
evolved.283 The Supreme Court’s majority opinion reveals the ideas behind the legal rationale.
Given its influence on the law in the United States, this dissertation focuses only on the majority
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opinion. As such, I apply a content analysis just to the majority rulings in Shelby County v.
Holder and Janus v. AFSCAME and the main cases each opinion cites as the basis of its decision.
Supreme Court Cases Selected
One of the ways The Network changed the shape of law was to instigate test cases to
present their legal theories in court. Through these cases, and the arguments presented in their
briefs and oral arguments, the Network created a legal record that could be employed in later
cases and eventually relied on by judges. By establishing their legal theories in both case law and
garnering legitimization in legal academia, these legal arguments could then “safely” be adopted
by the Supreme Court as the core reasoning of their decisions. As Hollis-Brusky (2013; 2015)
demonstrates, once the Court adopted these theories the justices had established a new precedent
giving the Court the ability to later quote itself. In this way, the Network provides the arguments
the Supreme Court can use to ground their decisions when reshaping doctrine while creating new
precedents to later cite and reinforce in law.
This process is exhibited in the Supreme Court decisions Janus v. American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31284and Shelby County v. Holder.285 Janus
struck down what was a forty-year precedent that allowed public sector unions to collect “agency
fees” to cover costs associated with collective bargaining from nonunion workers. Union work,
such as contract negotiation and grievance resolution benefited all workers, including nonunion
members that do not pay union fees. “Agency fees” were a compromise between paying full
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union dues and “free riding” workers. Janus struck down this middle position which cut off an
important source of union funds.
Shelby County struck down the formula used to implement the protections afforded by
the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965, thus rendering the VRA impotent.286 The most recent
iteration of the VRA was passed by Congress in 2006 and reauthorized for another 25 years. For
over four decades and including the 2006 reauthorization, the VRA was passed with bipartisan
support. However, beneath the external bipartisanship shown in the congressional vote was
growing opposition to the VRA within a segment of the Republican Party.287
I chose these two cases to study for a few reasons. First, neither outcome was sudden,
rather both of these cases were the result of a protracted struggle. The Network had been
attempting for decades to limit the reach of the VRA and The National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). Both cases are one piece of a comprehensive plan to transform legal liberalism. Even
before the formation of the Federalist Society, the VRA and NLRA were targets of
conservatives.288
Second, these two cases were controversial at the time of the decision, both cases were
narrowly decided (5-4 split), and both cases overruled long established precedents. Additionally,
each majority opinion was authored by a Federalist Society affiliated justice. These two cases
were not chosen because the authors of the opinions are close associates of the Federalist
Society. I chose these two cases because of the disruptive nature of the decisions and the
polarized reaction to each. The celebration on the right and the mourning on the left mirrors the
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close split on the court and the spirited dissents each case elicited. That both were authored by a
Federalist Society affiliated justice can be looked upon as random chance or perhaps more
properly as the inevitable outcome given the forty-year mission of the Federalist Society to
appoint conservative/libertarian justices and overturning what they considered legal liberalism
gone too far.
Furthermore, each case also contradicts the still popular notion of conservative justices as
practitioners of judicial restraint and deferring to the elected branches. These cases and their
surrounding narratives also demonstrate the ability of conservative political and legal leaders to
maintain that they alone are upholding the true Constitution while doing the very same thing they
lambasted the Warren Court for doing, i.e., overturning legislation passed by elected
representatives.289 Conservatives and the Federalist Society specifically have justified their
actions by reformulating an entire doctrine, Originalism. The two cases epitomize the new
judicial “restraint.” The Supreme Court in Janus overruled its precedent set 41 years ago in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,290 which upheld the collection of “agency fees” by unions
from nonunion and otherwise non-dues paying employees who still benefit from union contracts.
In Janus, the abandonment of stare decisis was justified based on Originalism, which was
developed within the Federalist Society. Shelby County ruled unconstitutional the formula that
covered specific jurisdictions that were guilty of the most egregious voting suppression
following the Civil War. Further, since its initial passage in 1965, each subsequent VRA
reauthorization by Congress had been with bipartisan support.291
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Another notable feature is that each majority opinion writer had “signaled” in an earlier
opinion a willingness to review the established precedent for these issues. Justice Alito sent his
“signal” in 2012 in his majority opinion in Knox v. Service Employees International Union292
that he was ready to review and likely overturn Abood. The answer to Alito became Janus, which
is a clear example of Network members’ response to Alito’s signal. Similarly, Roberts signaled
in his 2009 majority opinion in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v.
Holder293 his willingness to revisit the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. As Teles
(2008) demonstrates, one of, if not the most, important role of the Federalist Society itself is its
creation of the Network and its function to facilitate the preparation of the legal intellectual ideas
and the individuals well situated to pounce and take advantage of these legal opportunities. This
dissertation will show that as planned, in both instances, when those signals were sent, the
Network was well-prepared to respond. The result was the two cases central to this dissertation.
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion is also important to interest groups because
ultimately, the majority opinion sets judicial policy. Interest groups not only want to win their
case, they also want to have their own reasoning adopted into law to direct future legislation and
court decisions. Interest groups try to influence judicial decision makers by bringing challenges
to court and by writing amicus curiae.294 Interested parties frame issues in a specific way in an
attempt to convince the justices to adopt their perspective in the opinion.295
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Like other interest groups, the Federalist Society disseminates its legal arguments through
petitions to the Court and amicus curiae, but does so through its members in their capacity as a
scholar, lawyer, or a Network connected organization, a think tank, or law firm.296 Teles (2008)
describes the Federalist Society’s interest and mission to change the law and to prepare the
people and ideas necessary to do so. Additionally, as Chapter 2 reviewed, previous research
demonstrates the Network’s influence in a variety of legal areas.297 However, as Teles (2008)
explains, the Federalist Society’s goal was a complete change in legal culture, thus not limited to
these areas. Currently, there is a lack of scholarship that looks specifically at the Society’s
influence on voting rights and union organizing, however there is reason to believe this research
is a worthwhile endeavor.
Shelby County v. Holder encompassed two principles important to the network: state
sovereignty and coercive federalism. 298In seminar speeches and law review articles network
members characterized federal programs as coercing the states and consistently argued that the
Court should apply a more robust Tenth Amendment to protect state sovereignty.299 The
Supreme Court adopted Network members’ argument and transformed federalism while creating
an “anti-commandeering” doctrine supported by the arguments and scholarship of Network
members.300 Justice Scalia’s “anti-commandeering” doctrine was later employed by Federalist
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Society affiliated lawyers to successfully challenge the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid
expansion.301
Janus implicates the First Amendment, another area of frequent Federalist Society
activity. In particular, the Network was heavily invested in freedom of speech as applied to
campaign finance.302 Members of the Network have criticized agency fees, at issue in Janus, as
violating the free speech rights of non-union members. Network members assert that forcing
employees who choose not to join the union to pay an agency fee for services rendered is
equivalent to compelling the employees to “speak” in favor of the union which the non-union
workers did not support. In fact, the 1998 Practice Group newsletter referred to the “Use of
Union Dues for Political Spending” as number three on the “‘top ten’ list of federal government
efforts to suppress free speech” in 1997 – 1998 term.303 Linking union dues to political spending
and equating money with speaking is a similar connection that the Network made in the
campaign finance cases we saw earlier. Furthermore, the abandonment of stare decisis in Janus
was justified as returning to fundamental First Amendment principles, an argument developed
within the Federalist Society.304
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Thus, the first question is: Has the Federalist Society through its Network influence the
law in the area of voting rights and union financing? This question is tested by the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The Federalist Society Network has influenced the Supreme Court majority
opinion in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013)
Hypothesis 2: The Federalist Society Network has influenced the Supreme Court majority
opinion in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
Council 31 585 U.S. (2018)

The Federalist Society diffuses its “intellectual capital” through its vast Network. Ideas
are developed and debated within the Federalist Society, distributed by Network members
throughout the broad legal community, and presented to the Court in an attempt to influence the
justices. Network members attempt to influence the Supreme Court majority opinion via amicus
curiae. Network members also attempt to influence the Supreme Court majority opinion by
challenging particular laws or legal opinions. Members of the Network have been very active in
both amici curiae submissions and in bringing litigation before the courts.305 Further, the
Federalist Society created its Practice Groups to connect lawyers in the same legal area so that
they could develop strategies and arguments to challenge laws and legislation they viewed as
illegitimate.306 Additionally, as reviewed previously, interest groups are influential on Supreme
Court opinions through amicus curiae and case briefs. Therefore, the second question is: have
Network members been successful in their attempt to influence Supreme Court majority opinions
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through participation in litigation and amici curiae? In particular, has this activism been
influential in the area of voting rights and union organizing?
Hypothesis 3: The Federalist Society Network influenced the Shelby County decision through
its amici curiae
Hypothesis 4: The Federalist Society Network influenced the Janus decision through its
amici curiae
Hypothesis 5: The Federalist Society Network influenced the Shelby County decision through
its litigant brief.
Hypothesis 6: The Federalist Society Network influenced the Janus decision through its
litigant brief.

In testing these six hypotheses, I aim to demonstrate the significant impact the Network
has on U.S. voting laws and union laws. Specifically, this dissertation explores the influence of
the Network on two Supreme Court cases: Shelby County v. Holder 570 U.S. 529, (2013) and
Janus v. American Federations of State County and Municipal Employees, Council 31 138
(2018). Using the content analysis software ATLAS.ti, I compare these two Supreme Court
majority opinions to the amici curiae and litigant briefs written by the Network.

88

Chapter 4
Methodology
The aim of this dissertation is to explore the extent of the Federalist Society’s influence
on the law. Previous studies have revealed the Network’s influence on the U.S. law regarding
federalism and state sovereignty, the Commerce Clause, the Second Amendment,307 disparate
impact doctrine,308 and affirmative action.309 All the preceding areas of law have experienced
major disruptions in established doctrine. One goal of this dissertation is to expand our
understanding of the areas of legal doctrine that have experienced major disturbance in the past
few decades. That goal also entails demonstrating that this disturbance, too, is attributed to the
Network. In this dissertation, I specifically address the Network’s influence on laws regarding
voting and union financing.
The second purpose of this dissertation is to expand the body of research that conducts
detailed content analysis of Supreme Court opinions. Rather than focus on the outcome of the
case as prior studies have overwhelmingly done,310 this dissertation focuses on the content of the
majority opinions and the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court. I examine the amicus curiae
submitted and the majority opinions in Shelby County and Janus. I also analyze the amicus
curiae and the majority opinions in the cases that the majority opinion cites as the basis for the
decision. Rather than examine influence based on the percent of overlapping language between
court opinions and court filings, this study highlights the effect of language adoption itself on the
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substance of U.S. law. This chapter describes the qualitative methods uses to examine the
influence of the Network on Supreme Court majority opinions, in particular, the Network’s
ability to shape voting laws and union funding laws. I compare these opinions to the writings of
Network members to explore their influence on these two opinions.
Content Analysis
The methodology in this dissertation is a content analysis using ATLAS.ti. ATLAS.ti
enables a researcher to compare sets of documents to gauge their similarity. Thus, using
ATLAS.ti I will compare the Supreme Court majority opinion in Shelby County and Janus with a
set of documents emanating from the Network around each of these areas. The purpose of the
comparison is to determine the influence of Network members on these two Supreme Court
opinions and thus their impact on the law. The Network’s influence is measured as the amount of
overlap in language and in principles between the majority opinions and the briefs of the
Network members. To explore the sharing of language and principles, an analysis of the content
of all associated documents is required. I expect this content analysis to reveal that both of the
Supreme Court majority opinions under examination have adopted the principles articulated by
the Network to substantiate its rulings, thus illustrating the Network’s influence on the Court and
U.S. law.
In my search for the methods and software used to conduct content analysis, ATLAS.ti is
the most common one used and is available to this researcher so that will be used for this
dissertation. I also extensively searched Westlaw, LexisNexis and HeinOnline for studies that
detailed the steps taken in conducting the content analysis but was unable to find anything that
granular. I also discovered that content analysis comparing the principles in Supreme Court
opinions to amicus curiae and litigants’ briefs is nascent.
90

Data Analysis
ATLAS.ti is a qualitative analysis software that enables a researcher to analyze text, pdfs,
graphics, video, and audio data.311 All of these sources of information can be imported into
ATLAS.ti and segmented for coding. The purpose of coding data is to explore the relationships
within the data using these codes. To facilitate this exploration, ATLAS.ti reports frequencies to
assess how often a particular concept occurs within and across documents. These concepts are
then grouped into themes to reveal the overarching pattern in the data and to explore the
relationship contained within the data. ATLAS.ti also contains tools that allow the researcher to
create networks to visually display the relationships contained within the data.312 These are the
tools used to look for principles and language shared between documents.
Specifically, I will use thematic coding.313 This approach allows patterns to emerge from
the data rather than selecting codes a priori. When reviewing the documents, my aim is to look
for and identify trends and patterns in the court cases and allow themes to develop rather than
select them before reading the text. I am comparing two sets of documents for each individual
court case. One set is the Supreme Court majority opinions and the other is from the Network,
which includes court briefs and scholarly publications. In both cases, I am looking for patterns in
their writing, allowing trends to emerge. Finding and identifying the major themes in these two
sets of documents allow me to code segments and passages of the documents according to those
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themes and to compare the opinions to text written by members of the Network.314 Through
analyzing the themes, I can construct the relationships across opinions and Network documents.
Most Supreme Court cases are one of a series of cases that build on each other over time.
This is the process of stare decisis. In fact, what makes these two cases unique and worthy of
study is that they disrupted the pattern of cases that preceded them. Therefore, I also review
cases previous to Shelby County and Janus. I begin with the cases that set the precedent they
overturn (Shelby County: South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 1966; Janus: Abood v. Board of
Education, 1977). I include the previous cases in which the majority opinion alerted judicial
observers it was ready to reconsider its earlier precedents. In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District Number One v. Holder (2009), the Court questioned the constitutionality of the VRA.
And in Knox v. Service Employees International Union (2012), the Court expressed serious
doubts about the correctness of its prior ruling on agency fees. I examine the main cases the
majority opinion cited in Shelby County and Janus as guiding its decision. For instance, the
Janus opinion references Harris v. Quinn (2014) and Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass'n
(2016), along with Abood v. Board of Education (1977). These three cases will therefore be
included in the content analysis. In addition to the cases, I include documents representing the
Network’s ideas. Specifically, I conduct a content analysis of the amici curiae and litigant briefs
submitted to the Supreme Court by Network members. I separate the documents into two main
groups (Shelby and Janus) to examine each case individually. I analyze the Shelby County and
Janus case documents separately, completing the reading, coding and memo writing for one case
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before I begin on the second case. Within each main group I further group the cases by name.
This will allow me to analyze and report the results sequentially over time.
I am following the steps presented by Graham R. Gibbs on Thematic Coding in a series
of lessons on YouTube: Grounded Theory-Open Coding Part 1 to 4 June 19, 2010- June 20,
2010, Grounded Theory- Line by Line Coding June 19, 2010, Grounded Theory-Axial Coding
June 20, 2010, and Grounded Theory- Selective Coding June 20, 2010 Coding Part 1: Alan
Bryman's 4 Stages of qualitative analysis October 24, 2011, Coding Part 2: Thematic Coding,
Coding October 24, 2011, Part 3: What Can Codes be About October 24, 2011, Coding Part 4:
What is Coding For? October 24, 201, and Coding Part 5: The Code list or Code Hierarchy
October 24, 2011. I begin with an initial reading of each document that pertains to the main case
to get a general idea of the content and main themes. This first read is an introduction to the text,
looking for the major themes, jotting down notes and highlighting portions of the text. After the
initial read, I create a “memo” in ATLAS.ti summarizing major points or initial thoughts and
comments for that document.315 The process described below applies separately to each case
group with its own set of documents.
Once I complete the initial reading of all the documents within one main group, I read the
documents a second time coding segments of the text in ATLAS.ti. I create the first round of
codes based on themes I have identified in the first reading. I also create memos that define each
code. I use a system of “open coding,” based on a thematic approach to content analysis. I do not
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create codes in advance of reading, rather I let the themes emerge from the reading and develop
the codes based on these themes.
After the initial coding, I clean and organize the codes. I combine duplicate and similar
codes into a single code and group related codes by category. Some codes may fall into more
than one code group. A third reading checks the coding process for errors by making sure the
proper codes have been applied to all documents. Once I have reviewed the documents and
codes, I look for the themes by combining related codes or code groups into broader categories.
Grouping narrows the concepts identified into broader themes across documents.
Using the reporting tool in ATLAS.ti and the themes I have created, I can view the
various themes contained in a single quotation or how many quotations are linked to a specific
theme and the frequency of each theme per document as well as the usage of a particular theme
across documents and across time. These reports thus reveal the main themes in each document,
the most frequently used themes, and which documents share themes.316
This will allow me to determine the patterns of similarity or dissimilarity between court
opinions and the writings of the Network. Supreme Court majority opinions can be compared for
likeness to each case’s amicus curiae and to academic writings by Network members. The
similarity between Supreme Court, majority opinions, and Network writing can be viewed for
increase or decrease over time. Themes can be followed as they are introduced into academic
journals or into the court record and picked up or discarded by other amici and the Court.
Additionally, I can view which themes change overtime through time. In sum, I create codes that
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represent concepts contained within text. I then assembled these codes into broader themes,
which are then linked to the majority opinion and Network writings to compare for commonality.
After assessing the relationships between the Network’s legal writings and the majority opinion,
I report the findings and interpret the results. I describe the themes I find and how these themes
relate to the principles espoused by the Network. I compare my results to previous studies
reviewed in the previous chapters. I also reveal any surprises I may find and what these results
mean future research.
Expected Findings
This dissertation is a content analysis that compares the principles expressed by the
Network and two Supreme Court opinions handed down within the last decade. The aim is to
determine whether the majority opinion adopted the arguments expressed by Network members
at Federalist Society activities and in their briefs submitted to the Court. I anticipate that
comparing the ideas communicated by the Network to the majority opinions will show a strong
similarity in language. The similarity will demonstrate that the ideas developed within the
Federalist Society have been incorporated in the Supreme Court’s majority opinions in Shelby
County and Janus. Further, this reveals that the Federalist Society through its Network has had
significant impact on current U.S. law. Exerting significant influence is exactly what the
Federalist Society planned. The Federalist Society was designed with the purpose of changing
the legal order and that is exactly what these two court opinions accomplished.
State sovereignty and federalism are key principles that unite the Federalist Society.
These two concepts were also at the core of the decision in Shelby County. v. Holder. Indeed,
federalism and the separation between state and federal spheres were a priority within the
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Network.317 In seminar speeches and law review articles, members of the Network consistently
argued that the Court should apply a more robust Tenth Amendment to protect state sovereignty
and characterized federal programs as coercing the states.318 The Supreme Court first
transformed federalism in United States v. Lopez (1995) supported by Network members’
arguments. Two years later, in Printz v. United States (1997) Federalist Society, faculty advisor
and supporter, Justice Scalia, appealed to state sovereignty while constructing the “anticommandeering” doctrine with the aid of Network scholarship. Justice Scalia’s “anticommandeering” doctrine was later employed by Federalist Society affiliated lawyers to
successfully challenge the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion.319 Shelby County make
numerous overtures to a strong doctrine of state sovereignty that echo the opinions of these
earlier federalism cases that were written with the support of Network principles. 320Numerous
times, Chief Justice Roberts calls attention to the “extraordinary measures” of the Voting Rights
Act and the “substantial federalism costs” imposed by Section 5. The Chief Justice also
highlights to disparage the different treatment received by those states covered under Section 5’s
preclearance requirement. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly references a
previous opinion he wrote to make the claim that “equal sovereignty” was a part of “our historic
tradition” and to emphasize that the VRA was “a drastic departure from basic principles of
federalism.”321 Yet, the concept of “equal sovereignty” appears nowhere in the Constitution and
was not used in such a context until Chief Justice Roberts did in his 2009 opinion in Northwest
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Austin.322 The preceding forms the basis for my expectation that the language in Shelby County
will closely echo Network arguments about federalism and state sovereignty.
Janus also entails two principles of high import within the Federalist Society, the
suppression of First Amendment rights to free speech and individual freedom.323 Network
members and also lawyers for the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation tied public
sector agency fee’s to campaign spending. Beginning with the first newsletter from the Federalist
Society’s Free Speech & Election Law Practice Group union fees were described as “probably
the single largest element of unreported political spending.”324 The same article referred to union
fees as “compulsory” and the collection of “forced dues from individual employees as a
condition of employment” impinging on individual freedom.325 As reviewed in Chapter 2,
campaign finance and the First Amendment was an area of high Network legal activity.
Additionally, Alito’s justification for overturning precedent in this case was the same as
the new version of Originalism that originated within the Network. The previous decision has
erred in holding the First Amendment has not been violated by public-agency shop arrangements
and the doctrine of stare decisis was not a hindrance to correcting it. This same argument
regarding a First Amendment violation and when it is appropriate to abandon stare decisis was
used by Federalist Society members in their challenges to campaign finance laws and also
articulated by Chief Justice Robert’s concurrence in Citizens United (Hollis-Brusky 2015). The
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majority opinion in Janus also cites Citizens United, as justification for overruling precedent.
Citizens United was a case with significant Network participation and influence. Originalism, the
First Amendment, and political spending were all topics of Federalist Society conferences and
scholarship of Network members.326 I expect to find a strong similarity between the arguments
made by the Network members and that of the Supreme Court majority opinion in Janus.
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Chapter 5
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
The Pre-Janus Cases
The goal of this section is to explore the evolution of the arguments presented in Janus
through three prior cases regarding the collection of agency fees by public sector unions and the
First Amendment’s protection of speech and association. The arguments in the majority
decisions will be compared to the arguments in the amicus briefs with a focus on those of the
Network.
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209. (1977)
Abood upheld the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act (PERA) thereby allowing
public sector collective bargaining agreements to include an agency shop provision. This
provision allowed a public sector union elected by a majority of the workers to be certified as its
exclusive representative and to collect fees from nonmembers. The fees would be to offset “the
incentive that employees might otherwise have to become ‘free riders’ and refuse to contribute to
the union while obtaining benefits of union representation that necessarily accrue to all
employees.”327 The Court did not accept petitioners’ and amicus curiae’s argument that agency
fees per se compelled association in violation of the First Amendment and also rejected
petitioners’ and amicus curiae’s charge of a violation of the “unconstitutional conditions”
doctrine that was applied to state action. Abood petitioners and amicus curiae alleged that since
the failure to pay agency fees resulted in a worker being discharged, the agency shop was an
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unconstitutional condition on public employment by forcing the worker to surrender his First
Amendment rights. The Abood Court rejected this argument. The Court stated that even though
Hanson involved the private sector, it did find government action was involved but the First
Amendment had not been violated. Therefore, the Court asserted “[t]he appellants’ reliance on
the ‘unconstitutional conditions’ doctrine” was “misplaced.” 328 The Court was also not
persuaded by petitioners’ claim that “public sector collective bargaining itself is inherently
‘political,’ and that to require them to give financial support to it is to require… ‘ideological
conformity.’”329 However, the Court did find the use of agency fees for political activities did
unconstitutionally compel association, so the Court prohibited the use of fees for union political
activities.
Abood recognized that the First Amendment protected freedom of association which
included freedom to not associate. Additionally, the Court recognized that monetary
contributions to a political organization constitute speech protected by the First Amendment and
also included the right to not contribute. The Court cited its decision the previous year which
held “that contributing to an organization for the purpose of spreading a political message is
protected by the First Amendment. Because “‘(m)aking a contribution . . . enables like-minded
persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals.’”330 Abood also
acknowledged that agency fees compelled association and impacted the First Amendment but
that the First Amendment is not an absolute right such that other interests could not be
legitimate.331 Therefore, while recognizing a First Amendment impact, the Court determined that
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the state has a legitimate interest in peaceful relations between labor and management and
avoiding free riders. The Court understood agency fees “to distribute fairly the cost of these
activities among those who benefit, and it counteracts the incentive that employees might
otherwise have to become ‘free riders’ to refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining
benefits of union representation that necessarily accrue to all employees.”332 Without the ability
to collect fees from nonmembers, the Court ruled, union members would be forced to cover the
expense of nonmembers who, regardless of nonpayment, would still receive the union’s
negotiated benefits.
The Court conceded that there was an ongoing debate about the private sector as a model
but deferred to the state’s assessment that labor stability justified some interference with First
Amendment rights.333 The Court recognized the responsibilities that unions carried as the
exclusive representatives of a work unit. The Court stated that “[t]he tasks of negotiating and
administering a collective-bargaining agreement and representing the interests of employees in
settling disputes and processing grievances are continuing and difficult ones. They often entail
expenditure of much time and money … The services of lawyers, expert negotiators, economists,
and a research staff, as well as general administrative personnel, may be required.”334 Noting the
costs associated with the representation of all workers, members and nonmembers alike, the
Court upheld the collection of agency fees from nonmembers who would also receive the
benefits.335
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The Abood Court acknowledged that public sector collective bargaining has political
aspects but at the same time recognized that unions perform multiple tasks in representing their
members outside of collective bargaining. Therefore, it allowed agency fees for collective
bargaining activities but ruled that it could not be used for political purposes. While also
recognizing the majority of workers have a right to organize and to support political causes they
favor, the Court seemed to balance the rights of nonmembers to not associate with the rights of
unions to associate and acknowledged the right of the dissenting minority to not have their
money spent on political causes they do not wish to support. The Court found that “those union
members who do wish part of their dues to be used for political purposes have a right to associate
to that end ‘without being silenced by the dissenters.’”336 The Court noted, “But the judgment
clearly made in Hanson and Street is that such interference as exists is constitutionally justified
by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of
labor relations established by Congress.”337 The Court also addressed the appellants’ charge that
because of the inherently political nature of public sector bargaining as opposed to private sector
bargaining, a different First Amendment question arose.338 This was due to the differences
between the public and private sectors. The Court acknowledged the differences but described a
more complex political framework than simply one on one negotiations of a quid pro quo
contract as petitioners described. Policy decisions involved different levels and branches of
government, a variety of agencies and departments, and distinct constituencies, making it
unlikely government officials in their role as public employers have the ability to “act as a
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cohesive unit” as “managers in private industry.”339 In addition, officials are limited in
negotiations by laws, reliance on higher ups for approval and the budget process.340 The Court
recognized not one single person or organization influences the decision-making process.
Responsiveness to union depends on a confluence of factors that also include the influence of the
electorate which consists of government employees, taxpayers, and users of service.341 Public
employees as part of the electorate have political influence over the same employers. Possibly
public sector employees have more influence than private ones.342
Additionally, the Abood Court viewed workers in the public sector and private sector as
similarly situated with the same rights. Abood held that the First Amendment applied equally to
private and public sector workers. Public sector employees’ interest “in not being compelled to
contribute to the costs of exclusive union representation” was no greater or less.343 Maintaining
labor peace and avoiding free riders were also equally necessary in the public sector as in the
private sector. Hence, while collective bargaining differences between public and private sectors
are real, and the employer contexts may be different, this case did not create a greater First
Amendment infringement for public employees.344
Finally, public employees opposing a union’s positions can still participate in all other
political and civic activities and even express opposition to their union in a public forum.
Exclusive representation does not “muzzle” dissenting workers. Nonmembers still have the same
rights as all citizens to express their view in a public forum. The majority also held that

339

Id. at 228
Id. at 228
341
Id. at 228
342
Id. at 228-229
343
Id. at 229
344
Id. at 229-230
340

103

characterizing public sector union’s actions as political does not elevate the “ideas and beliefs of
public employees onto a higher plane than the ideas and beliefs of private employees.”345 The
Court held that although the central purpose of the First Amendment may have been to protect
political speech, that does not elevate political speech over other types of speech. The First
Amendment protects all speech equally. In sum, the Court majority in Abood seemed to balance
the rights of the dissenting workers, the rights of union members, and the interests of the state
government. The Court saw a role for each party and found a space to accommodate each party’s
rights.
Knox v. Service Employees International Union, 567 U.S. 298 (2012)
Abood largely remained intact until the Roberts Court came into being with the addition
of Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito (both well known to the
Network) to the Court. Justice Alito was nominated by George W. Bush in 2005, after a FS led
opposition campaign forced President Bush to withdraw his initial nominee, Harriet Miers, and
replaced her with the FS’s choice Samuel Alito. Seven years later, Justice Alito began
articulating a rationale for overruling Abood. Justice Alito’s first clear signal of his skepticism of
the Abood ruling was in Knox (2012). Knox questioned the constitutionality of agency fees,
strengthened the attachment of agency fees to First Amendment, and maintained that the
substance of public sector collective bargaining affected public policy and thus concerned the
public sphere. These assertions weakened Abood.

345

Id. at 231

104

The three National Right to Work Legal Defense Fund (NRTWLDF) attorneys
representing the challengers in Knox were members of the Network. The amicus brief jointly
filed by the Pacific Legal Foundation, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Mountain States
Legal Foundation, and Cato Institute was the only one submitted on behalf of the petitioners in
Knox. This brief included three Network members from two different Network affiliated
organizations.346 The case was decided 5-4. Network member Justice Alito wrote the majority
opinion, joined by Network members Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia, Network Affiliated
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy. Network participation in Knox totaled eleven: three
as attorneys, 347 four as amici curiae, and four as Supreme Court Justices.
Knox petitioners challenged a one-time fee imposed by the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) specifically to support SEIU’s campaign against an upcoming
California ballot proposition.348 The fee was in addition to the union’s annual fee assessment.
Knox petitioners and amicus curiae charged that the public sector union had violated
nonmembers’ First Amendment rights of speech and association by collecting the special fee
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without sending out a new notice and without providing an opportunity to “opt-out” of the fee.349
They also claimed that public employees were being forced by the state as a condition of
employment to surrender their fundamental First Amendment rights.350 The Court agreed and
held that public sector unions must issue a new notice for any special assessments or increase in
dues.
The Court also raised eyebrows when it ruled that unions thereafter must obtain
nonmembers’ affirmative consent before deducting special fees or dues increases. The majority
opinion written by Justice Alito stated that “requiring objecting nonmembers to opt out of paying
the nonchargeable portion of union dues—as opposed to exempting them from making such
payments unless they opt in—represents a remarkable boon for unions.”351 The majority held
that default should be the “probable preference of most nonmembers” and replaced the
traditional opt-out system with a system that required an affirmative consent before the union
could collect fees from nonmembers.352 However, an opt-in argument had not been addressed by
the petitioners’ brief or in oral arguments. They asked only for an opportunity to opt out of the
special fee as had been standard practice by relying on the declaration that “dissent is not to be
presumed—it must affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting employee.”353
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This was noted by Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence,354 by Justice Breyer’s dissent,355 and in the
Respondent’s brief.356 The majority declared “by allowing unions to collect any fees from
nonmembers and by permitting unions to use opt-out rather than opt-in schemes when annual
dues are billed, our cases have substantially impinged upon the First Amendment rights of
nonmembers.”357 The majority asserted its decisions authorizing agency fees and an opt-out
system were dangerously close to allowing the First Amendment to be violated.358 In the present
case the Court saw no reason to continue such an impingement and declared that “individuals
should not be compelled to subsidize private groups or private speech.” The majority ended the
longtime practice for special assessments and its vague wording suggested the constitutionality
of any opt out system for annual fees was also in doubt. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out
“While the majority’s novel rule is, on its face, limited to special assessments and dues increases,
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the majority strongly hints that this line may not long endure.”359 The open-ended nature was
noted by Justice Breyer as well. While dissenting, he argued that the opinion’s language
suggested the ruling could pertain to all assessments. Justice Breyer contended, “each reason the
Court offers in support of its ‘opt-in’ conclusion seems in logic to apply, not just to special
assessments, but to ordinary yearly fee charges as well.”360 Justice Breyer continued that
although the Court had recently ruled “the Constitution permits a State to impose an opt-in
requirement,” the Court “has never said that it mandates such a requirement” as Knox now
seemed to suggest.361 Without being briefed and for the first time, the majority opinion held the
Constitution mandated an opt-in system for special fees or dues increases and insinuated that the
Constitution required this new arrangement for all fees.362
The Network members’ brief did urge the Court to replace the current opt- out policy
with a mandate to opt-in. This topic had been the focus of the jointly written amicus brief from
the Pacific Legal Foundation, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Mountain States Legal
Foundation, and Cato Institute363 which included three Network members. The brief alleged that
the Constitution mandated that workers were presumed to dissent. The Network members
claimed an opt-out policy defied the Court’s traditional presumption of unconstitutionality for
any law violating a fundamental right364 and conflicted with the principle that the Court does not
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assume an individual willingly relinquishes a right.365 The focus of the brief from the Network
members was a strident argument for individual rights and the rights of the dissenting public
employees. They argued that inherent in the text of the Constitution was a “presumption of
liberty” that the opt-out system violated and should be abandoned to protect the dissenters’ First
Amendment rights.366 They claimed the rule “originated in dicta” and “warrants no stare decisis
effect.” 367 The majority adopted their argument including the assertion that the opt-out policy
had become the court doctrine more as a “historical accident than through the careful application
of First Amendment principles.”368 The majority also suggested that a ballot proposition that
would have required an affirmative consent prior to charging agency fees “would have bolstered
nonmember rights.” Therefore, the majority opined, nonmembers had been compelled “to
subsidize a political effort designed to restrict their own rights.” 369
The majority made other assertions that question the constitutional validity of the agency
shop in general. The majority stated that public sector collective bargaining included many topics
such as wages, pensions, and other items which implicated public spending thus making them
important to the general public. This made the speech in collective bargaining a type of political
speech protected by the First Amendment and the agency fees required to fund the bargaining
was compelled speech also protected by the First Amendment.
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Knox made explicit that just as the First Amendment prohibited compelled speech and
compelled association, “compelled funding of the speech of other private speakers or groups”
was also protected by way of an analogy to commercial speech.370 The opinion announced as a
“general rule” that “individuals should not be compelled to subsidize private groups or private
speech.” The opinion also “made it clear” that compelling subsidies for another group or
person’s speech required high First Amendment scrutiny and the government must provide a
compelling interest and the law must be applied in the least restrictive means.371
The majority also stated that an agency shop that required workers to pay union fees, “as
a condition of employment” forced an employee who did not want to join the union to “support
financially an organization with whose principles and demands he may disagree.”372
The opinion asserted that Abood was an “anomaly” and that “compulsory fees constitute
a form of compelled speech and association that imposes a ‘significant impingement on First
Amendment rights.’ ”373 After twice announcing this “impingement” had been “tolerated,” the
majority suggested the Court should “revisit” whether prior cases “have given adequate
recognition to the critical First Amendment rights at stake.”374 The majority repeatedly called
attention to the “impingement” imposed, twice in reference to the opt out schemes and three
times for agency fees, which suggested that the Court’s tolerance was waning, and they were
open to revisiting this issue in the future. The Court opined this arrangement had licensed a
substantial infringement of the First Amendment rights of nonmembers. The opinion concluded

Id. at 309 (2012) (“Closely related to compelled speech and compelled association is compelled funding of the
speech of other private speakers or groups”).
371
Id. at 309-310
372
Id. at 310
373
Id. at 310-311
374
Id. at 311
370

110

by stating that unions and dissenting employees both have the same rights to express their
political and social views in an open forum free of government obstruction. However, when
public workers are forced to pay agency fees to a union, the state is upsetting that balance.
According to the majority, the state was granting an advantage to the union in the political debate
at the expense of the nonmembers’ First Amendment rights. Agency fees gave unions “the
‘extraordinary’ benefit of being empowered to compel nonmembers to pay for services that they
may not want and in any event have not agreed to fund.”375
Knox also narrowed which union expenses could be considered chargeable as related to
collective bargaining. The majority rejected the union’s claim that member representation
included an array of activities outside of collective bargaining or that campaigning against a
ballot initiative that would hamper union contracts was chargeable in contrast to earlier Court
decisions.376 The majority claimed that the union’s understanding of chargeable expenses was
much too broad and campaigning against a ballot initiative was essentially political campaigning
not different than supporting or opposing a candidate. The majority contended that to allow a
measure that affected the state budget to be a chargeable expense would void any limits on what
is chargeable. This was due to the fact, according to the majority, that much of the content of
collective bargaining involves the state budget. The majority again connected collective
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bargaining to the state budget and public policy making it a public concern. The opinion also
attributed at least part of the state deficit to “powerful public-sector unions.”377
The majority declared avoiding free riders was the “primary purpose” agency fees had
been upheld while at the same time rejecting that justification as adequate to override First
Amendment rights.378 The majority contended that many private organizations have free riders
that the government does not force to financially compensate. Thus, unions did not deserve
special treatment.379 The majority only recognized labor peace and free riders as justifications for
an agency shop but also claimed neither reason was compelling in the public sector. In sum, the
majority’s ruling in Knox was limited in fact to specific circumstances. However, it was the
Court’s undermining of key facets of Abood’s holding that not only weakened the precedent but
also provided guidance for outside groups to plan their strategy. The Network members quickly
took advantage of the opportunity the Court had just produced.
Harris v. Quinn 573 U.S. 616 (2014)
Harris v. Quinn was also initiated by the NRTWLDF and argued by three Network
members. Harris was also a 5-4 Supreme Court ruling against the union written by Network
member Justice Alito. He was joined by Federalist Society members Justice Thomas and Justice
Scalia, Network affiliated Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy. Seven amici curiae were
submitted on behalf of the petitioners and twelve in support of respondents. Of the seven amici
curiae for the petitioners, only one appeared to have no connection to the Federalist Society.380
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Therefore, I was unable to conclude whether this person was a member of the Network. Network
participation in Harris totaled twenty-two: one attorney,381 seventeen as amici curiae, and four
as Supreme Court Justices.
Direct criticism and calls to overturn Abood began with Harris. While Knox concerned a
specific special fee, Harris challenged an agency shop clause for homecare providers. One
Network member as an attorney for the petitioners in Harris described Abood as a “radical
expansion of the government’s ability to compel its employees to associate with a union” and
urged the Court to overturn Abood.382 The Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Pacific Legal
Foundation, and Atlantic Legal Foundation similarly urged the Court to overrule Abood because
“[t]here is no government basis, compelling or otherwise, that justifies the interference with
fundamental First Amendment liberties that occurs win (sic) dissenting public employees are
compelled to finance the political activities of public employee unions.”383 The brief for the Cato
Institute and National Federation of Independent Business charged Abood had “circumvent[ed]
employees’ fundamental First Amendment rights to be free of coerced speech and association, to
exercise the freedom of speech, and to petition the government. Aberrant and offensive, it should
be overruled.”384
Petitioners alleged a state law violated their right to petition the state on a public program
by authorizing an agency shop. Stating that the First Amendment protected the right not to be
compelled to subsidize speech on policy matters by a union that an individual did not want to
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support or join, Harris ruled in favor of the petitioner.385 The majority opinion stated that as a
“bedrock principle” a right to not “be compelled to subsidize speech by a third party that he or
she does not wish to support.” Harris reiterated Knox’s assertion that Abood was an “anomaly”
among First Amendment cases and reaffirmed the claim that the main reason agency fees had
been allowed to be collected from nonmembers was to avoid free riders. However, avoiding free
riders was not sufficient to override the First Amendment.386
Harris was a lengthy criticism of the Abood decision. The opinion described the analysis
in Abood as “questionable” and as having “seriously erred.” 387 Although, the Court noted that
Abood was correct when it “recognized that forced membership and forced contributions
impinge on free speech and associational rights,” the decision veered off track and, in the end,
had not gone far enough to strike down the law.388 Specifically, the majority alleged that Abood
was wrong to base its decision on two private sector cases, Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson,
351 U.S. 225 (1956) and International Association of Machinists v. Street 367 U.S. 740 (1961)
since neither case had been a constitutional case and neither had based its decision on the First
Amendment. In Hanson, the Court had upheld a union shop under the Commerce Clause. In
Street, the Court ruled on a statutory and not a constitutional issue. The Harris majority asserted
that neither of the cases properly examined the First Amendment issue and it appears that Abood,
relying on these cases, followed suit.
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In addition, the majority claimed that Abood did not grasp the difference between
government permission to enact agency fees in the private sector as in Hanson and the public
sector in which government itself compelled the payments as in Abood.389 This difference was
significant to the majority and also meant that Hanson had not concluded that labor peace
overrode the First Amendment to justify compelled political association or compelled
conformity.390 The majority’s point was that Hanson and Street had not “settled” the First
Amendment issue of compelled agency fees payments to a public sector union and Abood was
incorrect to conclude otherwise.391
The majority also criticized the Abood decision for not drawing a clear divide between
collective bargaining in the private sector and collective bargaining in the public sector. 392 In
the public sector, the majority asserted, collective bargaining discussions touch on matters of
public concern, such as wages and pensions, that impact state spending and budgets unlike in
private sector bargaining. According to the majority, just looking at the explosion in state
spending on public employees’ wages and pensions since Abood made that clear.393 Additionally,
the majority ruled that, public sector union spending for collective bargaining cannot be
distinguished from money spent on political advocacy because both activities are aimed at the
government whereas in the private sector collective bargaining was with a private employer.394
Ultimately, the Abood Court, the majority claimed, missed that public sector unions were always
steeped in politics. Thus, the majority opined, any payments made to the union were supporting
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political speech. The majority held that, in contrast to Abood’s holding, the difference between
the public and private sectors is stark and have implications for the First Amendment. The
majority also rejected the notion by the dissent and the United States’ brief that the union speech
was not a matter of public concern.395 As stated in Knox, the majority further claimed, union
wages affected state budgets and state budgets are important matters of interest to the public. In
addition, in practice, the Court’s attempts to clarify chargeable and nonchargeable expenses has
met with little success and the process for workers to challenge fees has become too burdensome
for dissenting workers.
Furthermore, the majority, as in Knox, criticized labor peace and the problem of free
riders, working to delegitimize these justifications for agency fees. “Agency-fee provisions
unquestionably impose a heavy burden on the First Amendment interests of objecting
employees.”396 The majority further emphasized that, since agency fees implicated political
speech, it must pass a heightened scrutiny crafted for the First Amendment. However, labor
peace and free rider were not a compelling government interest for public sector agency fees and
did not pass even a lower standard of scrutiny. The majority then stated that unions’ labor peace
defense for an exclusive representative was irrelevant because petitioners are not attempting to
form another union or even oust the current one. All the workers wanted was to not pay fees. In
addition, the majority argued, unionization in the federal government absent an agency shop
requirement demonstrated that exclusive representation was not dependent upon agency fees thus
neither was labor peace.397 The union also had not demonstrated that agency fees were necessary
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to obtain the workers’ benefits and like other organizations, the dues collected from voluntary
memberships should be sufficient to cover the union’s needs. Under the weight of these
“unsupported” and “unwarranted assumption[s]” Abood’s foundation began to crumble.398 The
majority concluded that exclusive representation was not dependent on fees from nonmembers
which meant labor peace was not compelling interests to compel fees. 399 The majority also
continued the argument from Knox that “free rider arguments…are generally insufficient to
overcome First Amendment objections.”400 There are many advocacy groups whose members
benefits from their lobbying efforts, but do not share in the costs. These groups rely on voluntary
fees and no one has suggested all their beneficiaries should be made to pay.401 Unions should
not get special treatment. Thus, based on the majority opinion, Harris seemed to undermine the
principles that had upheld the agency shop for 40 years.
Evidenced by statements on the NRTWLDF’s website, Harris sent a clear signal to the
Network that the Court had serious misgivings regarding the agency fee system in general. The
discussion of the Harris decision on NRTWLDF’s website optimistically stated, “Significantly,
much of the Court’s opinion details how the ‘Abood Court’s analysis is questionable on several
grounds.’ Among other things, the majority recognized that the ‘core issues’ in public-sector
collective bargaining, ‘such as wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues.’ This
criticism of Abood suggests that, if a case involving actual public employees comes before the
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Court, a majority of the Justices would be willing to overrule Abood and hold that public-sector
forced fee requirements are unconstitutional.”402
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31
585 U.S. (2018), like Knox and Harris had been initiated by Network members from the
NRTWLDF. Also, like Knox and Harris, the decision was a 5-4 split. Justice Alito again wrote
the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and
Gorsuch. Janus struck down a state law which allowed public sector unions to collect “agency
fees” from nonunion employees to compensate the union for expenses accrued for collective
bargaining which benefited all workers, including nonmembers that do not pay union fees.
“Agency fees” were a compromise between paying full union dues and “free riding” workers. In
striking down the law, the Court overruled a precedent that had stood for forty years.
The Court held in Janus that forcing public employees “to subsidize a union, even if they
choose not to join and strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective bargaining
and related activities… violated the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to
subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.”403 The finding that all agency
fees were coercing the subsidization of political speech meant Abood had been wrong when it
concluded public sector unions were more than just political organizations. Abood, the majority
opinion held, had been “poorly reasoned,” resulted in “practical problems and abuse” by unions,
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was “inconsistent with other First Amendment cases and had been undermined by more recent
decisions,” and experience following Abood “shed new light” on the functioning of agency
fees.404
The Janus majority opinion tied up the loose ends from Knox and Harris, drawing a line
between workers in the private sector and those in the public sector, while erasing the line drawn
by the Abood Court between chargeable expenses for collective bargaining and nonchargeable
expenses for the union’s political activities. Additionally, dicta in Knox such as assertions about
the unconstitutionality of the opt-out arrangement, the innate political nature of public sector
bargaining, the non-distinguishable nature of public sector union expenses, and affiliating
oneself with the union message through fee requirements became the rulings in Janus. The
majority opinion written by Justice Alito was a strident assertion that any agency fees paid to a
public sector union were equivalent to being compelled to associate oneself with and promote the
union’s political message -- a message the Court and amici curiae assumed the nonmember
might totally oppose. In the decision, the Court held that requiring these nonmember public
sector employees to pay a “fair share” (in exchange for collective bargaining benefits) violated
their First Amendment rights. An additional part of the ruling was that unions are political
entities by design thus, any fees paid to the union funded speech about public policy. The
majority also maintained that because unions are innately political groups, union expenditures
could not be divided into nonpolitical expenditures and political expenditure. In the opinion, the
majority often compared unions to political parties.

404

Id.at 2460

119

In sum, Janus held that the First Amendment protects the individual right of the public
sector worker to not pay agency fees to a union. The Court found that agency fees required as a
condition of public employment, forced workers to associate with a union they did not wish to
join. These agency fees coerced nonmembers of the union to support and affiliate themselves
with the union’s message. Additionally, the majority held that public sector unions were political
organization in toto and therefore the message spoken by the union was political speech. Further,
because political speech “occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”
this violated public employees’ free speech rights.405 Simply stated, the Court opined, agency fee
requirements in the public sector are unconstitutional as it forced an individual to subsidize the
political views of a union she chose not to join and whose views she opposes. The majority
position was that all public sector agency fee requirements violated First Amendment rights of
public employees to be free from compelled speech and compelled association.
Agency Shops Compel Association and Compel Speech
The petitioners and amicus curiae in Janus began their arguments against agency fees
based on violations of the First Amendment and a combination of the freedom of association, the
freedom of speech and the freedom to petition government. Included in those freedoms is the
right to be free from compelled association and compelled speech. The majority opinion also
began its ruling with the assertion that the First Amendment protects the right to speak and not
speak as well as the right to associate and not associate. The Network members as petitioners and
amici argued that an agency shop violated the First Amendment rights of individual workers by
compelling speech and compelling association. They claimed that the First Amendment protects
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“the decision of both what to say and what not to say.”406 They contended that “compelling
speech and prohibiting speech are equally offensive to the Constitution.”407 Thus, an agency
shop violated these First Amendment principles because the government decided what an
individual would say, would not say, or how to say it instead of allowing the individual to
choose. To the Network, agency fees undoubtedly compelled speech and therefore, struck at the
very core of the Bill of Rights, representative democracy, and self-expression.
Many briefs easily extended the First Amendment protections against compelled speech
to being compelled to subsidize another’s speech. Therefore, it was natural that agency fees,
which are compelled payments to an organization were also compelled speech and compelled
association. The majority also endorsed this view, that being forced to financially support
another’s speech inflicted the same constitutional harm as compelling speech.408 The majority
stated as a matter of fact that the compelled funding of speech “seriously impinges on First
Amendment rights.”409
The Network members’ briefs equated agency fees with government pushing a certain
agenda. One brief warned of the “grave danger…whenever a government decides that everyone
must support a favored political agenda as a condition of public employment.”410 Another brief
claimed that when a public employer allowed an agency shop in the workplace, that government
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was tilting the scales toward speech it favored and jeopardizing individual rights.411 Agency fees
were also considered by amici curiae to be equivalent to government elevating one party’s
speech at the expense of the other. Janus petitioner described the process as such: “Agency fees
transform employee advocacy groups into artificially powerful factions, skewing the
‘marketplace for the clash of different views and conflicting ideas’ that the ‘Court has long
viewed the First Amendment as protecting.’ ”412 Another brief asserted that the union’s “speech
is transformed from that of a subgroup, offering one viewpoint among many, into the only
employee voice an employer need listen.”413 According to a third brief, this was antithetical to
the First Amendment, whose purpose “is to allow meritorious ideas and association with those
ideas to rise and fall without the government placing its thumb on the scale in favor of one idea
or another.”414 Another brief which included two very prominent Network members claimed an
agency shop was the government substituting its own view of the worker’s best interest. It stated,
“The First Amendment generally does not allow the government to force someone to subsidize
speech with which he disagrees simply because the government thinks that it benefits him.”415
Janus petitioner also argued, “[T]he government cannot force nonmembers to pay for union
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advocacy based on the ‘paternalistic premise’ that it is ‘for their own benefit.’ ”416 The majority
opinion adopted a similar position stating, “[T]he First Amendment does not permit the
government to compel a person to pay for another party’s speech just because the government
thinks that the speech furthers the interests of the person who does not want to pay.”417
Political Speech
The Network members as Janus petitioners and amicus curiae argued that agency fee
requirements forced a dissenting public sector employee “to underwrite union advocacy.”418
They claimed that in essence, “Compulsory agency fees force public employees to engage in
political speech they disagree with and to associate with political associations they oppose in
violation of their First Amendment rights. This is true regardless of whether those fees fund a
union’s advocacy and lobbying activities or its negotiation efforts with government employers.
Both types of activities are inherently political.”419 Unions were viewed as singularly political
organizations. The Network members argued there was no distinction in the substance of a
union’s speech when negotiating over working conditions and when lobbying the government.
Both of these acts targeted the government and therefore both acts involved public policy. The
Network members claimed a public sector union’s work “is quintessential lobbying: meeting and
speaking with public officials, as an agent of parties, to influence public policies that affect those
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parties.”420 A majority of amicus briefs claimed that for the public sector union, lobbying and
collective bargaining were both intrinsically political. Additionally, according to many of the
briefs, public sector workers’ wages, pensions, and benefits were not private economic matters
between employer and employee or employer and union representative. Instead, public sector
worker’s wages, pension, and any other benefits received were viewed by amici and the majority
as policy issues that impacted the state or local budget.
Amici repeatedly argued that public sector collective bargaining is inherently political,
therefore, any form of union activity would constitute political speech. Agency fees paid to a
union can be equated with supporting the politics of the union, thus subsidizing the union’s
political speech or speech on public matters. For example, the petitioner in Janus argued that
“[b]argaining with the government over non-financial policies is equally political. Union
demands for policies that restrict how the government can retain, place, manage, promote, and
discipline employees can affect the quality of services the government provides to the public.”421
The brief submitted by the United States on behalf of the Janus petitioner was an about face
from where the Solicitor General had stood in Harris. The United States’ Janus brief assuredly
declared, “Given that public-sector bargaining inherently involves public issues, compulsory
agency fees in government employment necessarily involve public employees’ speech as citizens
on matters of public concern.”422 Another brief similarly stated “in the public sector both labor
and management are government employees, both labor and management sit on the same side of
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the table and bargain with taxpayers’ money. Such bargaining inherently affects the political
priorities of public spending, making every bargaining decision an act of public
policymaking.”423 Therefore, since public sector unions engaged in politics, the speech that the
agency fees forced the dissenting members to support was political speech. Most simply stated in
one brief, “Compelling an individual to subsidize public-sector union speech compels that
individual to subsidize core political speech.”424 Paying agency fees meant “non-members are
subsidizing the political preferences of members”425
As the decision indicated, “[t]he core collective-bargaining issue of wages and benefits”
were political issues connected to public funds and the government could not compel the
nonmember to “speech” on these issues through the payment of agency fees.426 The Court also
adopted this public policy view of unions. The majority agreed with amici that agency fees paid
to a union significantly impinged First Amendment rights because unions “take[] many positions
during collective bargaining that have powerful political and civic consequences.”427 The
majority described the situation in similar language as the amicus briefs. The majority asserted
that agency fees force a public sector worker to fund a union “even if they choose not to join and
strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective bargaining and related activities.”
The Court ruled that agency fees, by compelling a nonmember to fund a third party’s speech in
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collective bargaining that may affect public issues, violate the nonmember’s right to free
speech.428
To demonstrate that collective bargaining affects public funds, the majority pointed to the
“severe budget problems” in some states.429 The majority considered the increase in state budgets
and deficits as a post-Abood “development” that “eroded the decision’s underpinnings.”430 The
majority also noted the variety of amici curiae submitted on the union’s behalf to illustrate the
many issues of public concern that unions may speak about in bargaining.431 The majority
“squarely rejected” the premise that collective bargaining speech could simply be private speech.
The majority maintained that a public sector union’s speech during collective bargaining
regarding public employees’ wages and benefits affected public spending and thus, must be “a
matter great public concern.”432 They argued “to suggest” otherwise “is to deny reality.”433
In addition to compelled speech and association, amici asserted that agency fees were
government compulsion to support the union’s political viewpoint while silencing the worker’s
own voice. The state, by allowing an agency shop and exclusive representation, suppressed the
dissenting worker’s viewpoint. The nonmember was barred from expressing their views to their
public employer. One brief described the situation as one in which bargaining for working
conditions was “artificially tilted in favor of empowering the union and gagging dissenting
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nonmembers.”434 Another brief maintained not only were the nonmembers silenced by public
sector collective bargaining, union members who disagree with union leaders were being
silenced as well as taxpayers.435 The brief from the California Public School Teachers claimed
that “compulsions to speak are worse still, because they force the citizen to affirmatively
contradict his own views, both violating his conscience and artificially enhancing the voice of
the opposing side.”436
Agency fees made an already speech repressive situation worse because dissenting
workers were both silenced and forced to promote a political view which conflicted with their
own and could even be damaging. As petitioner stated, “Compelled fees exacerbate the
constitutional and other harms that employees suffer as a result of the government forcing them
to accept an unwanted representative.437 The Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence explained
that Abood had authorized “the designation of a single organization as exclusive representative
of a segment of the public before legislative and executive officials on a matter of public
interest.” In addition, according to the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, the Abood Court
sanctioned the infringement on the First Amendment based on an unsubstantiated notion that an
exclusive representative served a compelling government interest greater than nonmembers’ free
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speech and free association rights.438 Another brief asserted that agency fees “forc[ed] workers to
fund speech that violates their consciences, their beliefs, their political commitments, and their
principles.”439 A third brief which included two prominent Network members argued that an
exclusive representative silenced nonconsenting public employees while agency fees force them
to subsidize the false information the union provided the government.440
The same brief continued:
The voice of the individual is lost when state or federal law compels him to support a
political organization he opposes. This compulsion is an effective censor of individual
opinion. Instead of being drowned out by many genuine voices, the individual is forced to
boost the voice of those he opposes or even despises. He is forced to pay for the
counterfeiting of public opinion, distorting democracy, and losing his freedom in one fell
swoop.441

According to this brief an agency shop silenced workers, elevated false public opinion
and distorted representation. The majority opinion was less animated in its descriptions but still
held a similar position. The majority argued that agency fees were dangerous because

438

The Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioner at 18, Janus v.
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466),
2017 WL 6205801
439
Competitive Enterprise Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Janus v. American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL 6054676
440
Brief Amicus Curiae of Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioner at 13, Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL
6205801
441
Brief Amicus Curiae of Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioner at 14-15, Janus v.
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466),
2017 WL 6205801

128

“[c]ompelling individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable violates that
cardinal constitutional command” that government cannot deny an individual the freedom to
think for themselves and form their own beliefs.442 The majority stated that free speech was
fundamental to representative democracy and the pursuit of truth. The majority reasoned that,
“Whenever the Federal Government or a State prevents individuals from saying what they think
on important matters or compels them to voice ideas with which they disagree, it undermines
these ends.”443 The majority went further and asserted that in addition to undermining democracy
and truth, compelled speech forced individuals to betray their beliefs.444 The majority then cited
West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, a case in which the Court ruled that school children could
not be (directly) compelled to recite the Pledge of Allegiance against their religious beliefs. It
noted, “Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is
always demeaning and for this reason, one of our landmark free speech cases said that a law
commanding ‘involuntary affirmation’ of objected-to beliefs would require ‘even more
immediate and urgent grounds’ than a law demanding silence.”445
Next, the majority opinion asserted that compelled speech and “[c]ompelling a person to
subsidize the speech of other private speakers” amounts to the same under the First Amendment.
To emphasize that money paid to an organization supported that organization’s viewpoint, the
majority quoted Thomas Jefferson from A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom: “As
Jefferson famously put it, ‘That to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical.’” The majority claimed
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this demonstrated that Jefferson and other Founders would denounce laws mandating public
employees to support viewpoints they opposed.446
Abood was Wrong and Should Be Overruled
The Janus Court directly confronted the Abood decision after nipping at its edges in Knox
and Harris. Amici curiae began the direct calls to overrule Abood. Amici argued for overruling
Abood based on violations of the First Amendment and “extensive and pernicious infringements
on the core constitutional rights of millions of people for the last 40 years.”447 One argument
made by critics for overruling Abood was that it had not applied the proper First Amendment
scrutiny. The critics argued that this made the decision inconsistent with First Amendment
precedent and unreconcilable with other cases regarding compelled association, compelled
speech, and regulations on expenditures for political speech.448 Amici also stated Abood directly
conflicted with the more recent decisions in Harris and Knox. They urged the Court to overrule
Abood and bring cohesiveness back to the First Amendment. The call to overrule Abood needed
to contend with the doctrine of stare decisis and explain why the Court should not “stand by
things decided.”
Stare decisis and Consistency
Perhaps the most visible influence of the Network was the Court’s use of “new
Originalism” in its justifications for not adhering to precedent. The core Network doctrine of
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“new Originalism” coupled with the new judicial “restraint” that developed within the FS
provided the majority with the necessary rationale to overrule Abood and abandon stare decisis.
The FS insisted on an original meaning interpretation of the Constitution. According to the
doctrine of “new Originalism” whenever a court ruling was deemed to conflict with the original
meaning of the Constitution it was necessary to right that error and return the law to align with
the Constitution’s original meaning. The Network argued the needed court action of overturning
a precedent and forsaking stare decisis to further the cause of “new Originalism” would not be
judicial activism in its derogatory sense but instead was demanded.
Three amici as well as the petitioners, all of which included Network members, began to
address the doctrine of stare decisis as they called to overrule Abood. One brief for Harris that
included four Network members insisted the time was now to overrule Abood and return
coherence to First Amendment jurisprudence. They claim that Abood met all the criteria that
determined when to overturn a precedent.449 The brief added that Abood departed so far from
First Amendment principles that stare decisis should not be considered a constraint on the Court.
450

Rather, they argued, stare decisis must yield when necessary to “erase [an] anomaly.”451 After

a discussion of Abood’s divergence from First Amendment principles a second brief noted that,
“‘This Court has not hesitated to overrule decisions offensive to the First Amendment’” (quoting
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Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010) (internal citation omitted). 452 This same
theme was echoed by the Brief of Petitioners.
In Janus, arguments against stare decisis based on the doctrine of “new Originalism”
came from four separate briefs: the Cato Institute, National Federation of Independent Business
Small Business Legal Center, and Center of the American Experiment, the American Center for
Law and Justice’s brief, the United States’ brief, and the Petitioner’s brief. The amicus brief from
the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) which included Network member Jay Alan
Sekulow453 succinctly summed up the philosophy in explaining why stare decisis did not
preclude the Court from overruling Abood. As the brief explained stare decisis does not bind the
Court to prior incorrect interpretations of the Constitution. The Network member’s briefs stated
that to uphold an incorrect precedent would be to elevate judicial interpretation of the
Constitution over the actual Constitution. This elevation of judicial constitutional interpretation
contradicts the Supremacy Clause and the Justices’ oath of office.454 The brief asserted this
followed from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) which stated that the Supreme Court
could overrule legislation that was offensive to the Constitution. The amicus brief reasoned that
since the Constitution is the supreme law and judicial precedents are secondary,455 the Court was
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not bound by stare decisis to an improper interpretation of the Constitution.456 They concluded
that the Court’s duty is “fidelity to the Constitution over fidelity to its own contrary
precedent.”457
The lengthiest arguments against stare decisis based on “new Originalism” appeared in
the brief from the Cato Institute et al. which included three or four Network members. Like the
brief above, they also claimed that the Court was not bound to stare decisis and should adhere to
the Constitution over judicial interpretation of the Constitution. This brief claimed that in
constitutional cases stare decisis had less hold over the Justices due to the difficulty in amending
the Constitution. Due to the difficulty of amending judicial precedent, they reasoned that in
contrast to statutory cases where stability was preferred, in constitutional cases correct
interpretation was more valuable even if this meant sacrificing stability.458 The same brief also
maintained that the proper understanding and application of stare decisis, “not only allows for
the abandonment of a precedent so thoroughly repugnant to our Constitution, it demands it.”459
The amici conveyed that “public-sector workers deserve, at long last, to have their First
Amendment liberties restored.” 460
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A clear example of the influence of the FS and their reach is the Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner in Janus. The U.S. government explained that in
their amicus briefs submitted for Harris (2012) and Friedrichs (2015), their position had been
that Abood was correct and remained good law. They asked the Court to reaffirm Abood’s
holding. However, in 2017 there was a new administration and a new Solicitor General, Noel J.
Francisco, who was a member of the Network. Upon reexamination under the direction of
Solicitor General Francisco and President Donald J. Trump the government changed their
position and now opposed reaffirming Abood. The government took an Originalist approach to
the First Amendment. Accordingly, the stated reason for the change was the influence of the
Court’s decisions in Harris and the arguments in Friedrichs. After these two cases the
government realized they previously had not given sufficient attention to the public employees’
free speech rights when workers objected to subsidizing the union’s speech on public policy with
which they disagreed. This time, the government alleged that Abood departed from and could not
be reconciled with existing First Amendment precedent and thus called for Abood to be
overrule.461 In line with originalist tenets, the government’s stated reasoning was that Abood was
misaligned with the Constitution and needed to be corrected.462
A fifth brief from the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, which included two
Network members made their “Originalism” argument against Abood under the heading
“Compelling Public Employees to Pay Agency Shop Fees for “Bargaining” Is Contrary to the
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Original Understanding of the First Amendment.” The Federalist Society often invokes the
founders and the framers as evidence for the tenets of “new Originalism.” However, in this brief
Network members conceded that the original intentions of the founding generation regarding free
speech was “scarce, at best.”463 Therefore, any attempt to assert the founders’ intention was to
reject compelled speech, they claimed quoting Federalist Society member and frequent speaker
Justice Clarence Thomas, must look to “the practices and beliefs of the Founders in general.”464
The brief then quoted Thomas Jefferson and separately James Madison regarding religious
toleration. They explained that the Court had easily adopted these statements concerning
compelled religious payments to compelled funds for political speech.465 Next the brief claimed
that Jefferson and Madison had believed that public opinion was essential for representation in a
government in which leaders must respond to the public and to protect individual liberty.466 An
exclusive representative censored the nonmember’s opinion which therefore, never reached the
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government employer, while agency fees created false opinion by substituting the union’s
opinion for the individual’s opinion. Their point was that an agency shop disrupted the flow of
information to the government. Worse yet an agency shop fed the government “counterfeited
opinion” through an exclusive representative who claimed “to represent the voice of all the
employees - even those that refuse to join the union”467Agency fees, and more subtly, the entire
agency shop was antithetical to Jefferson and Madison’s understanding of the republic they were
forming.
The majority’s ruling also followed the guidelines of “new Originalism.” The majority
started by stating, “Fundamental free speech rights are at stake.”468 Therefore, the Court had to
first compare the holding in Abood against other First Amendment decisions to determine
whether Abood was consistent with the standard bearers for First Amendment values.469 The
majority concluded Abood was inconsistent with the principles of the First Amendment. They
also concluded that public sectors workers’ First Amendment rights were violated by the agency
shop. The majority then addressed stare decisis stating it was the preferred course, although “not
an inexorable command,” and not required when the Court had “very strong reasons” to overrule
a prior decision.470 The majority determined stare decisis was not an obstacle to overruling
Abood since there were “very strong reasons” to overrule Abood. 471 The majority adopted the
same constitutional argument that appeared in briefs from the Network members regarding stare
decisis. The majority claimed, as had the amicus briefs, that stare decisis is less relevant for a

467

The Brief Amicus Curiae of Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence at 13, Janus v. American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL 6205801
468
Janus at 2440
469
Id. at 2463
470
Id. at 2478
471
Id.

136

Constitutional issue because overturning a Court’s decision can only be done with a
Constitutional amendment or by the Court itself. The majority also asserted, as many briefs had,
stare decisis applied least of all to cases that involved the First Amendment, and the Court would
“not hesitated to overrule decisions offensive to the First Amendment.”472 The majority
summarized the principal factors of stare decisis with the following:
Our cases identify factors that should be taken into account in deciding whether to
overrule a past decision. Five of these are most important here: the quality of Abood ‘s
reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other related
decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and reliance on the
decision. After analyzing these factors, we conclude that stare decisis does not require us
to retain Abood.473
There was similar language in the petitioner’s brief.
The Court will overturn a constitutional decision if it is badly reasoned and wrongly
decided, conflicts with other precedents, has proven unworkable, or is not supported by
valid reliance interests… Abood should be overruled for all of these reasons.474
The brief submitted by the United States also contained similar language.
Although this Court reconsiders its precedents with caution, stare decisis does not
warrant preserving Abood’s error. Stare decisis considerations are weakest in
constitutional cases, and this Court has therefore been willing to overrule precedents that
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have been undermined by subsequent legal developments…Court has twice characterized
Abood as an anomaly, and Abood’s incompatibility with the reasoning of Harris and
Knox is a sufficient justification for its overruling … overruling Abood would resolve a
conflict between two contradictory lines of precedent and clarify First Amendment
law.475
After examining Abood’s ruling against the criteria for stare decisis, the majority
concluded they were not bound to preserve Abood.476 One of the Court’s justification for
overruling a 40-year-old precedent was that Abood conflicted with established First Amendment
principles and recent decisions had weakened its reasoning.477
Abood’s Quality of Reasoning
Besides the constitutional validity of Abood, amici and petitioner challenged specific
aspects of the Abood ruling. Specifically, they challenged the use of Hanson and Street as
controlling,478 the Abood Court’s mistaken assumption that these two cases settled the
constitutionality of compelled public sector fees, and the failure of the Abood Court to
distinguish between the public sector and the private for the First Amendment. They also
criticized Abood for the consequences of applying the wrong test of validity for a constitutional
case. The justifications used to defend the necessity of agency shops, maintaining labor peace
and avoiding free riders, were deemed illegitimate as government’s interest in the public sector.
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Network members questioned the necessity of agency fees to labor peace at all and doubted that
free riders even existed since there was nothing “free” and no benefits were gained when forced
to join a union one opposed. Petitioner Mark Janus stated his objections to being called a free
rider as that implied that he benefited from union representation. Rather, the petitioner’s brief
characterized nonmembers as “forced riders,” that are “forced by the government to travel with a
mandatory union advocate to policy destinations they may not wish to reach.”479 The majority
noted Janus’ complaint saying, “he is not a free rider on a bus headed for a destination that he
wishes to reach but is more like a person shanghaied for an unwanted voyage.”480
The Janus petitioner (and Harris petitioners) and the Janus brief (and Harris brief) from
the Cato Institute, National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center and
the Center of the American Experiment further criticized the Court for relying on two private
sector cases and thus concluding that the First Amendment rights of public sector workers were
the same as private sector workers. Their argument was that those two cases had only upheld the
government’s authorization of private sector agency shop provisions not whether the
“government may directly compel association with or support of a union.”481 These specific
points were adopted by the majority in Harris and again by the Janus majority. Janus petitioner
and the brief submitted jointly by the Cato Institute, the National Federation of Independent
Business Small Business Legal Center, and the Center of the American Experiment482 also
highlighted that Hanson concerned the Commerce Clause. As such, Hanson offered no First
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Amendment analysis. Both briefs harshly criticized the Abood Court for wrongly appropriating
labor peace, a commerce doctrine which only necessitated rational scrutiny to an issue as
important as the First Amendment. These two specific themes were echoed again by the majority
in Harris and in Janus. The majority quoting Harris stated, “Abood went wrong at the start when
it concluded that two prior decisions, [Hanson and Street],483 ‘appear[ed] to require validation of
the agency-shop agreement before [the Court]’ ”484 This was incorrect, according to the majority;
instead, “[b]oth cases involved Congress’s ‘bare authorization’ of private-sector union
shops.”485 The Janus majority also incorporated the critique that Hanson was a Commerce
Clause decision and had dismissed the First Amendment question without an analysis.486
The final critique of relying on Hanson and Street, two private sector precedents, was that
neither case had ruled on the First Amendment; in fact, neither case rested on a constitutional
question. The Landmark Legal Foundation argued that Abood’s fundamental failure was that it
had not analyzed Michigan’s union shop law under strict scrutiny which is the correct standard
for the First Amendment. They claimed, “The Abood Court simply used the justifications found
in Hanson and Street.”487 This was also noted in the United States’ brief alleging that Abood
wrongly “viewed the constitutionality of public-sector agency fees as controlled by privatesector precedents, which did not involve the same First Amendment concerns.”488 More briefs
made this First Amendment argument against Hanson and Street than had referred to the
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Commerce Clause or the permission vs. compulsion aspect. The Janus majority agreed with
amici that the Abood Court was wrong to rely on Hanson and Street due to neither case
analyzing the First Amendment with strict scrutiny.489 Yet, based on these two cases, the Court
upheld the agency shop challenged in Abood. The lack of First Amendment scrutiny was a
significant disqualifier for the majority as it was for amici and petitioner.490 The majority opined
that had Abood applied strict scrutiny they may have recognized that labor peace did not depend
on agency fees.491 The government’s interest in labor peace and the free rider problem were both
widely rejected by amici for the public sector and also by the majority. Again, the briefs and the
majority turned to the cases Abood relied on as the starting point of its misdirection. The
majority claimed that Abood’s reliance on Hanson and Street led the Court to incorrectly apply a
lower scrutiny standard to assess public sector agency fees against First Amendment rights.
However, according to the majority, this “deference to legislative judgments is inappropriate in
deciding free speech issues.” 492
Amici broadly labeled Abood as “badly reasoned,”493 “wrongly decided,”494 and as having
“serious First Amendment flaws.”495 These critiques were incorporated by the majority into an
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analysis of Abood’s underlying reasoning. Quoting the Harris opinion, the majority declared,
“Abood was poorly reasoned.”496 The majority referred to Abood’s reasoning as weak and
explained that “the quality of [a precedent’s] reasoning” is highly significant when deciding
whether to overrule a precedent. The majority criticized the Abood Court for not understanding
the rulings in Hanson and Street, and not recognizing the difference between the State allowing
an agency shop in the private sector and the State negotiating an agency shop with a union in the
public sector.
The majority asserted that this distinction made all the difference for the First
Amendment.497 In the private sector it was the private employer requiring agency fees from its
employees but in the public sector it was a government mandating agency fees from its
employees. The fact that Abood involved a public employer elevated the First Amendment stakes
for the public employees.498 The majority claimed the Abood Court wrongly determined that
public sector and private sector workers had the same rights against compelled speech. This
misunderstood the political nature of collective bargaining in the public sector. As described
above, according to the majority and many of the amicus briefs, the issues discussed during
collective bargaining by definition were “important political issues.”499 Therefore, agency fees in
the public sector compelled a worker to subsidize political speech whereas in the private sector
employee pay and benefits were not public policy issues. The majority declared Abood had
missed this point and thus “as detailed in Harris, Abood was not well reasoned.”500
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Abood was Unworkable
Another argument made by many amici leading up to Janus was that because public
sector unions were organized as political entities, all union expenditures were also political
speech. According to the Network members, this made Abood’s distinction between union
spending that is “chargeable” i.e., nonpolitical expenses, and union spending that is
“nonchargeable” i.e., political expenses, unrealistic. In other words, the amicus briefs asserted
that it was impossible to distinguish between a union’s collective bargaining acts and political
acts. Further, the amicus briefs asserted, the impracticality of the Abood distinction was
demonstrated by the numerous times the Court was called upon to determine which side of the
line union expenses fell on. The difficulty in separating expenses and the continually disputed
nature of the rule made it unworkable.501 As one brief explained Abood’s “validity is so hotly
contested that it cannot reliably function as a basis for decision in future cases.”502 Amici curiae
asserted that when precedent has become unworkable or is constantly debated this is justification
for the Court to overturn the precedent. Another brief claimed that “the Court overturns poorlyreasoned applications of the United States Constitution when that application has proven
unworkable”503 The petitioner’s brief claimed, “Abood is thus unworkable in the sense that
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matters most: in safeguarding employee First Amendment rights.” 504 The general consensus
among the amicus briefs was that Abood’s rule was “unworkable” in practice and that justified
overturning the decision without concern for stare decisis.505
The majority opinion adopted amici’s analysis stating, “Another relevant consideration in
the stare decisis calculus is the workability of the precedent in question … and that factor also
weighs against Abood.”506 Quoting Harris, the Janus majority, asserted that “Abood ‘s line
between chargeable and nonchargeable union expenditures had proved to be impossible to draw
with precision.”507 The Court attempts to distinguish chargeable expenditures from
nonchargeable expenditures had failed and thus the majority concluded this only proved that
“Abood has proved unworkable.”508
In sum, the majority adopted many of the rationales provided by the amicus briefs in its
decision to overturn Abood. The overarching principle put forth by the majority and many of the
amicus briefs was that the Court should approach any encroachment on the First Amendment as
presumptively unconstitutional.509 The amicus briefs and the Court viewed Abood as a 40-yearlong violation of free speech.510
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Content Analysis of the Janus Decision
There were 24 total submission for petitioners in Janus. Of the 24, I was able to identify
at least one Network member in all but three briefs. However, the number of Network members
varied from brief to brief and their participation in Federalist Society’s events also varied
considerably. For example, in the filed brief by The Rutherford Institute, I found only one event
at a law school chapter listed for one of the attorneys, so I decided not to include that brief as a
Network brief. Many other briefs included highly active members of the Network and leaders of
the Practice Groups. The Brief for the Petitioner included three active participants in the
Federalist Society. There was a total of 46 Network members participating in Janus, 38 as
amicus curiae, five Supreme Court Justices, and three of the six attorneys for Mark Janus.
The Agency Shop as Compelled Association and Compelled Speech
One argument made by the Network in their briefs for Janus was paying an agency fee to
a public sector union forces an individual to support political ideas that he or she objects to and
contradict his own beliefs. Network members viewed agency fees in the public sector as
compelled association and compelled speech that violated the First Amendment rights of
individual workers whose preference was not to associate with the majority elected union. Using
the content analysis software atlas.ti to code the briefs shows that 12 of the 24 briefs submitted
on behalf of the petitioners asserted that the First Amendment protected against compelled
association and 11 of these 12 were written by Network members. Additionally, 14 briefs
expressed that the First Amendment protected against compelled speech, of which 13 were
written by Network members. Content analysis also reveals that 17 of the 24 submitted briefs
asserted that agency fees compelled speech and association in violation of the First Amendment.
This theme was mentioned 38 times across the 17 briefs. The 17 briefs included 15 submitted by
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members of the Network. This was the underlying holding of the majority opinion. The Court
ruled that agency fees compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment.
Table 1. Content Analysis Results Janus Theme 1: Compelled Speech and Association
Number of briefs
mentioning
Agency fees compel
speech and association
First Amendment:
Gov’t Cannot Compel
to Speech
First Amendment:
Gov’t Cannot Compel
to Associate

Number of Network
briefs mentioning

Number of
mentions in
Janus opinion
1

17

15

14

13

2

12

11

1

The majority concluded that public employees’ right to free speech was violated by an
agency shop which forced public employees to “subsidize a union, even if they choose not to
join and strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective bargaining and related
activities.”511 Content analysis shows that 12 briefs mentioned a total of 18 times that the First
Amendment barred the government from compelling one to subsidize speech they opposed and
this included 9 briefs signed by Network members. Fifteen briefs, all of which included at least
one Network member, argued 29 times that agency fees compelled a nonmember to associate
with a union that the public employee did not want to join. Six amici curiae, four of which were
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Network members made this point quoting the same Thomas Jefferson line from A Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom that the majority later cited twice.512
Table 2. Content Analysis Results Janus Theme 2: Agency Fees Forced to Promote Ideas
Oppose.
Agency Fees Forced
to Promote Ideas
Oppose
Agency fees forced to
support speech oppose
Agency fees forced to
associate with union
did not want to join
Thomas Jefferson
quote

Number of briefs
mentioning
12

Number of FS
Network briefs
mentioning
9

Janus opinion

1

15

15

1

6

4

1

Public Sector Unions Bargaining is Political Speech and Lobbying
The central assertion of the majority in Janus was that the negotiations during public
sector collective bargaining were political speech unlike the same negotiations in the private
sector. The majority thus concluded agency fees violated the First Amendment of public
employees. The majority reasoned that agency fees force workers who do not want to join the
union nonetheless support the union’s speech in public sector collective bargaining. The
majority also stated the substance of public sector collective bargaining,513 issues such as
working conditions, benefits, and wages affected the public spending which made what the
union’s words of interest to the public. The Court rejected the contention that unions’ bargaining
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concerned purely private matters and did not appear to imagine any scenario where the union
was not acting politically or that collective bargaining concerned private negotiations between
employer and employee. Content analysis indicates that the majority discussed collective
bargaining as political speech 8 times and specifically mentioned 6 times that “core issues such
as wages, pensions, and benefits” discussed in public sector collective bargaining “are important
political issues.”514
The Network also argued since the union is bargaining over wages, pensions, and other
worker benefits and conditions with the government, the union’s bargaining positions will
necessarily affect public policy and state budgets. Therefore, whatever speech or activities that a
union engages in, is naturally political speech. Content analysis shows that 19 out of the 24 amici
curiae submitted on behalf of the Janus petitioners asserted that collective bargaining concerned
political issues. This topic was talked about 86 times and 17 of the briefs were written by
Network members. It also shows that all 16 briefs that argued 47 times that collective bargaining
was “inherently political” were from Network members as were nine of the ten briefs which
argued 26 times that collective bargaining and lobbying are the same. Thirteen briefs, all from
the Network members stated 43 times that collective bargaining issues such as wages, pensions
and other employee benefits are matters of public policy. Since such a large proportion of the
briefs discussed the political nature of public sector unions, I looked a little deeper into the
documents to see which of these briefs devoted a section to the issue. Of the 19 briefs that
mentioned that public sector bargaining speech is a political activity, 10 had a section with a title

514

Id. at 2481
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to that effect. All of these were written by Network members. While many briefs may mention
this theme, the discussions are mostly within the Network briefs.
Collective bargaining was also discussed as it related to public spending and state
budgets. The impact of collective bargaining on state budgets was discussed in 10 amicus briefs
and mentioned 37 times. Nine of these briefs included at least one Network members. The
majority discussed state budgets in relation to public sector collective bargaining seven times.
Six amicus briefs linked the increase in public sector unions to fiscal crises and municipal
bankruptcies across the nation. All six amici curiae included at least one Network member. Two
of these Network members’ briefs were cited by the majority. The majority claimed that the
increase in public spending due in substantial part to collective bargaining contracts and the
public debate over government debt had led to collective bargaining’s rise as a salient political
issue.515

Id. at 2483 (“These developments, and the political debate over public spending and debt they have spurred, have
given collective-bargaining issues a political valence that Abood did not fully appreciate.”).
515
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Table 3. Content Analysis Results Janus Theme 3: Political Speech
Theme: Public Sector
Collective Bargaining
is Political
Public sector collective
bargaining concerns
political issues
Public sector collective
bargaining is
inherently political
Public sector collective
bargaining is lobbying
Core bargaining issues
of wages, benefits are
political issues
Section discussing
political speech
Public sector collective
bargaining concerns
state budgets
Public sector collective
bargaining causes
fiscal crisis

Number briefs
mentioning

Number Network
briefs mentioning

Janus opinion

19

17

8

16

16

0

10

9

0

13

9

6

10

10

n/a

10

9

7

6

6

1

Another part of the Network members’ argument was that these “nonmembers” or
“dissenting” public employees who chose not to join the union were forced to pay agency fees
which compelled them to support political speech that they oppose in violation of the First
Amendment. The content analysis shows that 20 briefs argued a total of 74 times that agency
fees compelled the subsidization of a political view the dissenting worker opposed. Nineteen of
these briefs included members of the Network. This was also discussed in the majority opinion
four times.
The majority related agency fees to a First Amendment right to be free from government
deciding how individuals must think. The majority held, “Compelling individuals to mouth
support for views they find objectionable violates that cardinal constitutional command, and in
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most contexts, any such effort would be universally condemned.”516 Content analysis can trace
this same theme of connecting agency fees to betrayal of conscience to five briefs written for
Janus, all of which were by Network members and one brief written by Network members for
Harris. These five briefs from the Network also claimed compelled fees were worse because
“government employer intrudes upon its employees’ liberty more seriously when it requires them
to support political positions they do not favor (for example, by forcing them to pay union fees)
than when it restricts their speech in order to improve workplace functioning and job
performance.”517
Table 4. Content Analysis Results Janus Theme 4: Betraying beliefs
Theme: Public Sector
Collective Bargaining
is Political
Compelled to support
political speech that
they oppose
Agency fees forced to
betray beliefs

Number briefs
mentioning

Number Network
briefs mentioning

Janus opinion

20

19

4

5

5

2

Stare Decisis
Twenty-one of the briefs called to overrule Abood in their Janus briefs. While almost all
the briefs submitted on petitioner’s behalf argued for overruling Abood based on the First
Amendment, not all approached the subject of stare decisis. Based on content analysis, mentions
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Id. at 2463
Brief for California Public-School Teachers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16, Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL
6054679
517
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of the word “stare decisis” tallied 55 mentions in just five briefs. The proper use of stare decisis
was most extensively discussed by the jointly-written brief of the Cato Institute, National
Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center and the Center of the
American Experiment which accounted for 25 of the 55 (46%) of the mentions. The brief from
the United States which mentioned stare decisis seven times and accounted for 13% also
included a discussion of stare decisis proper role. Next in the number of mentions was the brief
from American Center for Law and Justice which mentioned stare decisis six times (11%) of the
total mentions. Janus petitioners mentioned stare decisis five times accounting for 9% of the
mentions, and the brief from the Madison Institute which mentioned stare decisis 3 times or
5.5% of the total mentions. The subject of stare decisis was most extensively discussed by four
briefs: the jointly-written brief mentioned above, and the United States’ brief, the American
Center for Law and Justice’s brief and the brief by the Janus petitioners. The fifth brief merely
mentioned the term once, and it was not a theoretical discussion of the principles of stare decisis.
Table 5. Mentions of Stare Decisis
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner

Mentions

Percent of
Total

Brief for the Cato Institute, National Federation of
Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, and
Center of the American Experiment
Brief for the United States

25

46%

7

13%

Amicus Brief of the American Center for Law and Justice

6

11%

Brief for the Petitioner

5

9%

Brief of Amicus Curiae James Madison Center for Free
Speech
Janus Opinion

3

5.6%

8

14%
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The main justification by these amici which all included Network members was that stare
decisis principles properly understood were less binding in constitutional cases. Abood fits the
category. Content analysis shows the majority and two briefs, the jointly-written brief by three
entities and the Brief for the United States, all quoted the line “stare decisis is ‘not an inexorable
command.’”518 The majority and three briefs, the petitioner’s brief, the jointly-written brief by
the Cato Institute, National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center,
and Center of the American Experiment and the Brief for the United States519 all quoted, “This
Court has not hesitated to overrule decisions offensive to the First Amendment.”520 The majority
and the same three briefs, plus an additional brief from American Center for Law and Justice all
quoted, “stare decisis ‘is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our
interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior
decisions.’”521 The arguments against stare decisis based on “new Originalism” came from four
separate briefs: the Cato Institute, National Federation of Independent Business Small Business
Legal Center, and Center of the American Experiment, the American Center for Law and
Justice’s brief, the United States’ brief, and the Petitioner’s brief. These amicus briefs
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Brief from the Cato Institute, National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center and the
Center of the American Experiment at 3, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466) 2017 WL 5564296; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 29-30, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council
31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466) 2017 WL 6205805; Janus at 2478 “stare decisis is ‘not an inexorable
command.’”
519
Cato Institute and National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center and Center of the
American Experiment at 5, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31
138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466) 2017 WL 5564296 ; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 29-30, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council
31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466) 2017 WL 6205805; Janus at 2478
520
Janus at 2478
521
Cato Institute and National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center and Center of the
American Experiment at 4, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31
138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466) 2017 WL 5564296 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997))
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summarized in the language of “new Originalism” why the doctrine of stare decisis did not
preclude the Court from overruling Abood. Content analysis demonstrates these four briefs, all of
which included at least one member of the Network framed their Constitutional arguments to
dismiss adhering to precedent in this case in the same language. Content analysis also
demonstrated the majority incorporated this same language in their opinion. These members of
the Network and the five conservative majority agreed on these points regarding stare decisis:
The doctrine while important can be excused, it is laxer for cases that involve a Constitutional
issue, and finally, in cases concerning the First Amendment is exceptionally pliant. According to
the majority and amici “stare decisis applies with perhaps least force of all to decisions that
wrongly denied First Amendment rights.”522
Table 6. Content Analysis Results Janus Theme 5: “New Originalism”

Number of briefs

“Not an
inexorable
command”
3

Weakest for
Constitution

Least of all for
First Amendment

4

3

Cato Institute, et al.

1

12

2

United States

1

2

2

Petitioner

1

1

1

American Center for Law and
Justice
The Madison Institute

0

4

0

0

0

0

Janus opinion

1

2

1

522

Janus at 2478; also see Cato Institute and National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal
Center and Center of the American Experiment at 1, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466) 2017 WL 5564296
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Legal Consistency and Legal Developments
These quotes comported with the “new Originalism” argument made in the Network
members’ brief that Abood was not consistent with standard First Amendment principles. They
argued this was because the Court had not applied heightened scrutiny to compulsory fees that
was mandated for a First Amendment case. The Network also asserted decision conflicted with
later precedents that did apply a stricter standard such as Harris and Knox. In short, Abood
“departed spectacularly from settled First Amendment law.”523 Thus, according to the Network,
another legal factor worthy of consideration when contemplating stare decisis was whether the
older precedent remained consistent with newer precedents; whether the precedent has departed
from similar cases; or whether the precedent has become outdated and unreconcilable with other
precedents.524 Petitioner’s brief called to overrule Abood because its ruling was contrary to
constitutional precedents that existed at the time and to constitutional precedents that
followed.525 Similarly, the brief from the United States reasoned that precedents may also be
overturned when ensuing cases have weakened the precedent’s foundation.526 They asserted that
Abood had been undermined by the Court’s later decisions in Knox and Harris and therefore
should be overruled.527 According to the Cato Institute et al., a precedent can be overruled when
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(Brief for the Cato Institute, National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, and
Center of the American Experiment as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Janus v. American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL 5564296
524
Brief for the Petitioner at 34, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council
31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL 5952674
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Brief for the Petitioner 25-26, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council
31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL 5952674
526
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 30-31, Janus v. American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL 6205805
527
Brief of the United States at 10-11, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL 6205805 (“this Court has twice characterized Abood
as an anomaly, and Abood’s incompatibility with the reasoning of Harris and Knox is a sufficient justification for its
overruling…overruling Abood would resolve a conflict between two contradictory lines of precedent and clarify
First Amendment law.”).
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it is an outlier among other similar cases. This may be due to new facts that have come to light,
the way the law has developed, or perhaps the precedent itself was decided “incorrectly.”528 The
majority also indicated that a precedent’s inconsistency with similar decisions was one of the
factors the Court considered in determining whether to overrule an earlier decision.529 Among
the reasons the majority cited for not following stare decisis was that since the decision
conditions surrounding public sector unions had changed and experience had exposed concerns
with agency fees.530 The majority stated, new facts and legal developments had weakened the
decision making it an outlier relative to other First Amendment cases. 531
In the content analysis we see that nine briefs, all of which were written by Network
members, mention that when a precedent was deemed inconsistent with similar cases and more
recent rulings, stare decisis was not required. Two briefs contained a lengthy discussion of
inconsistency as reason to overrule Abood. Those two were the petitioner’s briefs with 12
mentions and the joint brief from Cato Institute, et al. with nine mentions. The brief from the
United States had five mentions, Jason R. Barclay and James S. Montana, Jr., Former General
Counsel to Governors of the State of Illinois’s brief had four, the California Public School
Teachers’ brief had three, the Madison Center for Free Speech’s brief had two mentions, and the
last three briefs had a single mention.
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Cato Institute and National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center and Center of the
American Experiment at 10, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31
138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL 5564296 (“This can occur either ‘if the precedent under
consideration itself departed from the Court’s jurisprudence,’ or if the law has afterward ‘so far developed as to have
left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine’”).
529
Janus at 2479 (“be taken into account in deciding whether to overrule a past decision … its consistency with
other related decision” )
530
Id. at 2460
531
Id. at 2483

156

Only three amici discussed changes in the law as developments that made it necessary to
overrule Abood and justified under the Network’s stare decisis doctrine. The content analysis
also shows this was discussed 10 times. The two briefs submitted with Network members
accounted for 40% of the mentions. Cato Institute et al.’s brief and United States’ brief each
accounted for 20% of the mentions. One brief, which did not include a Network member,
accounted for 10% and did not mention stare decisis at all nor theorize about its justification, but
did reference overruling Abood because of new facts. The majority opinion accounted for 50% of
the mentions discussing both the issue of stare decisis as it related to precedents and also new
developments since Abood as they related to precedents. The two briefs from the Network
members and the majority opinion all discussed “new developments” in conjunction other factors
relating to stare decisis considerations.
Table 7. Content Analysis Results Janus Theme 6: Factors to weigh stare decisis
Number of
briefs

Network briefs

Consistent with other cases
mentions

9

9

Janus
Opinion
mentions
3

New developments
mentions

3

2

5

Quality of Reasoning
The Janus majority declared, “An important factor in determining whether a precedent
should be overruled is the quality of its reasoning, … and as we explained in Harris, Abood was
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poorly reasoned.”532 The petitioners’ brief in Harris, specifically referred to Abood as “not well
reasoned” as a justification to invalidate agency fees.533 The majority opinion in Harris
characterized Abood’s ruling as “questionable on several grounds” which had “become more
evident and troubling in the years since then.”534 In Janus, the petitioners mentioned Abood’s
poor reasoning four times but contained a detailed review of what the specific aspects of that
reasoning was and why that allowed a precedent to be overturned. The brief from the Cato
Institute et al. also asserted a precedent that “was badly reasoned and produces erroneous results”
was enough to overturn Abood. The Cato Institute et al. referred to the bad reasoning of the
Abood decision three times. The Janus majority based overturning Abood on its flawed and poor
reasoning 10 times.
Referring to the “quality of reasoning” was how the majority bundled what the Court and
amici perceived as flaws with Abood. Falling under the “quality of its reasoning” was criticism
that Abood wrongly concluded that two prior private sector cases, Hanson and Street, required
the Court to validate the agency shop. However, according to the majority both cases were
narrow decisions that simply upheld “Congress’s ‘bare authorization’ of private-sector union
shops under the Railway Labor Act.”535 This meant, as the Court had already discussed in
Harris, that “Abood failed to appreciate that a very different First Amendment question arises
when a State requires its employees to pay agency fees.”536 The petitioners in Harris, whose
attorney was a Network member, twice discussed that Hanson and Street were the wrong
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Janus at 2479
Brief for Petitioners at 34, Harris v. Quinn 573 US 616, (2014) (No. 11-681),
534
Harris at 635
535
Janus at 2479
536
Id.
533

158

precedents to rely on because both had merely permitted the agency shop. Cato Institute and
National Federation of Independent Business’s Harris brief, which included five Network
members, mentioned this theme four times and California Public-School Teachers, the Christian
Educators Association International, and the Center for Individual Rights’ Harris brief
mentioned this once. The Harris majority adopted this position and had two mentions. In Janus
the Cato Institute et al.’s brief repeated that Hanson and Street had merely permitted agency
shops in the private sector four times. The petitioner’s brief for Janus cited the majority from
Harris to simply state Abood had “‘fundamentally misunderstood’ earlier cases concerning laws
authorizing private sector compulsory fees.”537
Another flaw the majority found in Abood’s reasoning was its use of a Commerce Clause
doctrine, labor peace, to uphold what should have been a First Amendment analysis. Therefore,
Hanson was not applicable to the facts of Abood. This concept also appeared in the Harris briefs
from the petitioner which mentioned this five times, and the Cato Institute and National
Federation of Independent Business’s brief seven times. The majority mentioned this once in the
opinion. Three briefs - the petitioner’s brief, the brief from the Cato Institute et al. and the
Landmark Legal Foundation’s brief claimed Abood was mistaken to rely on Hanson and Street.
These briefs also argued that Hanson and Street had only discussed labor peace in relation to the
Congress’s Commerce Clause power and not as a Constitutional issue. Cato Institute et al.’s brief
mentioned Hanson and Street had been Commerce Clause cases eight times, the Landmark Legal
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Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council
31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL 5952674
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Foundation three times, and the petitioner’s brief once. The majority opinion mentioned this
twice.
Another reason the Abood Court had been wrong to base their decision on Hanson and
Street according to the majority was due to the absence of any First Amendment analysis.
“Abood failed to appreciate that a very different First Amendment question arises when a State
requires its employees to pay agency fees… Moreover, neither Hanson nor Street gave careful
consideration to the First Amendment.”538 Six briefs criticized Abood for relying on Hanson and
Street because neither was a First Amendment decision. All six briefs included members of the
Network. The Cato Institute et al.’s brief mentioned this nine times, the Landmark Legal
Foundation’s brief mentioned this six times, James Madison Center for Free Speech mentioned
this four times, James Madison Institute mentioned this three times, the United States mentioned
this four times, Janus Petitioner mentioned this three times, and the majority opinion mentioned
this three times.
Workability
Amici curiae claimed that Abood’s attempt to separate union expenses into chargeable
nonpolitical expenses and nonchargeable political expenses was a fool’s errand. This fact made
Abood’s rule unworkable and ripe to be overturned. The majority agreed with amici curiae that
the distinction was “impossible to draw” and therefore also considered the precedent
unworkable.539 Accordingly, another factor the majority considered when determining whether to

538
539

Janus at 2479
Janus at 2481
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overturn a precedent was “the workability of the rule it established.”540 The majority declared
this twice more.
Another relevant consideration in the stare decisis calculus is the workability of the
precedent in question…and that factor also weighs against Abood.541 The workability of the
precedent applied to its practical application since the decision and according to the majority
Abood “has led to practical problems and abuse” 542 Specific references to the “workability” of a
precedent as it applied to stare decisis were mentioned in five briefs for Janus and only one brief
from Harris. The following are the number of times each brief discussed that a precedent should
be overruled if its rule was unworkable: The petitioner’s brief mention this six times, the Cato
Institute et al.’s brief mentioned four times, 1851 Center for Constitutional Law’s brief
mentioned seven times, Jason R. Barclay543 and James S. Montana, Jr., Former General Counsel
to Governors of the State of Illinois’s brief mentioned five times, Jane Ladley and Christopher
Meier’s brief mentioned three times.
In the Harris set of briefs, the only one to mention the unworkability of precedent as a
determinant for stare decisis was the jointly-written California Public-School Teachers, the
Christian Educators Association International, and the Center for Individual Rights’ brief which
mentioned workability four times.
More briefs discussed the impossibility of separating union expenses without a specific
mention to stare decisis. In Harris, the impossibility of separating expenses was asserted by four

540

Id.
Id.
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Id. at 2460
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briefs all of which included at least one Network member. The California Public-School
Teachers et al.’s brief mentioned this three times, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, et al.’s
brief mentioned it twice, Albert Contreras et al.’s brief one time, and the Illinois Policy
Institute’s brief one time. In Janus there were ten briefs that discussed non-distinction between
union spending for collective bargaining and one for lobbying. One brief summed up this theme
in the statement, “This is because when a public employee union bargains for higher wages and
other benefits, it is arguing for a public policy that devotes more resources to programs staffed
by its members at the expense of other programs.”544 The petitioner’s briefs mentioned this five
times, United States’ brief mentioned this three times, the Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence mentioned this theme two times, Pacific Legal Foundation et al.’s brief mentioned
this two times and Jason R. Barclay and James S. Montana, Jr., Former General Counsel to
Governors of the State of Illinois’ brief mentioned this twice. The five other briefs each
mentioned this once.545
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The Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioner at 9, Janus v.
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448, (2018) (No. 16-1466),
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Table 8. Content Analysis Results Janus Theme 7: Abood was wrong and should be overruled
Number of Number of
briefs
Network
mentioning briefs
mentioning
Quality of
Reasoning
and stare
decisis
Workability
and stare
decisis
Commerce
Clause
Hanson and
Street
No First
Amendment
analysis
Hanson
only
authorized

3

3

Number
of
mentions
in Janus
opinion
10

5

5

3

Number of Number of
briefs
Network
mentioning briefs
mentioning
1

1

Number
of
mentions
in Harris
opinion
2

6

1

1

0

3

2

2

2

1

6

6

3

3

3

7

2

2

1

3

3

2

Conclusion
My hypothesis is that the FS influenced the Supreme Court majority in its decision in
Janus. Janus held that agency fees violated public employees’ free speech rights because it
forced workers to subsidize political speech. The majority’s position was that all public sector
agency fees requirements compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. Thus, the First
Amendment now protects the right not to pay agency fees to a union.
As explained earlier the language in the Network briefs discussed public sector unions as
political entities and collective bargaining as issues of public importance. The Network further
argued this scenario unconstitutionally compelled the workers to support information the
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government received which were opposed by nonmembers. The Network contended this
distorted the political process. The majority opinion seemed to have adopted this framework. The
majority held that a law in which public employees are forced to subsidize a union, even if they
choose not to join and strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective bargaining
and related activities…violate[d] the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to
subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.546
The majority was echoing the ideas that had been asserted by amici from the Network
when it described public sector collective bargaining as speech that concerned the public issues,
concerned the citizenry, and speech that involve public spending. 547 The Network was
represented in all but three briefs. In Section 3, content analysis shows that the concept of public
sector unions as political entities was addressed by many briefs. Almost all of the briefs
submitted by the petitioner and amici curiae mentioned that public sector bargaining involved
political issues. Looking deeper into the number of mentions showed a clearer picture. In the
Network members’ briefs, the idea that public sector collective bargaining was inherently
political speech was more than a mention, it guided the Network’s argument. This is also seen in
the content analysis. The Network’s briefs contained longer discussion of the issue as seen by the
larger number of mentions. In addition, the briefs that dedicated a section to this theme were also
all written by the Network.
This was not a novel argument in 2018. The counsel for Abood petitioners had asserted
way back in 1976 that “public-sector collective bargaining is inherently and unalterably political
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Janus at 2460
Id. at 2460 ; 2476, 2464
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in character.548” It was a novel assertion in 1976 and it was initiated by the counsel for Abood,
but it was an argument the Court did not find compelling. The Court in Abood recognized some
aspects of union activity involved politics and disallowed agency fees for those acts but also
recognized collective bargaining as an economic act. The Abood Court did not hold a singular
view of public sector unions as did the Network. Nor did the Abood Court focus singularly on
protecting the dissenters’ rights or the rights of the minority of workers as did the Network.
Quoting Justice Douglas’ concurrence in Street, the Abood Court reasoned,
But the judgment clearly made in Hanson and Street is that such interference as
exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important
contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by
Congress. “The furtherance of the common cause leaves some leeway for the
leadership of the group. As long as they act to promote the cause which justified
bringing the group together, the individual cannot withdraw his financial support
merely because he disagrees with the group’s strategy”549
The principles expressed in this passage vividly illuminate the change in the Court since the
1970s. For, it is the ideas expressed in this passage: a common cause, a collective identity
bringing mutual benefit, the importance of unions in employer-employee relations, the deference
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Brief for the Appellants at 62, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (No. 75-1153), 1976
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Abood at 222-223 (“But the judgment clearly made in Hanson and Street is that such interference as exists is
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1805. (Douglas, J., concurring).
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to Congress’ judgement, and a First Amendment that is balanced among rights, that the Network
and eventually a five Court majority expressly sought out to reject.550 The Court in Abood
explicitly spoke of the rights of the majority of workers who had elected the union as well as the
protections of the minority of workers. Nothing remotely similar would appear in Janus. The
Abood Court, although at the precipice of the “the money is speech” doctrine,551 did not take an
absolutist view of the First Amendment or introduce the possibility of denying an individual’s
ability to think for themselves if the Court allowed agency fees to continue.552 The seeds were
present in the Abood petitioner’s brief and in Justice Powell’s dissent, but it would take four
decades to cultivate a majority on the Court.
The Network never let up challenging Abood in the lower courts and the Supreme Court
with this argument in case after case. These arguments were advanced at FS annual meetings, at
Lawyers Chapter events and Students Chapter events by the same lawyers arguing the cases in
court and by other Network members. Many of these members began submitting separate briefs
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No better illustration of this attack is the language in Cato Institute and National Federation of Independent
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Abood, the Court accepted it as Hanson’s central holding and therefore settled law.” Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners Brief of the Cato Institute and National Federation of Independent Business as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 14-15, Harris. v. Quinn 573 US 616, (2014) (No. 11-681), 2013 WL 6248441
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in support of this argument. In briefs submitted to the Court prior to Knox, Harris and Janus, this
argument remained the same; public sector unions are involved in politics. Their actions and
speech impact public funds and public policies. The Network insisted that Abood wrongly
believed unions could perform tasks that were not political and that was an irredeemable flaw.
The Network continued to challenge Abood in the courts until they were able to create the right
circumstances. They finally made headway in the 2012 Knox decision in which the Court
conceded, “Because a public-sector union takes many positions during collective bargaining that
have powerful political and civic consequences the compulsory fees constitute a form of
compelled speech and association that imposes a ‘significant impingement on First Amendment
rights.’”553 An essential element was obtaining the right justices on the bench. This did not
happen until decades later with the addition of Justice Alito and Justice Roberts to the Court,
which also was in large part due to the influence of the FS. It was a combination of continuously
initiating cases, dispersing their arguments to a wider audience through Federalist Society events,
and readying themselves and their responses to the Court’s signals, along with a change in
Supreme Court members that finally allowed a change in Court doctrine in Janus.
The topic of stare decisis is where we can see the influence of the Federalist Society
Network more clearly. Section 2 shows the overlap in language between the Network briefs and
the majority opinion. The Network’s doctrine of “new Originalism” and its principles
surrounding stare decisis provided the Court with the rationale behind overturning Abood.
Section 3 then show that of 24 briefs submitted only five briefs even mentioned the words “stare
decisis” all of which are written by Network members. In addition, only four of these briefs had
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a meaningful discussion of the theory that allowed certain precedents to be expendable. Once
again, all four included Network members. None of the other briefs that argued overturning
Abood developed the “new Originalist” reasoning adopted by the Court.
The brief from the American Center for Justice and Law which included two Network
members also provided the historical portion of “new Originalism” rooted in the founding
generation thus appealing to the justices that it was their duty to right their own wrong
committed in Abood. The Cato Institute et al.’s brief which included three Network members
also discussed the Originalist justification for ignoring precedents and outlined each of the
factors the Court considers when deciding whether or not to overturn a precedent. The
petitioners, with three Network members, and the United States’ brief, with three Network
members, also discussed the same determinants as the Cato Institute et al. in the decision to
overturn a precedent. All four briefs that discussed stare decisis, did so relying on the same “new
Originalism” principles promulgated by the Federalist Society. In their own discussion of stare
decisis, the majority listed these very same factors as the previous briefs which the Court thought
“should be taken into account in deciding whether to overrule a past decision.” The most
important ones were “the quality of Abood’s reasoning, the workability of the rule it established,
its consistency with other related decisions, developments since the decision was handed down,
and reliance on the decision.”554 Each of those five factors had been discussed in detail by
Network members’ briefs.
When we look at the specific criticism that made up Abood’s “questionable reasoning” or
flaws in the analysis, we again see the criticism of Hanson and Street’s as controlling precedents
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for Abood discussed exclusively by Network members. The criticism of the Court in applying
private sector precedents to public sector labor unions, using a Commerce Clause doctrine for the
First Amendment, and not applying the proper standard of review for a First Amendment
question all came from Network briefs. These same criticisms of Abood later appeared in the
majority opinion.
What is also notable about the Janus case is the Network presence overall in the amici
curiae submitted. There is at least one Network member present on 87.5% of the briefs and a
total of 41 Network members. In Knox, there was two amici curiae with seven Network
members and three Federalist Society affiliated organizations. In Harris, there were seven amici
curiae with 18 Network members and 10 FS affiliated organizations. Janus had 21 amici curiae
with 41 Network members and 24 different FS affiliated organizations. Network participation in
Knox totaled 11 - three as attorneys, four as amici curiae, and four as Supreme Court Justices.
Network participation in Harris totaled 22 - one attorney, 17 as amici curiae, and four as
Supreme Court Justices. Network participation in Janus totaled 46 – three as attorneys, 38 as
amicus curiae, and five Supreme Court Justices. That in itself shows the reach and growth of the
FS over time.
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Table 9. Federalist Society Network Participation in Janus
Case

Total
Network Network Amici
Network
Supreme
Total FS
briefs
briefs
attorney Curiae
affiliated
Court
Network
including including
for
organizations Justices participation
petitioner petitioner petitioner
Abood
2
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Knox

2

2

3

4

3

4

11

Harris

8

7

1

17

10

4

22

Janus

24

21

3

38

24

5

46

Lastly, the Federalist Society is also known for a strict individualist view of
Constitutional rights. In general, the Federalist Society see little if any rights that are attached to
groups. That view is definitely evident in its writings for Janus. The Abood opinion
acknowledged collective bargaining has political aspects but also addressed the rights of unions
to associate, as well as the decisions of a majority of workers and government interest in labor
peace and free riders. None of the amici curiae written by the Network members or any of the
majority opinions reflected on the role of collective associations in representative government as
positive. Instead, the focus was always on individual dissenters isolated from their colleague
majority workers. Likewise, the three majority opinions discussed in this dissertation showed
little consideration for the workers’ right to associate or that a majority of workers elected to
unionize through a democratic process. The Network members and the majority always
portrayed unions and collective interest as suppressive. As the majority declared,
We recognize that the loss of payments from nonmembers may cause unions to
experience unpleasant transition costs in the short term and may require unions to
make adjustments in order to attract and retain members. But we must weigh these
170

disadvantages against the considerable windfall that unions have received under
Abood for the past 41 years. It is hard to estimate how many billions of dollars have
been taken from nonmembers and transferred to public-sector unions in violation
of the First Amendment. Those unconstitutional exactions cannot be allowed to
continue indefinitely555
Neither the majority in Janus nor the Network as amici could imagine any benefits a nonmember
may have received as a result of the union’s collective bargaining. The individual’s choice was
either with the union or against it.
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Chapter 6
Shelby County v. Holder

The Pre- Shelby County Cases
The goal of this section is to describe Voting Rights Act signed into law on August 6,
1965, (VRA or the Act) 556 and the circumstances that led to its passage. I then examine the first
legal challenge to the Act, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Following
Katzenbach, I next examine Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder
557 U.S. 193 (2009) which led to Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
The Voting Rights Act of 1965
In the words of the Supreme Court, the Voting Rights Act was passed “to banish the
blight of racial discrimination in voting” that had “infected” mainly Southern states since the end
of the Civil War.557 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed in response to the Civil Rights
Movement and the violence enacted upon the Civil Rights demonstrators demanding states and
local officials recognize African-Americans’ right to vote as guaranteed by the Fifteenth
Amendment. It was Congress’s intent to put the force of the federal government behind the
Fifteen Amendment.558 By 1965 Congress recognized that relying on the judicial process to
eliminate unconstitutional obstacles to voting “case-by-case” had not been enough to stay ahead
of crafty southern officials. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment gave Congress “the power to
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Public Law 89-110
South Carolina v. Katzenbach 383 U.S. 30, 308 (1966).
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enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”559 It was time for Congress to exercise its
enforcement power and instigate direct federal intervention. That was what the Voting Rights
Act was passed to accomplish. Section 2,560 echoing the language of the Fifteenth Amendment,
prohibited the denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on race or color.561 It allowed
plaintiffs to challenge in court voting practices as racially discriminatory. However, the burden
of proof was placed on the plaintiff.562 Section 2 was permanent and applied nationwide.
In contrast to Section 2, Section 4 and Section 5 targeted certain jurisdictions that had the
most egregious practices of voting discrimination. Section 4 included the triggering formula
which defined which geographic areas would be required to comply with Section 5 of the Act.
Section 4 eliminated literacy tests and other prerequisites for voting in those states and counties
in which either the voter registration rate or the voter turnout rate was under 50% of the votingage population in the 1964 presidential election.563 The states and counties that were captured by
Section 4’s formula would then be subject to Section 5’s “preclearance” conditions. Section 5
prohibited those “covered” states and counties from implementing new voting rules or practices
until approved by the Attorney General. There were six southern states subject to preclearance
directly following the passage of the Act.564 Proposed voting rules could not have as their
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purpose nor have as its effect the denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on race or color.
Section 5 was a temporary preemptive measure that allowed the Attorney General to block
discriminatory voting laws or requirements prior to being implemented.565 This was a significant
change from filing lawsuits after the fact and allowed the federal government to gain control of
enforcing the right to vote through prevention. Three additional sections (Section 6, 7, and 8)
allowed the Attorney General to assign federal examiners to covered jurisdictions to oversee
voter registration and elections. Section 11 prohibited the intimidation or denial of the right to
vote to any qualified person and banned the refusal to count any qualified vote cast.566
The Voting Rights Act enabled the federal government to be proactive in enforcing the
Fifteenth Amendment in those states that were covered by Section 4’s formula. The preclearance
conditions and federal oversight were controversial from the start because these provisions did
allow the federal government to intrude in state election laws. The Voting Rights Act allowed the
federal government to monitor state elections, reject electoral changes deemed discriminatory
and covered a broad array of electoral changes.567 Sections 4, 5, and part of 6 were challenged
immediately after passage.568 The first challenge that reached the Supreme Court was South
Carolina v. Katzenbach 383 U.S. 301, (1966). South Carolina challenged parts of the Voting
Rights Act as an unconstitutionally intruding on state power.
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South Carolina v. Katzenbach 383 U.S. 301, (1966)
A little over a month after President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act
into law, South Carolina filed a motion with the Supreme Court to challenge certain provisions
of the Act. The Supreme Court accepted the case under its original jurisdiction pertaining to a
controversy between a State and a citizen of another state.569 The Court also invited the other 49
states to participate in the case as amici curiae. Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Virginia also captured by the coverage formula submitted briefs in support of South Carolina.
South Carolina had to abide by Sections 4 which eliminated their literacy test, Section 5 which
required preclearance of any voting changes, and 6(b)’s allowance of federal examiners in local
elections. South Carolina claimed these provisions surpassed Congress’s power to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on race-based voting obstructions.
South Carolina argued that constitutional provisions must be interpreted as each
provision related to the “whole compact.” Therefore, Congress’s enforcement power, according
to South Carolina, should be understood in its relationship to the constitutional structure of a
limited government and federalism. The petitioner’s brief further explained that each of the
Constitution’s guarantees including the Amendments were equal to others. There was no
constitutional provision that stood above or below the others nor did any one provision work in
isolation. Even the provisions that granted power and those that limited powers did not cancel
each other out but rather worked together in “harmony.”570 Thus, when judging the
constitutionality of an exercise of the enforcement power it must be interpreted “not only in light
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Brief of the Plaintiff at 6, South Carolina v. Katzenbach 383 U.S. 301, (1966) (No. 22), 1965 WL 130083
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of the Fifteenth Amendments which it purportedly enforces but also against the background of
the entire Compact.”571 The gist of the petitioner’s argument was that under a constitutional
framework of limited government and a federal structure, if an Act’s scope extended beyond the
purpose of the right it was meant to enforce, it cannot be appropriate. In the petitioner’s view, the
Fifteenth Amendment’s “sole purpose” was to prevent racial discrimination in voting. Therefore,
Congress’s enforcement power was limited to upholding the ban on discriminatory practices.
The VRA exceeded this singular purpose by interfering with other constitutional guarantees and
as such was not appropriate.572
Specifically, South Carolina challenged Section 4 and Section 5 of the VRA as
unconstitutionally commandeering the reserved powers of states to regulate their own electoral
process. According to the petitioner, the federal government was taking over the state’s role in
determining voter qualifications for its state elections per Section 4 which eliminated the literacy
test and other voter qualifications.573 Section 5’s preclearance provision allowed the federal
government to regulate all future election processes in covered states. By taking over this duty,
the federal government nullified Article I, Section 2574 of the Constitution (which stated that any
person qualified to vote in state elections was also qualified to vote in congressional elections)
and Article I, Section 4 which allowed the states to regulate their election procedures.575 South
Carolina asserted that the Court must take account of these other constitutional provisions, the
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limited federalist government created by the Constitution, and the intentions of the framers. The
brief also pointed to prior Court decisions holding that states had the exclusive right to organize
their electorate and elections as long as the laws were race neutral.576
In addition, South Carolina claimed that by only subjecting some states to specific
sections of the Act, Congress was violating “the Constitutional principle of Equality of
Statehood.”577 South Carolina claimed this principle meant that all the States were equal under
the Federal government which meant that each state in the union had the same constitutional
rights and the same authority in relation to the other states. The Voting Rights Act’s selective
application violated this doctrine.
The Katzenbach Majority
The Katzenbach majority rejected the petitioner’s challenges. The majority referred to
Section 4 and Section 5 as the “[t]he heart of the Act.” The Court acknowledged that the
remedies it enacted were “stringent” but also noted the Act was targeted to “areas where voting
discrimination has been most flagrant.”578 The majority narrowed the question before them
simply to whether the challenged sections were an appropriate exercise of Congress’s
enforcement powers under the Fifteenth Amendment as it relates to the States.579 The Court
answered yes, the VRA, as enacted, was properly suited “to banish the blight of racial
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discrimination in voting.”580 The majority found the automatic triggering formula was justified
to address the “widespread and persistent discrimination in voting” that overwhelmed any
attempt at “case-by-case litigation.”581 The Court also ruled that “after nearly a century of
systemic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment…the specific remedies prescribed were an
appropriate means of combatting the evil.”582 The majority declared the coverage formula’s use
of “test and devices” legitimate since literacy tests and poll taxes had a historical connection to
voting discrimination. The Court also held as valid the coverage formula’s inclusion of the
voting rate in the 1965 presidential election as an indicator of systemic disenfranchisement. The
Court also determined that the suspension of tests in certain jurisdictions and the deployment of
federal examiners at the Attorney General’s request justified enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment. In reference to reviewing new electoral laws before going into effect, the Court
declared, “This may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional power, as South
Carolina contends, but the Court has recognized that exceptional conditions can justify
legislative measure not otherwise appropriate.”583 The majority further ruled that in relation to
the States' reserved powers, “Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the
constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”584
The majority also addressed the petitioner’s claim that parts of the VRA violated the
“principles of Equality of Statehood” with one simple statement.585 The majority held “The
doctrine of equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that
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doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the
remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”586 That one sentence and one other
mention at the beginning of the opinion stating that the petitioner had invoked “Equality of
Statehood” was the only role state equality played in Katzenbach. The Voting Rights Act of 1965
was upheld as constitutional by an 8-1 vote. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice
Earl Warren. The Court established that Congress rightfully had “full remedial powers to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting” and noted this
power had been used by Congress many times previously.587 The Court’s final conclusion held
“that the sections of the Act which are properly before [them] are an appropriate means for
carrying out Congress’s constitutional responsibilities and are consonant with all other
provisions of the Constitution.”588
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder 557 U.S. 193 (2009)
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One was a municipal utility district
formed through Texas state law. The district was attempting to “bailout” of Section 5 of the
VRA’s preclearance requirements but had been denied by the district court. The Utility District
appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that it was a “political subdivision” eligible for bailout
under the Court’s broader definition.589 In lieu of a finding for the utility district on its bailout
request, the utility district also asked the Court to determine the constitutionality of Section 5.
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The first issue subsequently became overshadowed by the constitutional issue and was the
subject of most of the amici curiae submitted on the district’s behalf.
One of the attorneys for Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One was
Greg Coleman, a member of the Network. Mr. Coleman previously clerked for Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas from 1995-1996 and for Judge Edith Hollan Jones at the U.S. Court of
Appeals Fifth Circuit from 1992-1993.590 A second attorney, Christian J. Ward, is also a member
of the Network and was a past president of FS’s Austin Lawyers Chapter.591 Mr. Ward, while in
college had been on the editorial staff of the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, the
official journal of the FS. In addition to the appellant's briefs, there was a total of six amici
curiae submitted on behalf of the petitioner.
The VRA was set to expire in 2007, 25 years after the last reauthorization. After holding
numerous hearings Congress passed and President George W. Bush signed the Fannie Lou
Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments
Act of 2006. Eight days after the reauthorized Act was signed into law, a utility district in Texas
filed a federal lawsuit. The district’s suit was funded by an organization called the Project on
Fair Representation (PFR) which was started in 2005 by Edward Blum specifically to challenge
the 2006 reauthorization. The utility district, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One, was the only plaintiff as no other covered district joined the case.592 In keeping
with the Project on Fair Representation’s mission, the case challenged the reauthorization of the

590

https://www.yettercoleman.com/profiles/gregory-s-coleman/
https://www.yettercoleman.com/profiles/christian-j-ward/
592
Berman 2013; Project on Fair Representation, https://www.projectonfairrepresentation.org/cases funded by
Donor’s Trust like National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.
591

180

Act,593 particularly Section 4, which detailed the coverage formula and the “bailout” process, and
Section 5, the preclearance provision. The Voting Rights Act had been reauthorized four times
since 1965. The first was in 1970 for five years, then 1975 for seven years, in 1982 for 25 years
and the last time was in 2006. The coverage formula had been updated in 1970 and in 1975 but
not in 1982 or 2006. In 2006 when Congress passed the Act, the coverage formula remained as
established in 1975 which extended to jurisdictions with a voting test in effect and a voter
registration or turnout under 50 percent in 1972.
Petitioner’s statement began by explaining how much America had changed in the 44
years since the passage of the VRA. Although almost every aspect of voting rights had
improved, what had not changed, the utility district charged, was Section 5 of the VRA. The
“original emergency has now passed,” the petitioner argued, yet Section 5 persisted in its
“unparalleled federal intrusion.”594 For these reasons, the utility district declared Section 5 now
exceeded Congress’s enforcement powers and Congress could no longer justify its “intrusive
inversion of our federal structure.”595 The utility district asserted that in its current form, Section
5 “sweeps far past purposeful discrimination to ensnare and preempt” presumptively
constitutional state voting laws.596 Section 5, therefore, was no longer constitutional.597
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Petitioner claimed, along with amici curiae that Congress should have ended or modified
Section 4 and Section 5 but chose not to do so. The Act as reauthorized in 2006, without
changes, was beyond the scope of Congress’s enforcement powers granted by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.598 According to the district and the amici briefs, Section 5 had been a
response to an emergency in which a very specific and pervasive problem had been identified.599
They further asserted that the Court in Katzenbach held the VRA constitutional only due to the
“unique circumstances” and “exceptional” conditions found.600 The petitioner’s brief and amici
declared that the impetus behind Section 5 was that state and local officials continuously and
purposefully shirked the federal courts’ ruling upholding constitutional guarantees against racebased discrimination.601 Congress in 1964 had found the practice so prevalent that litigating each
case could not keep up with the infractions.602 Furthermore, argued the briefs and the district, in
its original application Section 5 was targeted to particular jurisdictions that Congress had
documented a history of ignoring the constitutional guarantees of the Reconstruction
Amendments and intentionally discriminating against African Americans.603 However, according
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to the briefs and petitioner, that was the past. In 2006 Congress was attempting to solve old
problems that no longer existed.
The utility district noted that minority voter registration, minority voter turnout, and the
election of black candidates had all dramatically increased since the 1960s. The utility district
also highlighted the recent election of Barack Obama, the first black president to suggest Section
5 was obsolete.604 This theme was repeated by many of the briefs submitted supporting the utility
district. In their briefs opposing the 2006 reauthorization of Section 5, many of the amici curiae
including the petitioner adopted a that-was-then-this-is-now attitude towards racial
discrimination by the states. All six amici curiae plus the petitioner, alleged that state
discrimination and disenfranchisement of voters based on race had been eliminated. They
claimed that without evidence of persistent and widespread discrimination, a renewal of Section
5 could not be justified. A brief written by a longtime and active member of the Network,
Michael Carvin (for three other longtime Network members Dr. Abigail Thernstrom, William
Bradford Reynolds, and Hans A. von Spakovsky), alleged that Section 5 was not an appropriate
response to the current situation because “the evil presented now is but a shadow of that rampant
in the 1960s South.”605 Another longtime active Network member contended in his brief for the
Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation Goldwater Institute that state discrimination
was “all but extinct.”606 The Pacific Legal Foundation (which included a former member of the
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Executive Committee for the Federalist Society’s Civil Rights Practice Group) also claimed,
“Changes in the social and political landscape cast doubt on, not only Section 5's relevance but
its constitutionality. These changes show that the justifications for Section 5’s remedial measures
no longer exist.”607
Congress’s 2006 reauthorization was described by petitioners as based on an obsolete
coverage formula using outdated data that was not relevant to the current era. The evidence
Congress had gathered to justify the reauthorization did not convince the petitioner nor amici
curiae that Section 5 was still necessary. The petitioner and amici curiae judged the relevancy of
Congress’s evidence against the original tactics used by some states to intentionally ignore
federal court rulings by instituting new obstruction devices as soon as the old device was
outlawed. They claimed that Section 5 had been designed only to address obstruction tactics of
the type employed during Jim Crow and only based on evidence that demonstrated a pattern of
state discrimination that was intentional. The utility district contended Congress’s evidence
concerned “discrimination in general,”608 not specific discrimination equivalent to what had been
gathered by Congress in the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, the utility district charged, Congress
had collected data with the intention of demonstrating that discrimination had not been
eliminated while ignoring that discrimination was no longer of the same purposeful type faced
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prior to the passage of VRA.609 This was also alleged by the brief submitted from the
Southeastern Legal Foundations which included at least one Network member.610 Southeastern
LF joined the case to emphasize that the evidence presented by Congress to justify the need to
reauthorize Section 5 was not comparable to the type of evidence gathered by the 1965 Congress.
According to Southeastern LF, this made the VRA’s 2006 reauthorization constitutionally
troubling. Their brief claimed the record Congress compiled did not demonstrate any instances of
states using the same or similar types of practices that had been employed in the past to
systematically disenfranchise African Americans. A second brief from the Scharf-Norton Center
for Constitutional Litigation Goldwater Institute declared, “the days of the literacy test are long
over” and “minority political progress is no longer ‘modest and spotty.’”611 Additionally, the
Southeastern LF and petitioner faulted Congress for failing to provide any evidence to support
their claim that without Section 5 as a deterrent, the covered jurisdictions would resort to their
old habits of voting discrimination and ignoring federal laws and court orders.612 These two
briefs argued that Section 5 simply presumed the covered jurisdictions were determined to pass
new discriminatory voting laws to evade the Fifteenth Amendment.613 Preclearance, according to
the utility district, unfairly presumed states were still engaged in “resolute intransigence and
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endemic discriminatory animus.”614 Thus, the evidence collected had not demonstrated a need to
continue Section 5’s burdensome intrusion into state sovereignty.615
A showing of general or incidental racial discrimination was not enough to excuse
violating state sovereignty. Petitioner and amici curiae were specific in what they viewed as
constitutionally compliant evidence. Petitioner summed it up stating that Congress must
demonstrate “a systematic pattern of covered jurisdictions recently engaging in concerted efforts
to game the system to the disadvantage of minorities by acting preemptively to impose new
barriers to voting once old barriers are judicially deemed unenforceable (or at least a meaningful
demonstration that jurisdictions would have reverted to those practices had Section 5 not been
reenacted).”616 Amici curiae and petitioner also argued that systemic state discrimination in
voting had all but disappeared and criticized Congress for its failure to either eliminate or modify
Section 5 accordingly.617 Amici curiae and the petitioner all declared the Constitution required
Congress to establish an ongoing systemic pattern of voting discrimination based on race by the
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covered states and then design Section 5’s remedies to match that specific violation. They
contended that anything short of that did not pass the constitutional test.
In sum, the claims by the utility district and amici curiae alike, Section 5’s original
purpose was narrow and precise. For them, Section 5 worked for a specific time in history, in a
certain geographic location place, and because the remedies enacted were closely connected to a
concrete problem. The VRA’s 2006 reauthorization, on the other hand, attempted to solve a
problem that no longer existed. They insisted that Section 5’s provisions extended well beyond
purposeful discrimination. It was no longer a temporary emergency measure targeted only to
locations with evidence of contemporary discrimination.618 Two briefs went further to allege the
reauthorized Section 5 put pressure on states to engage in race conscious districting.619
According to these two briefs, the real race-based policies were preclearance itself. One brief
insisted that Section 5’s preclearance requirement advanced state racial discrimination by
encouraging states to construct districts by separating or combining individuals based on their
racial group. According to the brief, “preclearance systematically promotes an obsession with
racial politics.”620 Furthermore, preclearance violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and conflicted with the colorblind society the Fourteenth Amendment
was passed to secure. A second brief asserted that in its reauthorized form, Section 5 “is an
affirmative requirement for States to create racial classifications of the sort that presumptively
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violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”621 The same brief also declared that the Court had warned
Congress that the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) broad interpretation of Section 5 raised “serious
constitutional concerns.” Despite this warning Congress in 2006 reauthorized the DOJ’s
standard.622
Federalism
The second issue addressed by the utility district and amici curiae was the topic of
federalism and state sovereignty. The utility district contended, supported by amici curiae, that
the 2006 reauthorization of Section 5 altered the Constitution’s federalism structure and
reconfigured the separation of state and federal powers.623 Section 5 was described by the
petitioner as an “unparalleled federal intrusion on the contemporary generation in certain parts of
the country”624 and “the most intrusive inversion of our federalist structure.”625 Petitioner also
described Section 5 as “unprecedented,” “unparalleled,”626 the “most severe intrusion on state
sovereignty in federal law”627 and “the most serious compromise of our federalist structure on
the statute books.” The Pacific Legal Foundation, Center for Equal Opportunity, and Project 21
exemplified other amici curiae by stating that Section 5 was a “federally intrusive law” that
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directly inserts the federal government into state and local policymaking and prevented states
from enacting their own elections laws which was a constitutionally reserved power of the
states.”628 All agreed that Section 5 extorted high federalism costs which could be justified only
for a “real, specific problem.”629 The utility district and amici curiae further insisted that
Congress must demonstrate a compelling need to continue such extreme remedies above and
beyond the VRA’s general prohibition on denying “the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race or color.”630
The brief for the Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation Goldwater Institute
declared that “preclearance commandeers state sovereign power” and was neither suited nor
related to the problem of “active state-sponsored invidious discrimination.”631 The brief further
stated that preclearance allowed Congress to ignore the Tenth Amendment in favor of the
Fifteenth Amendment setting a “dangerous precedent.”632 The Goldwater Institute’s brief also
proclaimed that preclearance stood in opposition to “equality under the law and federalism” and
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therefore should be struck down.633 The brief also called “to liberate covered jurisdictions to
exercise their sovereign powers in a manner that treats citizens as unique individuals, rather than
protected class cogs.” 634
The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion was written by Justice Roberts with seven of the other Justices
joining. Justice Thomas wrote a separate partial concurrence in the judgment and partial dissent.
The Court chose to avoid the constitutional question regarding Section 5 and thus ruled on the
statutory question of defining eligibility for a bailout. The majority held that the utility district
was eligible for a bailout.635 The majority could have simply ended there and not asserted a new
conception of federalism. Thus, Northwest Austin could have stood for a simple interpretation of
what constituted a political district for purposes of bailing out under Section 5. Instead, the
majority engaged the question of Section 5’s constitutionality as posed by the petitioner, which
was also unnecessary, unless the purpose was to force a response.
The majority opinion began with a review of the history of the VRA. The majority noted,
“[T]he historic accomplishments of the Voting Rights Act are undeniable”636 and announced that
“[t]hings have changed in the South.”637 The majority repeated the same information as
regarding improvements in racial gaps in voter registration and voter turnout in covered States
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and further noted that the gap was even smaller in states originally covered than nationwide.638
The majority also echoed amici curiae and petitioner’s claims that blatant state discriminatory
practices were now rare and that minorities had been elected at “unprecedented levels.”639
The majority observed that
“[t]hese improvements are no doubt due in significant part to the Voting Rights Act
itself, and stand as a monument to its success.” However, coinciding with its
“historic” achievements, Section 5 also “imposes substantial ‘federalism costs’ ”
by authorizing “federal intrusion” into state and local policymaking.640

Some Justices, the majority continued, have expressed doubt about the constitutionality
of Section 5 based on significant costs to federalism the Act imposed.641 The majority also
stated, as amici curiae had that the mandate that all voting changes be precleared by the
Department of Justice pushed beyond merely enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment.642
In addition, echoing amici curiae briefs, the majority noted the data used for the coverage
formula was outdated and there was evidence that suggested the formula did not explain the
contemporary political context. The majority then proposed that “[t]he evil that § 5 is meant to
address may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.” And in
support of this claim, the majority cited the same report by Ed Blum of the Project on Fair
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Representation and co-author Lauren Campbell643 as had the briefs from Southeastern LF and
Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation Goldwater Institute. The majority then
conveyed its own skepticism about the constitutionality of preclearance stating that “[p]ast
success alone, however, is not adequate justification to retain the preclearance requirements.”644
The majority conceded that these achievements may be insufficient, and preclearance was still
needed. But, they again expressed skepticism and maintained, “the Act imposes current burdens
and must be justified by current needs.”645 The majority concluded that under the test put forth
by the petitioner and its amici curiae, the “congruent and proportional test” from Boerne or the
rational basis test as called for by the respondents, the result would the same. Each test raised
significant constitutional concerns.646 However, the majority did not establish which standard the
Constitution mandated.
The majority called forth a doctrine of “equal sovereignty” that to this point had not been
used as a way to compare the treatment of states by federal legislation. The majority declared,
“The Act also differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition that all the States
enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”647 The majority then quoted Katzenbach in which the Court had
declared the equality of the States was not an obstacle for Sections 4 and 5 but omitted the part
wherein the Court limited equality of the States to admitting new States to the Union. The line in
Katzenbach stated, “The doctrine of equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar
this approach, for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the
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Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”648 The
majority quoted, “The doctrine of the equality of States ... does not bar ... remedies for local evils
which have subsequently appeared.”649 This omission seems to suggest that the majority wished
to ignore the Katzenbach Court’s limitation of equal sovereignty to only state admissions.
Further, the emphasis on “local evils” appears to suggest that the majority wanted to focus on the
localized targeted aspects of Section 4 and 5. Highlighting the word “local” fuels the next line in
the opinion which states, “But a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the
problem that it targets.”650 In hindsight, this passage and slight changes appear to be setting the
foundation for Shelby County’s ruling.
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, also asserted an
inherent federalism tension existed in preclearance. Justice Thomas noted that striking a balance
between the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on discriminatory voting practices and the Tenth
Amendment’s grant of reserved powers meant “the constitutionality of § 5 has always depended
on the proven existence of intentional discrimination so extensive that elimination of it through
case-by-case enforcement would be impossible.” 651 Justice Thomas, similar to the amici curiae
would have declared Section 5 unconstitutional due to “the lack of current evidence of
intentional discrimination with respect to voting.”652 Notably, there was little difference in the
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conclusions of the majority opinion and Justice Thomas’ concurrence other than Justice Thomas
was ready to overrule Section 5 right then.
This was the extent of the discussion of equal sovereignty; a total of about four lines in
the majority opinion. It was a very short passage for a concept of equal sovereignty that had to
that point been only used in cases regarding the admission of new states into the United States.
Nor was equal sovereignty relevant to the Court’s holding. However, the majority opinion, in
combination with Justice Thomas’ dissent, suggested a new judicial direction for voting rights.
Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder
Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder was argued in the Supreme Court by Bert W. Rein of
Wiley Rein LLP653 for the petitioners, Shelby County. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General,
Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. argued the case for the respondents654. The case was
decided 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice
Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate concurrence.
Justice Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan. There were 19 amici curiae submitted in support of Shelby County, AL which included
amici curiae from Republican attorney generals from the states of Alabama, Alaska, and Texas
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with each writing a separate brief and a joint brief from Arizona, Georgia, South Carolina, and
South Dakota. 655 There were 29 total briefs submitted in support of the respondent.
Shelby County continued where Northwest Austin left off. The majority in Northwest
Austin raised “serious constitutional issues” concerning the Voting Rights Act and had declared,
“Past success alone … is not adequate justification to retain the preclearance requirement.”656
Sensing an opportunity, Ed Blum pursued Shelby County’s lawyer and convinced him to
challenge the constitutionality of Section 5. Mr. Blum also hired and paid for Mr. Rein to
represent the county. Shelby County, Alabama was a jurisdiction covered under the Voting
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Rights Act. The County challenged the constitutionality of the coverage formula (Section 4) and
the preclearance requirement (Section 5) of the Voting Rights Act as reauthorized by Congress in
2006.657 Shelby County had not sought a bailout. In fact, quite the opposite, the Attorney
General had recently rejected the county’s proposed voting changes. The County quoted
Northwest Austin to claim the “coverage formula ‘differentiates between the States, despite our
historic tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty.’ ”658 Shelby County contended that
“Section 5 exacts a heavy, unprecedented federalism cost by forbidding the implementation of all
voting changes.”659
That was Then, This is Now
The general consensus among the briefs submitted to support petitioner, Shelby County,
was that the Voting Rights Act in its original form passed in 1965, reauthorized in 1970 and
1975 was an intrusive act that was given a constitutional “pass” due to the urgent need. The
briefs almost all unanimously asserted that Section 4 and Section 5 had only been granted
constitutionality due to the extraordinary determination of Southern lawmakers to deny African
Americans their constitutional rights. During the century following the Civil War Southern
lawmakers had become quite skilled at evading the Fifteenth Amendment. Just as soon as the
federal courts struck down a discriminatory practice, state and local leaders quickly enacted a
new discriminatory scheme. Thus, in certain jurisdictions lawmakers were always “one step
ahead” of the federal courts.660 This made enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment through

657

Brief for Petitioner at 18, Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, (2013) (No. 12-96) 2012 WL 6755130
Brief for Petitioner at 18, Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, (2013) (No. 12-96) 2012 WL 6755130
659
Brief for Petitioner at 18, Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, (2013) (No. 12-96) 2012 WL 6755130
660
Appellant's Brief at 40, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193
(2009)( No. 08-322), 2009 WL 453246; Brief of Amicus Curiae Georgia Governo r Sonny Perdue in Support of
Appellant at 26, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) )( No. 08 658

196

“case-by-case” litigation ineffective.661 Shelby County and amici curiae asserted that it was
those unique and specific conditions that allowed Section 5 to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Amici curiae and Shelby County described the situation at the time as “exceptional,”
“uncommon,” and “unique” but declared that was all in the past. The Act, the briefs declared,
was an inordinate intrusion into the sovereignty of the states that was only appropriate for narrow
circumstances. The Voting Rights Act was an extreme measure meant for an extreme time. What
made Section 4 and Section 5 acceptable then, were the circumstances on the ground, the
formula was targeted to specific locales, and it was temporary.
According to Shelby County and amici curiae what made the present Voting Rights Act
problematic, was those “exceptional conditions” that allowed Section 5’s invasive remedies, “no
longer exist.”662 Since Section 5 was applicable only for those particular circumstances,
preclearance was no longer valid, and Section 5 was an overreach of Congressional enforcement
power. In 2006, Congress had reauthorized the Voting Rights Act without changing the coverage
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formula in Section 4 and continued preclearance under Section 5. However, as petitioner and
amici curiae contended, voting discrimination had sharply decreased since 1965, the formula
was irrelevant. They argued that the formula still being used in the 2006 reauthorization was
based on 1975 registration and turnout rates and so not relevant to the present.
In its brief, Shelby County reviewed the voting achievements since the passage of the
Voting Rights Act. Many of the briefs also cited the same evidence to tout the vast
improvements that made the Voting Rights Act no longer necessary. The briefs referenced the
increased registration rates and voter turnout rates among African Americans and also noted that
in some of the covered districts, African Americans’ rates were higher than whites’ rates.663
Many of the briefs agreed with Shelby County’s sentiment that widespread voting discrimination
was a thing of the past and it was only the exceptional circumstances that made “preclearance an
appropriate enforcement remedy.”664 However, in the present, they claimed that was no longer
true. Shelby County and many of the amici curiae were ready to declare mission accomplished
and this evidence showed that Section 5, based on old voting records was no longer justified.665
For example, the brief from the Judicial Education Project emphasized Section 5 was
originally designed to be temporary and only meant “to address the conditions that prevailed at
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the time. It has ably served that purpose.”666 Petitioner and amici curiae argued that to be
constitutional, Section 5 preclearance must be based on “current burdens” and related to “current
needs” and limited in geographical scope. Many of the briefs cited the standard articulated in
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, (1997) for remedial legislation which said, “There must
be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end.”667 This was related to Section 5, according to the Judicial Education
Project because “[i]t was congruent and proportional at the time; it is no longer so. Its work
done, the time has come to praise its considerable accomplishments, and declare that its
extraordinary requirements are no longer appropriate means to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment.”668 Likewise, the brief from The National Black Chamber of Commerce asserted
that in its present form, Section 5 was not a valid means to enforce the guarantees of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.669
Shelby County and amici asserted that the Voting Rights Act had a grand noble mission
when enacted, but that Sections 4 and 5 were very narrowly tailored to remedy the specific
violations of barriers to accessing the ballot. In line with its specific mission, Shelby County and
amici insisted that Section 5 was limited to abolishing “deliberate racial discrimination” that
blocked minorities from the ballot.670 The discrimination must be “purposeful or intentional
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discrimination,”671 “pervasive discrimination and legislative gamesmanship,”672 or “systemic and
widespread”673 Additionally, Congress must present a “history and pattern of unconstitutional
[action] by the States…at the time the challenged law was passed.”674 Shelby County and several
other briefs argued Congress had failed to show that a pattern of discrimination remained in the
covered jurisdictions and emphasized that Section 5 was a relic of the past and did not capture
current conditions.675 Since the literacy test, poll taxes, and the other old devices that kept
minorities from the polls were banned, amici and Shelby County asserted that Section 4 and
Section 5’s provisions could not be justified. Furthermore, since there was no longer a pattern of
systemic purposeful discriminatory acts there could be no legitimate reason to continue usurping
states’ powers. The briefs faulted Congress for its reauthorization of Section 5 despite its failure
to find evidence of “purposefully discriminatory state action.”676 At best, the record collected by
Congress demonstrated “isolated incidents”677 which was not enough to continue such intrusive
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practices.678 They also criticized Congress for continuing to use the same formula and targeting
the same jurisdictions without acknowledging that,
the South they remember is gone (and the discrimination that existed there never
did in Alaska, Arizona, Manhattan, etc.). Widespread disfranchisement is ancient
history, as unlikely to return as segregated water fountains. America is no longer a
land where whites hold the levers of power and minority representation depends on
extraordinary federal intervention, consistent with the Constitution only as an
emergency measure. Today, southern states have some of the highest black voterregistration rates in the nation; over 900 blacks hold public office in Mississippi
alone.679
Preclearance’s purpose was to prevent a jurisdiction from adopting “tests and devices”
that obstructed access to voting.680 The current evidence Congress provided was a different kind.
The evidence Congress presented was so-called “second-generation barriers.” Gone from the
evidence were literacy tests, poll taxes, and the barriers of the past, and in its place was vote
dilution. According to amici and Shelby County, these practices were not the same and had
nothing to do with the old practices.681 The brief from Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence
argued that “second-generation barriers” … are nothing like the unconstitutional first-generation
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barriers that jurisdictions were using decades ago, and they cannot sustain Section 5.”682 Shelby
County and the Mountain States Legal Foundation echoed that view and stated that these
practices were not blocking access to the polls, rather these are concerned with the “weight of a
vote once cast.”683

Amici further claimed vote dilution was not a Fifteenth Amendment

violation.684 As the petitioner claimed, “Preclearance is not an appropriate remedy for practices
that affect the weight of votes cast.”685 Amici and the petitioner all expressed that Section 5
cannot be based on evidence of vote dilution and other “second-generation barriers.” The
difference between the federal government banning voting barriers and ending vote dilution was
significant. The brief written for John Nix, Anthony Cuomo, and Dr. Abigail Thernstrom
explained that banning vote dilution “necessarily entails limiting opportunities for nonminorities, because group representation is a zero-sum game.” On the other hand, the brief
continued, eliminating barriers to access “expands opportunities for all individuals, minorities
and nonminorities alike.” 686 Several other briefs also described Section 5 in its 2006 iteration as
a racial classification policy that was itself violating the “Constitution's nondiscrimination
guarantees.”687 Project 21’s brief insisted that when applied to redistricting Section 5’s primary
focus was on racial sorting that required “jurisdictions to segregate voters by race in order to
concentrate minority votes and supposedly increase the weight of such votes.”688 Another brief
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warned that Section 5 now included “an unconditional mandate to avoid diluting minorities'
opportunities for ‘electable’ legislative seats regardless of the reasons for dilution.” This placed
a “cap on non-minorities' opportunities to exceed that guaranteed ‘racial balanc[e].’” 689
Federalism and Equal Sovereignty
Underlying the arguments against Section 4 and Section 5 was a strict view of federalism,
the Tenth Amendment, and unequal treatment of the states. Several briefs noted that the Court
had acknowledged the federalism conflicts embedded in Section 5 in prior decisions regarding
the Voting Rights Acts.690 However, these cases continued to uphold the Act as a rational
exercise of enforcement power. The mission of the challengers to the Voting Rights Act was to
demonstrate that Sections 4 and 5 were no longer related to the problem it was meant to remedy
and therefore was simply intruding on state sovereignty. Shelby County and the amici argued
that preclearance treaded on the states’ authority to control their elections. They claimed that
preclearance pushed the limits of Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment because
all electoral changes had to be approved. Many amici referred to preclearance as a “prior
restraint” that exacted high federalism costs and usurped state and local policymaking.691
Preclearance, according to amici and petitioner, commandeered a state’s reserved power to
regulate its own local elections.692
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Several briefs noted the “substantial federalism costs” that resulted from Section 5. The
requirement that all electoral changes had to gain approval from the Department of Justice prior
to enactment was seen by amici curiae and Shelby County as too high of a federalism cost.
According to the Judicial Education Project, the fact that “even the most minor of changes to
state voting laws and procedures - for even the smallest of subdivisions of covered jurisdictions only amplifies the intrusiveness of the statute.”693 A few of the covered states submitted briefs
and complained about increased federalism burdens and an outdated formula. The brief
submitted by Texas stated that their federalism costs had increased rather than decreased as the
need for preclearance declined.694 Arizona, Georgia, South Carolina, and South Dakota in their
brief also claimed, “the DOJ has exacerbated the VRA's federalism costs by broadening its
interpretation of Section 5 and denying preclearance to an ever-widening array of sovereign state
prerogatives.”695 The brief submitted from the Cato Institute pointed to two ways preclearance
violated federalism. One was simply the need for prior approval which preempted state election
law. According to the Cato Institute’s brief, the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence’s briefs,
and Shelby County’s brief, preclearance served as a “prior restraint” on all new election rule
suggested by a covered jurisdiction. Additionally, preclearance treaded on a power reserved to
the States.696 The second way preclearance violated federalism principles was to “undermine[]
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the ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ by ‘differentiating between the states’ with a
coverage formula that is now unsubstantiated and, therefore, completely arbitrary.”697
Shelby County and the other states’ briefs contended that Section 5, by treating the
covered states differently than noncovered states, violated the principle that all states are granted
“equal sovereignty.” Although, an exception was made for this violation when it was enacted,
“the United States is a different country than it was forty-seven years ago.” 698 The brief from the
covered states of Arizona et al. contended, “No Covered Jurisdiction uses discriminatory tests or
devices, and many have higher voter turnout or lower disparity in minority voter turnout, than
numerous uncovered jurisdictions. The Covered States, therefore, are denied the fundamental
principles of equal sovereignty and equal footing.”699 Requiring only certain jurisdictions to
preclear all of their voting changes was seen by another brief writer as an “extraordinary reversal
of the normal presumption of legitimacy afforded to sovereign enactments.”700
As mentioned previously, Northwest Austin was the first time the Court invoked the issue
of “equal sovereignty” outside of admitting a new state. The Northwest Austin majority’s
statement that the Voting Rights Act “differentiates between the States, despite our historic
tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty,’”701 allowed Shelby County to confidently
declare, when Congress exercises its enforcement power, the “Court must ensure that Congress
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is reacting to constitutional violations and has appropriately addressed them without intruding
into matters reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment or unjustifiably denying equal
State sovereignty.”702 Amici also repeated Shelby County’s declaration the “coverage formula
‘differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition that all the States enjoy equal
sovereignty.’”703 The briefs were unanimous in claiming that the violation of equal sovereignty
rendered Section 4 unconstitutional.704
The Majority Opinion
The Shelby County majority opinion relied heavily on Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District Number One v. Holder 557 U.S. 193 (2009), also written by Chief Justice Roberts. The
majority explained its Northwest Austin decision as having “expressed serious doubts about the
Act’s continued constitutionality.”705 The majority also noted Northwest Austin had “explained
that §5 ‘imposes substantial federalism costs’ and ‘differentiates between the States, despite our
historic tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty.’”706 The Court also noted Northwest
Austin determined “ ‘[t]hings have changed in the South.’”707 Minority turnout and registration
had increased and “blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare.” 708 The
majority also wondered “whether the problems that §5 meant to address were still ‘concentrated
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in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.’”709 In short, according to the majority, the VRA
was stuck in the past.
The majority repeatedly referred to the VRA as “extraordinary” and “unprecedented”710
to point out that Section 5 was appropriate only for a special and specific time, and that time had
passed. The majority again referred to its Northwest Austin ruling which emphasized “a statute’s
‘current burdens’ must be justified by ‘current needs.’ ”711 This led the Court to conclude in
Northwest Austin that “‘coverage formula raise[d] serious constitutional questions.’”712 The
majority again noted the dramatic achievements made in eliminating the blatantly discriminatory
practices and decreasing the stark voting disparities.713 Yet, the VRA continued as if nothing
had changed. The majority commented that problems still exist, but more to the point, it is
undeniable that “due to the Voting Rights Act, our Nation has made great strides.”714 Despite
these dramatic improvement Congress did not loosen Section 5’s restrictions or reduce the sweep
of Section 4’s coverage. The majority claimed that Congress had reauthorized the Voting Rights
Act in 2006 making Sections 4 and 5 more stringent and turned a temporary measure into one
with more permanence.715
The majority, just like the briefs, called out Congress for neglecting to update the
coverage formula to fit “current conditions.”716 The majority criticized Congress for keeping the
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old “formula based on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day.” 717 The
majority also dismissed “second-generation barriers,”718 such as vote dilution claims, as
irrelevant to a formula that was based on devices that denied access to the ballot. Vote dilution,
in contrast, was “electoral arrangements that affect the weight of minority votes.” The majority
rejected that the preclearance requirement as currently formulated could include changes that
pertain to anything other than gaining access.719 Nor did the majority contend that deference
should be given to Congress in the decision of the relevancy of the coverage formula. The
“second-generation barriers” were some of the “current conditions,” that needed their own
“current burdens” and were unrelated to the past.720
The majority also chastised Congress for expanding Section 5 after the Court had
explicitly narrowed its scope and even warned Congress that to broaden the coverage of Section
5 “would ‘exacerbate the substantial federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already
exacts, perhaps to the extent of raising concerns about §5’s constitutionality.’”721 The Court in
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (Bossier II), had limited preclearance
to only redistricting plans that regardless of a discriminatory purpose would not “worsen[] the
position of minority groups.”722 Redistricting could not be denied preclearance “if the intent was
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‘discriminatory but nonprogressive.’”723 The 2006 reauthorization responded to the Court and
expanded Section 5 to include prohibiting redistricting with “a discriminatory purpose.”724
Congress had also responded to the Court’s decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003)
by essentially overruling it. The majority criticized this move by Congress which expanded
Section 5 to bar any voting law that intentionally or effectually diminishes the ability of any
citizen, on account of race or language minority, “to elect their preferred candidates of
choice.”725
Treating State Unequally and Equal Sovereignty
In Shelby County, the majority justified striking down the formula in Section 4 of the
VRA as violating “the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.” 726 The principle of
equal sovereignty had until now applied only in instances of admitting new states.727 According
to Stanford law professor Michael W. McConnell, the expanded meaning the majority attributed
to equal sovereignty seems to have been “made up.” McConnell continued, “There's no
requirement in the Constitution to treat all states the same. It might be an attractive principle, but
it doesn't seem to be in the Constitution.”728 Nonetheless, the majority repeatedly referenced
Northwest Austin in Shelby County to support the principle of equal sovereignty of the states
which held that Congressional legislation cannot treat states differently.729
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Combined with state equal sovereignty, the majority expressed a strict version of dual
federalism. The majority claimed the Voting Rights Act conflicted with the Constitution’s
federalist structure.730 The majority described Section 5’s preclearance as “a drastic departure,”
and an “ ‘extraordinary departure,’” from the traditional State-Federal relationship.731 Section 5
was a “ ‘federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking’”732 that was
“unfamiliar to our federal system.” 733 The majority described Section 4’s coverage formula,
which selected the states to be precleared as “an equally dramatic departure from the principle
that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.”734 The majority also referenced Northwest Austin’s
statement that “ ‘a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a
showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that
it targets.’” 735
Thus, the majority in Shelby County based its Constitutional argument on a principle that
cannot be found in the text of the Constitution. Not only is it not found in the Constitution, but
the majority attributed a meaning to equality sovereignty divorced from its original context in
case law. The majority based its decision on dicta from Northwest Austin. Northwest Austin had
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created a new meaning for the principle of equal sovereignty. In its original application equal
sovereignty or equality of States was applied only to the terms of the admission of new States to
the Union.736 This point had been made in Katzenbach, which the majority noted but then
glossed over to add that equal sovereignty also applied as a follow-up metric once states have
been admitted. The majority took a principle out of context and gave it a new application. The
majority cited cases in which equal sovereignty had only been applied to the admission of new
states, recognized that was Katzenbach’s reading of equal sovereignty but then overrode it and
tacked on a new notion of equal sovereignty that was simply stated in Northwest Austin as dicta.
The majority stated,
“Coyle concerned the admission of new States, and Katzenbach rejected the notion that
the principle operated as a bar on differential treatment outside that context. 383 U.S., at
328–329, 86 S.Ct. 803. At the same time, as we made clear in Northwest Austin, the
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing
subsequent disparate treatment of States.”737
Justice Ginsberg called attention to this move in her dissent. Justice Ginsberg stated that
the majority “ratchets up what was pure dictum in Northwest Austin, attributing breadth to the
equal sovereignty principle in flat contradiction of Katzenbach.” Justice Ginsberg further
charged the majority’s abandonment of the Katzenbach precedent came without “nary an
explanation of why it finds Katzenbach wrong, let alone any discussion of whether stare decisis
nonetheless counsels adherence to Katzenbach’s ruling on the limited ‘significance’ of the equal
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sovereignty principle.” Rather, the majority spent much of the decision invoking an
“unprecedented extension of the equal sovereignty principle” that Justice Ginsburg argued was at
best taken “outside its proper domain” or at worst as others argued, “made up.”738
Content Analysis of the Shelby Decision
The content analysis below demonstrates how often and across how many briefs the
different themes discussed above were mentioned. In total, twenty briefs were examined, at least
seventeen of which included a member of the Network. There was a total of 46 Network
members participating in Shelby County, 39 as amicus curiae, four Supreme Court Justices, and
three of the four attorneys for Shelby County.
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Case

South
Carolina
Northwe
st Austin
Shelby
County

Total
briefs
includin
g
petitione
r
1

Network
briefs
including
petitione
r

Network
attorney
for
petitione
r

Amici
Curiae

Network
affiliated
organiza
tions

Supreme
Court
Justices

Total FS
Network
participa
tion

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

7

6

3

17

7

4

24

20

17

3

39

13

4

46

An “Extraordinary” Act for an “Extraordinary” Time
The content analysis revealed that many of the amicus briefs asserted that the Katzenbach
Court had only upheld the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA due to the

738

Miller 2014; Litman 2016; Totenberg 2013
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“extraordinary conditions” and “unique circumstances” of the Jim Crow South. Eleven amicus
briefs, ten of which included a member of the Network, referred to the “exceptional
conditions”739 that surrounded the passage of the VRA which thus allowed the Court to uphold
Sections 4 and 5 in Katzenbach. Ten amicus briefs, nine of which included a Network member,
noted the “unique circumstances” at the time. Twelve of the amicus briefs, quoting Katzenbach,
stated that Sections 4 and 5 were an “uncommon exercise of congressional power.”740 Ten of
these briefs included at least one member of the Network. Eight briefs mentioned that this scale
of enforcement power in any other situation would not be appropriate. Nine separate briefs
described Section 5 as an “extraordinary remedy” and nine briefs called it “extreme.” The use of
the descriptive “extraordinary” or other superlatives was intended to demonstrate that from the
first challenge the Court acknowledged Section 5 “was even then an extreme remedy only to
tackle a virtually intractable problem which had defied lesser measures.”741 The majority opinion
also defined the VRA as an “uncommon exercise of congressional power” that was “not
otherwise appropriate,”742 but was justified by “exceptional conditions.”743 The majority also
stated that these were “extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary problem.”744

Katzenbach at 334. (“Preclearance “may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional power, as South
Carolina contends, but the Court has recognized that exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not
otherwise appropriate.”).
740
Id. at 335.(“Congress knew that some of the States covered by s 4(b) of the Act had resorted to the extraordinary
stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the
face of adverse federal court decrees. Congress had reason to suppose that these States might try similar maneuvers
in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself. Under the
compulsion of these unique circumstances, Congress responded in a permissibly decisive manner.”).
741
Brief of the Judicial Education Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 25-26, Shelby County v.
Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (12-96), 2012 WL 6771850
742
Katzenbach at 335.
743
Shelby County at 545
744
Id. at 535
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The amicus briefs further claimed Sections 4 and 5 had been constructed to meet a
specific need at a specific time and in a specific place. According to the amicus briefs, Section 4
and 5 depended on the existence of those conditions to remain constitutional. Content analysis
also provides other results. Fourteen briefs argued that Katzenbach upheld Sections 4 and 5
because it was targeted only to jurisdictions with the most atrocious practices. Twelve of the
fourteen amicus briefs included at least one Network member. Thirteen amicus briefs stated that
these two sections had also been deemed constitutional because the racial discrimination it
targeted was widespread and tenacious. Eleven of these briefs included a Network member. Ten
amicus briefs pointed out that Katzenbach had upheld the VRA because litigation could not keep
up with the speed with which old disenfranchisement laws were replaced with new laws. Five
briefs noted that less intrusive remedies had been unsuccessful allowing more intrusive remedies
to be implemented. Four of these briefs contained at least one Network member. Ten briefs noted
that in the original version of the VRA, Sections 4 and 5 were only meant to be temporary. They
complained the latest iteration attempted to make them permanent. Eight of these included a
Network member. Nine briefs claimed the coverage formula was only meant to target the
specific voting obstacles related to post-Reconstruction and Jim Crow such as literacy test and
poll taxes.
Table 11. Content Analysis Results Shelby County Theme 1: Section 5 special conditions
Total briefs
Sec. 5 targeted specific states
Sec. 5 racial discrimination widespread
Sec. 5 justified: Case by case enforcement
impossible
Sec 5. temporary
Sec 5. justify specific barriers to & equal access
to vote
214

14
13
10

Network
briefs
12
11
9

Shelby
Opinion
6
8
2

10
9

8
8

3
2

Section 4’s Coverage Formula No Longer Connected to Reality
From the content analysis, one sees that the coverage formula received a lot of criticisms
by the amicus briefs. Many briefs criticized Congress for not adjusting the coverage formula to
reflect the present state of discrimination. Fourteen of the amicus briefs claimed the relationship
between the constitutional violation and the remedy must pass the standard as established by
Boerne, that is, the remedy must be “congruen[t] and proportional[]” to the problem.745 Eleven of
these briefs included at least one member of the Network. Eighteen amicus briefs, or 90 percent,
used the majority’s language from Northwest Austin, to assert that the current burdensome
coverage formula was not aligned with “current needs.”746 Fifteen of these briefs included at least
one member of the Network. This theme was one of the more popular themes in the briefs which
was mentioned a total of 81 times across the Shelby County briefs and nine times in the Shelby
County opinion. Shelby County’s brief mentioned this theme thirteen times; the brief from the
States of Arizona, et al. mentioned the theme ten times; and the brief from the Cato Institute
mentioned this theme nine times. The brief from John Nix, Anthony Cuomo, and Dr. Abigail
Thernstrom had seven mentions; the Southeastern Legal Foundation’s brief had five mentions;
the brief from the Landmark Legal Foundation mentioned it four times; Judicial Education
Project mentioned it thrice; and the other ten briefs stated the 2006 coverage formula was not
capturing current conditions either once or twice. Four of the seven amicus briefs (57%) plus the
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City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)
Shelby County at 536
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majority opinion in Northwest Austin also mentioned 31 times that the current coverage formula
did not represent current conditions.
Twelve briefs adopted another of the majority’s statements from Northwest Austin to
make the assertion that if the coverage formula was going to treat some states differently, then it
must be “sufficiently related” to a constitutional violation that was unique to those locations.747
Ten of the briefs included at least one Network member. The majority in Shelby County,
reiterated their Northwest Austin position “that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage” must
be “sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” 748 Nine amicus briefs, eight of which
included at least one Network member, declared the coverage formula must be fitted to the
specific problem of voting discrimination. The majority also adopted the position that to be
constitutional, the coverage formula must align with “current needs.”749 The majority referred to
their Northwest Austin opinion to reiterate that “and any ‘disparate geographic coverage’ must be
‘sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.’”750 The majority concluded the coverage
formula no longer met that requirement.
Congress’s Evidence
The crux of amici curiae’s argument regarding the coverage formula was that the
evidence gathered by Congress must replicate the evidence demonstrated by the 1965 Congress.
If today’s evidence did not meet that standard, then amici curiae insisted, the older coverage
formula was not applicable. In amici curiae’s view the record presented by Congress in 2006 had
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Id. at 550
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not met that standard. In additions, to their own detriment, Congress neglected to update the
formula to meet the current environment. Therefore, the reauthorized Section 4 could not justify
the reauthorization of Section 5 due to the “serious mismatch between the formula’s triggers for
coverage and the purported constitutional basis for reauthorization of preclearance.”751 Fifteen
briefs criticized Congress for not updating the coverage formula. Thirteen briefs claimed that the
evidence gathered by Congress had not demonstrated state discrimination that was either
widespread, pervasive, or intentional like the type that upheld the original Act. All but one of
these briefs contained a Network member. Eight briefs asserted the Court’s previous cases had
established that Congress must demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination in order
to activate the enforcement power of the Fifteenth Amendment which the briefs alleged
Congress had not done. Six of these briefs included at least one member of the Network. Ten
briefs claimed that “second generation barriers” or vote dilution was not evidence of the kind of
purposeful discrimination that allowed Section 5’s intrusive methods. Eight of these briefs
included at least one Network member.
The majority also saw a fundamental problem with Congress’s evidence. However, rather
than criticize the kind of evidence Congress claimed justified the reauthorization of Section 4’s
coverage formula as it was, the majority criticized Congress for not using the evidence it did
collect as the basis for a new coverage formula.752 The majority also took the position, like the
eleven amicus briefs, that second-generation barriers to voting could not justify keeping Section
4 intact. The majority’s reasoning was also the same. Second-generation barriers such as vote
dilution were “not impediments to the casting of ballots, but rather electoral arrangements that
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Brief for the Petitioner at 21-22, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (12-96), 2012 WL 6755130
Shelby County at 550
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affect the weight of minority votes.”753 Allowing a coverage formula designed for “voting tests
and access to the ballot” to now apply to “vote dilution” through Court inaction would be to
“pretend that we are reviewing an updated statute, or [to] try our hand at updating the statute
ourselves, based on the new record compiled by Congress.”754 Because Congress had failed to
update the coverage formula, the majority concluded, their only choice was “to declare §4(b)
unconstitutional.”755
Table 12. Content Analysis Results Shelby County Theme 2: Coverage formula
Total briefs

Network
briefs

Coverage formula not congruent and
proportional

14

11

Coverage formula does not reflect current
conditions

18

15

9

disparate geographic coverage must be
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets

12

10

4

Coverage formula must be related to
discrimination

9

8

6

Coverage formula not updated

15

12

11

Not evidence of intentional, widespread
discrimination

13

12

2

Need evidence of a pattern

8

6

0

Not for second generation barriers

10

8

2

753
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Opinion

The South Has Changed
Another common theme that content analysis revealed was that the VRA was necessary
and proper in its day but decades later the nation had mostly eliminated any systematic
discrimination. In other words, “the VRA had worked!”756 The amicus briefs and the majority
opinion shared the same statistical data. Eleven briefs noted the significant decrease in the gap
between black and white registered voters and between black and white voting turnout. Ten of
these briefs included at least one Network member. Eight of those eleven briefs also noted an
increase in the election of black candidates. The majority also noted the decreased disparity in
registration and turnout numbers and cited Northwest Austin which had also mentioned this
theme.757
Twelve amicus briefs argued that the VRA had been justified back in the day but could
not be justified today. Eleven of these twelve included at least one Network member. Sixteen
briefs claimed the Voting Rights Act had been successful and it was time to declare victory.
These sixteen briefs claimed the rampant discrimination by the state was part of the past and it
was time to move on. The conclusion reached by these briefs was that Section 5 should be
eliminated as well. The Cato Institute’s brief summed up the theme for all sixteen briefs, “[t]he
South has changed, America has changed, and it's time for this Court to change constitutional
understandings regarding Section 5 as well.”758 The Cato Institute repeated that message ten
times in its brief. Similarly, the brief from the Pacific Legal Institute twice offered the view that
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Brief amicus curiae of Cato Institute in Support of Petitioner at 11, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529
(2013) (12-96), 2012 WL 75423
757
Shelby County at 535 (citing Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 203–204
(2009)).
758
Brief of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute in Support of Petitioner at 13 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529
(2013) (12-96), 2012 WL 75423
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“[t]he deplorable conditions that once justified Section 5's extraordinary measures are no longer
present in the South (or the United States generally).”759 Shelby County’s brief declared “mission
accomplished” four times.760 Likewise, this theme was stated by the brief from Former
Government Officials six times and from the Justice and Freedom Fund’s brief three times.
Problems solved was also stated twice by the State of Texas’s brief, the Landmark Legal
Foundation’s brief, the Southeast Legal Foundation’s brief, and the American Unity’s brief. This
theme was mentioned at least once in the remaining six briefs. As the Judicial Education Project
put it, “The sins of history are no basis for modern policy.”761 Northwest Austin has already
declared “[t]hings have changed in the South” and the majority in Shelby County proclaimed,
“There is no denying … that the conditions that originally justified these measures no longer
characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.”762 The majority also criticized Congress for not
adjusting Sections 4 or 5 to suit the times. The majority also chastised Congress for making the
provisions of Section 5 more stringent not less. The majority stated that Section 5’s amendments
“exacerbate[d]] the substantial federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts,
perhaps to the extent of raising concerns about §5’s constitutionality.”763
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Pacific Legal Foundation at 4, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (12-96), 2012 WL 6755130
Brief for Petitioner at 23, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (12-96), 2012 WL 6755130 (“Sections
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Brief of the Judicial Education Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 27, Shelby County v. Holder,
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Table 13. Content Analysis Results Shelby County Theme 3: That was then, this is now.
Total briefs
Turnout and registration increased

11

Network
briefs
10

Increase in election of Black
candidates
Justified then, not now

8

7

6

12

11

23

16

14

10

VRA successful, the South or U.S.
has changed

Shelby
Opinion
9

Equal Sovereignty and Federalism
Shelby County challenged Section 4 and Section 5 of the VRA as a violation of the Tenth
Amendment and a violation of a State’s right to equal treatment under the law. First, Shelby
County claimed Section 5’s preclearance mandate usurped the power reserved to the States to
control its own elections. Second, Shelby County challenged Section 4’s coverage formula as a
violation of the principle of equal sovereignty that the Court had recently articulated in
Northwest Austin. The logic was that since the coverage formula only required certain states to
submit their voting changes to federal preclearance, not all states were being treated the same
under the VRA.764 This was the argument also made by most of the amicus briefs. The brief
written by frequent FS speakers Michael A. Carvin and Michael E. Rosman for another frequent
Network member and outspoken opponent of the VRA, Dr. Abigail Thernstrom summed up
amici’s argument regarding Section 5. This brief claimed that Section 5’s preclearance
requirement exceeded the allowable scope of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment because
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Brief for Petitioner at 19, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (12-96), 2012 WL 6755130
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it prejudged all electoral changes by certain jurisdictions as invalid until given federal clearance.
According to the Network member this was “an extraordinary reversal of the normal
presumption of legitimacy afforded to sovereign enactments.” 765
The amicus briefs, including petitioner Shelby County, contended that since the coverage
formula was no longer valid and preclearance was no longer necessary as shown in the above
section, these actions by the federal government were now viewed as exceeding their
enforcement authority. 766 All twenty briefs claimed that Congress had exceeded their
enforcement power when it reauthorized Section 5. Further, the resulting “federalism costs”
could no longer be excused.767 Eighteen briefs used the words from a 1999 Supreme Court
decision768 to describe Section 5’s impact as having “substantial federalism costs.”769 The
“federalism costs” referred to their belief that the federal government had commandeered the
state’s authority to enact legislation to regulate elections within their state. Preclearance was
viewed as “an intrusive remedy with substantial federalism costs.”770 The briefs claimed this
power had been given to the States in the Tenth Amendment and the requirement to gain
permission from the federal government before enacting any election legislation violated state
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Brief for John Nix, Anthony Cuomo, and Dr. Abigail Thernstrom as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (12-96), 2012 WL
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Brief for Petitioner at 18, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (12-96), 2012 WL 6755130
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Id. at 22-23, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (12-96), 2012 WL 6755130 (“Sections 5 and 4(b)
have accomplished their mission and their encroachment on Tenth Amendment rights and the constitutional
principle of equal sovereignty is no longer appropriate.”)
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Lopez v. Monterey Cnty. 525 U.S. 266 (1999)
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The term “federalism costs” came from a decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy in Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 926 (1995) (“But our belief in Katzenbach that the federalism costs exacted by §5 preclearance could be
justified by those extraordinary circumstances does not mean they can be justified in the circumstances of this case.
And the Justice Department's implicit command that States engage in presumptively unconstitutional race based
districting brings the Voting Rights Act, once upheld as a proper exercise of Congress’s authority under §2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment, Katzenbach, supra, at 327, 337, into tension with the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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Amicus Curiae Brief of the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioner at 2, Shelby County
v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (12-96), 2013 WL 98689
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sovereignty. According to ten amicus briefs, the federalism costs had only increased with the
2006 reauthorization. Eleven briefs mentioned the Tenth Amendment as granting powers to the
States and eight amicus briefs mentioned that elections were specifically reserved to the states.
Seven of the seven briefs included a member of the Network. Fourteen briefs referred to
preclearance as an intrusion into state sovereignty and twelve of those briefs included at least one
Network member. Nine briefs described preclearance as a drastic departure from federalism
principles. Seven of the briefs included at least one Network member.
A majority of the briefs asserted that a second constitutional violation was that Section 4
and Section 5 did not apply to all states and thus did not treat each state equally. The amicus
briefs thus claimed that Sections 4 compromised the equal sovereignty principle. The application
of the concept of “equal sovereignty” to federal legislation came directly from language in the
Northwest Austin decision.”771 Sixteen briefs asserted that preclearance and the coverage formula
violated the principle of equal sovereignty of the states because some states were treated
differently. The briefs all cited the Court’s Northwest Austin decision for establishing this
principle. The brief from the States of Arizona, et al. contended that keeping the coverage
formula intact would mean the “the amici States will very likely continue to be unequal
sovereigns until at least 2031, despite an utter lack of evidence that such treatment is
justified.”772 While the brief from the Judicial Education Project claimed, “It is “axiomatic that
the States of the union are equal, such equality being inherent in the very ideal of a union.” The
Judicial Education Project further contended that “The VRA is the sole exception from this ideal,
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Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (12-96), 2013 WL 50688
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and this unequal treatment has raised concerns from the very outset.773 The brief for John Nix,
Anthony Cuomo, and Dr. Abigail Thernstrom written by frequent Federalist Society speakers
Michael A. Carvin and Michael E. Rosman remarked that Section 5’s “extraordinary
preclearance regime is gratuitous and its selective imposition is unjustified discrimination among
sovereigns entitled to equal treatment.”774
Nine briefs also spoke of Section 5’s disparate treatment of the states apart from equal
sovereignty. These briefs noted that a similar law to one passed in a non-covered jurisdiction
could be rejected in a covered district. To these nine briefs, this different treatment “created two
different classifications of States: covered and uncovered.”775 Additionally, the different
treatment “demeans the dignity of the States, and it is not a valid use of Congress’s Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement power.”776
The majority framed Shelby County as a question of the VRA’s continued
constitutionality given its “extraordinary measures” and “disparate treatment of the States.”777
The majority repeatedly returned to their decision in Northwest Austin to support its holdings in
Shelby. The majority even stated that the guiding principles for its decision in Shelby came
directly from the majority opinion in Northwest Austin.778 The Shelby County Court repeated its
first principle, as stated in Northwest Austin, that “the Act imposes current burdens and must be
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justified by current needs.” 779 As shown above, this line from Northwest Austin guided some of
the arguments that then appeared in the briefs submitted to Shelby County. The second principle
as articulated in Northwest Austin was that
“a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a
showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the
problem that it targets.”780

This line also guided many authors of the amicus briefs. As previously stated, the
principle of equal sovereignty does not appear in the Constitution and up until Northwest Austin
had only been used by the Supreme Court to refer to the admission of new states into the
Union.781 Interestingly, only two briefs attempted to discuss any foundation for this new
application of “equal sovereignty” to federal legislation beyond citing Northwest Austin. Also
notable was the majority’s curt response to the dissent for its refusal to accept the majority’s use
of equal sovereignty, “despite Northwest Austin’s emphasis on its significance.”782 Notably,
South Carolina’s challenge to the VRA had invoked a principle of “equality of statehood.” Even
though the Court rejected South Carolina’s articulation of the doctrine as applied to federal
legislation, at least South Carolina based the doctrine on the Constitution’s Article IV, Section 2
and 4 and the Fifth Amendment. Equality of statehood, or as it became known “equal
sovereignty” made its first appearance post-Katzenbach in the VRA line of cases in Northwest
Austin. In Northwest Austin, the majority explicitly left out part of the Katzenbach quote which
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stated the doctrine was limited to the admission of new states and thus did not restrict the use of
preclearance or a coverage formula. From that point onward, equal sovereignty as applied to
equal treatment of states under federal law appeared to be taken as a matter of fact by the
petitioner, the amici, and the Court.
Table 14. Content Analysis Results Shelby Theme 4: Federalism and equal sovereignty
Total briefs

Network briefs

Shelby Opinion

Federalism costs

18

16

2

Federalism costs increased

10

8

8

Tenth Amendment reserved powers

11

8

4

Elections reserved to states

8

7

1

Intrusion state sovereignty

14

12

1

Drastic departure federalism

9

7

8

Violated equal sovereignty

16

13

12

Disparate treatment of states

9

7

11

Conclusion
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the first case analyzed, South Carolina’s arguments
were centered on the powers reserved to the States and the equal treatment of States under
federal law. South Carolina based its argument regarding election matters reserved to the States
on Article 1, Section 2 and Section 4 of the Constitution and the Seventeenth Amendment. South
Carolina also alleged “equality of statehood” was implied by the Constitution in Article IV,
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Sections 2 and and in the Fifth Amendment.783 South Carolina alleged Sections 4 and 5
abrogated their right to set voter qualifications and election procedures by banning literacy tests
and other qualification tests and also treated the covered states differently from non-covered
states. The Katzenbach majority acknowledged the focus of Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting
Rights Acts was applied to only a few states but rejected that the principle of “equality of States
… bar[red] this approach.” Importantly, the Court did not stop there but continued, “for that
doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the
remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”784 As shown above, the majority in
Northwest Austin, omitted via ellipses that portion of the quote and unlike the Katzenbach
majority emphasized “local evils.”785
The content analysis draws out these themes in a way that can be summarized across the
cases. A total of seven briefs were submitted on behalf Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District One including the petitioner’s brief.786 Only one of the seven did not include a Network
member. In Northwest Austin some of the arguments from South Carolina’s brief reappeared but
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this time in numerous amicus briefs. Amicus briefs discussed the costs to federalism that
preclearance imposed, what they viewed as the clear and significant departure from federalism
principles, and the intrusion into state sovereignty. One brief submitted on behalf of the utility
district was particularly emphatic in its quest “to liberate covered jurisdictions to exercise their
sovereign powers in a manner that treats citizens as unique individuals, rather than protected
class cogs. The Court should strike down Section 5 preclearance as incompatible with principles
of equality under the law and federalism.”787 Content analysis also reveals other themes in the
Northwest Austin briefs that later appeared in the Shelby County opinion. Those themes were that
Sections 4 and 5 had been upheld for a specific purpose and specific situation i.e., those Sections
were justified because of the widespread voting discrimination that continued to occur, that the
coverage formula only applied to the specific type of voting barriers in use at the time, that
Section 5 was only meant for a five-year period of time, and targeted specific states with an
obvious pattern of documented discrimination. The Northwest Austin briefs also agreed that the
VRA was an extraordinary policy meant for extraordinary conditions that imposed a significant
federalism burden on some states that was necessary at the time. However, according to the
amicus briefs, boosted by the VRA, the South and the nation had remedied its systemic
discrimination and thus, such intrusions into state sovereignty were no longer justified or
constitutional. The emergency had passed. The briefs also argued that when Congress passed the
reauthorization in 2006, it had not updated the formula and the old formula Congress kept was
not “congruent and proportional” to the present situation.
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The ruling in Northwest Austin was a statutory ruling. However, the majority expressed
the same federalism concerns as the amicus briefs. The majority stated that the “federal
intrusion” authorized by Section 5 and the “substantial ‘federalism costs’” that resulted caused
the Court to question its continued constitutionality.788 The majority, like the amicus briefs, also
conveyed that the coverage formula was irrelevant to “current political conditions.”789 According
to the briefs and suggested by the majority, this lack of congruence may be a fatal flaw.
Northwest Austin also introduced a concept of equal sovereignty that had been rejected
in Katzenbach. The majority claimed an “historic tradition” of equal sovereignty whose history
appeared to have begun after Katzenbach. This idea of equal sovereignty does not appear to have
come from the briefs in the VRA cases discussed in this dissertation.
The decision in Northwest Austin provided a template for opportunistic legal activists to
follow and the Network was ready to respond. The petitioner’s brief stated its specific challenge
by citing and directly quoting Northwest Austin.790 Following the signals sent by the majority,
the Network members crafted their responses this time in sixteen separate briefs. The arguments
in the amicus briefs were similar to those in Northwest Austin but were more numerous. For
example, instead of six briefs arguing that the remedy imposed was not “congruent and
proportional” to the problem it aimed to fix, eighteen briefs argued that the coverage formula and
Section 5’s “current burdens” did not meet the day’s “current needs.” And instead of five briefs
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claiming that Sections 4 and 5 were for a special place and time, it was ten or more in Shelby
County. And of course, the arguments for a strong version of federalism also multiplied. There
were five briefs submitted in Northwest Austin arguing against the VRA intrusion into the states’
domain. In Shelby County, the number of briefs making that same argument was fourteen.
The amicus briefs also expanded their states’ right claims to include the concept of equal
sovereignty. Picking up on the majority’s declaration of this “historic tradition,” nearly all of the
briefs submitted for Shelby County mentioned equal sovereignty at least once. This language
from the majority also seemed to have spurred a discussion from several of the briefs about the
disparate treatment of states under preclearance. As mentioned above, this concept of equal
sovereignty appears to have come into the VRA cases from the outside. The concept of equal
sovereignty aligns with the Federalist Society’s strong version of Tenth Amendment rights and
strict dual sovereignty not explicitly discussed in this dissertation. It is not too difficult to see
how a strong version of state sovereignty can lead to the further view of equal treatment under
the law for states. However, these ideas do align with the Network’s ideology and influence in
other areas of the law. As other scholars have shown, the Network had been instrumental in the
adoption of the “New Federalism” under Chief Justice William Rehnquist.791 In particular,
Hollis-Brusky has demonstrated the influence of the Network on the Supreme Court’s federalism
cases, separation of powers cases and the Tenth Amendment.792 Shelby County and its strong
statement for state’s rights and equal treatment for states under the law aligns with the Network’s
ideas and influence in those areas.
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Hollis-Brusky 2013; 2015
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The majority also articulated a structural view of the Constitution that also connects to
the Network’s understanding of Federalism and state sovereignty.793 The Constitution created a
government based on limited powers, federalism, and separation of powers. The Constitution
simultaneously granted power while it limited power but neither the grant nor the limit canceled
the other out. Rather all powers work in harmony within the structure of the Constitution. 794
Recall, this was also South Carolina’s depiction of the Constitution in Katzenbach. South
Carolina’s brief described the Constitution and the Amendments as all being equal in
importance, no one provision is superior or inferior to another. Each grant of power i.e., the
Fifteenth Amendment, had to be considered “in light of” the limit on power, i.e., the Tenth
Amendment.795 South Carolina had stated, “it is proper to judge the ‘appropriateness’ of this
legislation not only in light of the Fifteenth Amendment which it purportedly enforces, but also
against the background of the entire Compact.”796
According to the Shelby County majority, although the Supremacy Clause states that
federal law is supreme to state law, the federal government does not have veto power over state
laws or the right to preclear laws prior to enactment.797 The majority balanced the Supremacy
Clause with the Tenth Amendment to assert that states were autonomous in their sphere to create
and shape their own government and enact their own agendas.798 The majority next quoted a line
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Brief of the Plaintiff at 7, South Carolina v. Katzenbach 383 U.S. 301, (1965) (No. 22). 1965 WL 130083
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from a 2011 opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy to state that federalism allocated
powers in a way that “preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States.”799
The majority continued with a quote that captures quintessential Federalist Society
philosophy regarding federalism,800 “But the federal balance “is not just an end in itself: Rather,
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”801
Calling on the Framers as the Network likes to do and as their written amicus briefs had, the
majority claimed it had been the intention of the Framers for the states to retain authority over
elections.802
The Shelby County majority reprised the declaration of a “ a ‘fundamental principle of
equal sovereignty’ among the States.” It aligned that concept with the structure of the
Constitution itself when it stated, “Indeed, ‘the constitutional equality of the States is essential to
the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.’ ”803 This
time, the majority acknowledged the quote was from a case that concerned admitting new states.
However, the language was still rather ambiguous, and the majority’s next statement
substantially downplayed the Court’s rejection that the concept applied outside of admitting new
states. The majority stated, “Katzenbach rejected the notion that the principle operated as a bar
on differential treatment outside that context.” But recall, what Katzenbach said was in full: “The
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that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’” (Bond quoting New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 181
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doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that
doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the
remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”804 The majority continued and
boldly asserted, “At the same time, as we made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate
treatment of States.” 805 The majority simply asserted this doctrine without a textual connection
to the Constitution. The strongest support for equal sovereignty came from the Court’s own dicta
in Northwest Austin. The only connection the majority appeared to provide was based on the
structural arrangements of federalism, state sovereignty, and the Tenth Amendment.
Furthermore, it was on this basis that the 5-4 majority overruled Section 4, the coverage formula
of the VRA, which by all accounts, was a tremendous benefit for not only for African Americans
specifically but for all Americans. Equal treatment under the law for States won at the expense
of legislation with a proven record of providing equal treatment under the law for people. As
Justice Ginsburg explained in her dissent, the majority “suggest[ed] that dictum in Northwest
Austin silently overruled Katzenbach’s806 limitation of the equal sovereignty doctrine to ‘the
admission of new States.’” A suggestion Justice Ginsburg found “untenable.”807
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
My hypothesis is that the Federalist Society Network has influenced the Supreme Court
majority opinion in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) and Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 585 U.S. (2018). I
demonstrate the Network’s influence through a comparison of the litigant briefs and amicus
briefs submitted by Network members with the majority opinions in two cases leading up to and
including Shelby County and three cases leading up to and including Janus. This dissertation
demonstrates that the Network has indeed influenced the majority opinions in Shelby County and
Janus.
Ideas Diffusion to Janus
My first set of hypotheses was that the Federalist Society Network has influenced the
Supreme Court majority opinion in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, Council 31 585 U.S. (2018) through its amicus briefs and through the
petitioners’ briefs. Examining the litigants’ briefs and amicus briefs in four cases, three leading
up to Janus and Janus itself, reveals that the Network has influenced the Janus majority opinion.
The Network was involved in Knox, Harris, and Janus as attorneys for the petitioners, as
amici curiae, and four Supreme Court Justices in Knox and Harris and five Supreme Court
Justices in Janus. In their role as petitioners and amici curiae, the Network argued that agency
fees were compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment rights of workers and that
unions fees were political speech. The Network also asserted that union fees forced an individual
to support ideas she did not believe and deny ideas she did believe. The 5-4 majority adopted all
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of these arguments in its ruling. The Network’s briefs made these arguments in each of the three
cases examined after the establishment of the Federalist Society as an institution. When Abood
was heard in 1977, the organization was still five years away from its formation in the law
schools of Yale and Chicago. The Network’s unified arguments began comparatively muted with
Knox, gained numbers and strength in Harris, and again increased their numbers and fine-tuned
their arguments in Janus. Even the few briefs not directly affiliated with the Network had also
argued that agency fees compelled speech and union speech was political. This exemplifies how
the Network’s influence has spread. The fundamental argument made by the Network was that
all agency fees compelled speech and thus violated the First Amendment. As this study
demonstrates, this was the underlying holding in Janus. For 40 years, the pre-Janus status quo
held that only some agency fees, those used for explicitly political activities, violated the First
Amendment rights of workers.
This theme connects to the next Network argument which was the inherent political
nature of public sector collective bargaining. The Network members claimed that agency fees
funded political speech because when a public sector union is speaking it is to a public employer.
According to the Network, this context structurally made the content of the speech political. In
its various briefs and arguments, the Network connected agency fees to public policy, state taxes,
state budgets, and state financial woes, concluding that all public sector union speech concerned
the public interest. This argument formed the core of the majority opinion in Janus, which held
all public sector union speech was political in nature.
A related but frequent theme in the Network’s briefs portrayed agency fees as a
suppression of free speech. An individual employee made to pay fees to a union, for a service the
union provides but the individual does not want to pay for, was thus cast as a victim of the
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majority. The Network members analogized agency fees to forced silence, forced support of
ideas one opposes, or forced betrayal of one’s own beliefs. The Network advocated on behalf of
the dissenting employee without a voice to speak to their government employer. In contrast to
this supposed coercion, the fact that a public employee maintains all of the rights of citizenship
and in that capacity can still petition government as a citizen, received no mention whatsoever in
any briefs or written arguments advanced by the Network. Indeed, the Network expanded their
claims further arguing in Janus that because a worker had rights as a citizen to speak to the
government, the right extended to the workplace too. The majority accepted this assessment in
their ruling and held that agency fees forced a worker, over her objections, to associate with and
actively support a union whose ideas she opposes. According to the majority, similar to
compelled speech, when individuals are compelled to subsidize an organization’s speech
essentially, “individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions.”808 This idea was
elaborated most forcefully in the briefs whose authors included members that are considered
most influential among the Network.
Ideas Transmission to Shelby County
My second set of hypotheses is that the Federalist Society Network has influenced the
Supreme Court majority opinion in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). The flow of
influence examined was through its litigant briefs and amicus briefs. This study found evidence
of the Network’s influence in Shelby County. Like Janus, content analysis showed ideas flowed
from the amicus briefs to the majority. The Network was involved in Northwest Austin and
Shelby County as attorneys for the petitioners, as amici curiae, and as four Supreme Court
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Justices. The petitioner’s brief and the amicus briefs all contained similar ideas and echoed each
other’s reasoning. The main theme that was emphasized across a majority of the briefs was that
the VRA had been passed in 1965 to address an urgent situation that no longer existed. The
Network further asserted that Section 4’s coverage formula was outdated and unjustly punished
states that no longer obstructed ballot access. The Network stated that Section 4 and 5 had
outgrown its relevance. The Network members stated that the VRA was meant to address only a
specific type of discrimination that was prevalent in the 1960s that had grown beyond the federal
government’s control. For this reason, only, drastic anti-federalism measures were justified. The
Network further claimed that Sections 4 and 5 had become far removed from the original goal of
combatting the intentional discrimination committed by state and local officials which made the
costs of the anti-federalism measures too heavy to bear. Moreover, the Network contended that
the evidence Congress presented to justify the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA did not
demonstrate the widespread and purposeful discrimination presented in 1965. The Network
concluded that it was time to end the intrusion on state sovereignty allegedly inflicted by the
VRA’s preclearance requirements. The majority agreed with all points and incorporated them
into the Shelby County opinion. Although this principle of equal sovereignty entered the Voting
Rights Act line of cases as a simple statement of fact by the majority in Northwest Austin, it can
also be traced to the Network through a different line of cases. Tracing that lineage is beyond
the scope of this dissertation as my focus is limited to cases that challenged the VRA. However,
other scholars have tracked the strengthening of the doctrine of state sovereignty, state immunity,
and states’ rights to the Network through cases concerning those topics. It appears that the
federalism cases may be the origin of a state sovereignty doctrine that was seamlessly transferred
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to equal sovereignty in cases concerning the VRA. Pursuing the connection between these two
lines of cases while not examined here would be beneficial as a future project.
Federalist Society’s Founding Principles in Janus and Shelby County
The Federalist Society was founded on the principles of limited government, individual
liberty, dual federalism, and originalism. Starting with the principles expressed by the Federalist
Society itself, the amicus briefs and the majority opinion in Janus exemplify the Federalist
Society’s first stated principle: “the state exists to preserve freedom.”809 This theme ran
throughout the amicus briefs submitted in Janus set of cases. The briefs charged the state with
intruding on individual rights by allowing an agency shop empowered to compel fees from its
employees through paycheck deductions. To the Network, this arrangement represented a worstcase scenario of Big Government infringing upon individual liberties. The Network further
asserted that agency fees reflected the government putting its thumb on the scale in favor of the
unions, rather than functioning in an impartial manner. The Network demanded that government
stay out of the way and let the free market of ideas functioned as the Network envisioned it was
intended by the framers of the First Amendment. This reasoning aligns with the Federalist
Society’s stated principle of the state’s limited role in preserving individual liberty and having
rather than promoting social equality. Political speech provided the rationale, but at its core, the
Network’s argument purported to offer an unregulated, free market vision of the First
Amendment. According to the Network, the free market and limited government is the best way
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Founded in 1982, the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies is a group of conservatives and
libertarians dedicated to reforming the current legal order. We are committed to the principles that the state exists to
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to enhance liberty. In the three majority opinions studied here, the Knox majority most vividly
expressed the free market version of the First Amendment.
Even as it eroded federal supports for public sector unions, the Network’s legal activism
also seriously weakened federal protections for minority voting rights. Shelby County showcases
another of the Federalist Society’s founding principles which states “the separation of
governmental powers is central to our Constitution.”810 Separation of powers here refers to the
separation between federal and state governments. This principle is expressed in Shelby County
through the Network advocating for dual federalism, a robust state sovereignty, and against
intrusive federalism. As reviewed in Chapter 2, Hollis-Brusky (2013; 2015) demonstrated that
federalism and distinctly separate spheres for state and federal action were a priority within the
Federalist Society Network. Members of the Network consistently characterized federal
programs as coercing the states in seminar speeches, law review articles, and interviews.811 As
discussed, an especially strong version of this principle appeared in Northwest Austin from
Network member Justice Alito. It is not hard to imagine the strong version of states’ rights
becoming the equal sovereignty the majority brings to Northwest Austin.
However, a states’ rights analysis was completely absent in Janus or even Harris and
Knox. The state as a sovereign entity empowered by the Tenth Amendment with the powers not
explicitly granted to the federal government was not discussed by either the amicus briefs, the
petitioners, or any of the majority opinions. The right of a state to enact its own laws without
interference from the federal government in the absence of an enumerated power was nowhere to
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be found. The Network did not wish to allow the states to decide their own public sector labor
laws. The pre-Janus status quo for 40 years had left that choice to the states.
Similarly, in Shelby County, a strong individual rights argument is missing. An individual
right to vote is completely absent from the case analysis. There is no recognition as Justice
Ginsburg noted that the “right to vote” is mentioned in five places in the Constitution: the
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty–Fourth, and Twenty–Sixth Amendments.812 In Shelby
County, states’ rights dominate over an individual’s rights to vote. While in Janus, individual
First Amendment rights supersedes a state right to enact their own laws. This is not surprising
but only shows the ability of the Network to pick and choose its arguments to suit its purposes.
One can imagine the Network would be ready with counter arguments as to why this may be the
case. While inconsistency is hardly limited to the Federalist Society or the Network, it should be
troublesome to an organization that prides itself on adhering to principles.
The influence of the Network is also visible in the justices themselves. The authors of the
majority opinions, Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, were both members of the Federalist
Society. Particularly in the case of Justice Alito, the Federalist Society itself had enormous
influence on his selection. Likewise in 2005, the Network led the campaign to confirm Chief
Justice Roberts to the bench. Justice Gorsuch, the fifth vote to overturn Abood,813 was literally on
a list of approved nominees by the then Executive Vice President of the Federalist Society and
current Co-Chairman of the Board of Directors.
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New Life to Old Ideas
A key finding was that many of the arguments that appeared in the Network’s briefs
originated with the losing side in the original case. In Janus, most of the arguments can be traced
to the Abood petitioners’ attorney. The attorney for Abood, Sylvester Petro814 was considered far
outside the mainstream in the 1970s and his ideas radical even for Republican appointed
judges.815 The connections between Petro’s ideas and the Network is further illustrated by the
description of Petro as Federalist Society frequent speaker, “Richard Epstein on steroids.”816
Petro’s ideas were picked up and transmitted through the Network and have now won over a 5-4
majority. Likewise, in Shelby County culminated many arguments that first appeared in
Katzenbach. South Carolina argued that the VRA’s covered states were treated unfairly under
Section 4 and 5 and the doctrine of equality of statehood should override the federal
government’s protection of equality in voting. This argument was rejected by the Court along
with many states’ rights arguments in the 1960s. Indeed, the Federalist Society was formed
precisely to articulate, normalize, and popularize legal doctrines that had fallen out of favor
during the heyday of liberal jurisprudence in the 1960s and 1970s. The two sets of cases
examined in this dissertation fit with the description of the Federalist Society as the reprocessing
center of conservative ideas that had only a small circle of adherents and were cast out of the
legal mainstream. As Teles (2008) explains these conservative ideas needed to be consolidated
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found the Institute for Labor Policy Analysis (McCartin 2018). Petro’s social circle included influential libertarian
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and polished to appeal to a wider audience. When the Federalist Society was founded the
conservative ideas that eventually won a majority in both Janus and Shelby had been rejected by
the Court.
Future Research
As previously mentioned, connecting the federalism cases to the VRA cases would be
another feature to help understand the Network’s influence. It is also important to understand
how Network ideas spread to different areas of law and how these ideas overlap. Another area
for future research is understanding the influence of the different amicus briefs. It appears that
the majority relied on some briefs in these cases more than others. It also appears that these are
the briefs with the more active and those more in leadership roles in the Network. In the future it
would be interesting to explore that angle.
Limitations
In conclusion, there are a few limitations within this study. The documents I used to
examine the Networks’ ideas were limited to the petitioners and amicus briefs. It would be
fruitful to examine the scholarly writing and speeches presented at the Federalist Society events
itself to strengthen the relationship between the Network and the majority opinions. The
Federalist Society hosts thousands of events annually and it is during these events that new ideas
are fleshed out. It would be interesting to see the evolution of their ideas as they are refined
within the Federalist Society.
The content analysis I performed was a learn-as-you-go experience. Since I was learning
coding as I coded the cases, I learned some “tricks of the trade” late in the coding process which
meant I had to double back quite a bit to recode. I have a lot of codes that I did not use because I
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did not have time to check the accuracy of the codes once I had recoded. In the end, these codes
were mostly codes that may have added more detail to the analysis, and I may have been able to
include more subtle themes throughout the briefs. Adding that information in the future would be
an interesting touch as it could draw out subtleties in the arguments. Another tip I picked up a bit
too late was that it may also be possible to code the themes in “layers” which would then allow
an analysis of which codes co-occur with each other and which themes are connected.
Final Conclusion
The Federalist Society was organized to normalize and spread conservative ideas that had
been cast aside during the Civil Rights Era. The Federalist Society’s mission was to grow legal
conservatism while turning back legal liberalism. In 1982, conservative law students formed the
Federalist Society with a strategy to populate the courts, law profession, and government
administrations with young lawyers well versed in conservative legal principles. In the 1980s
conservative ideas had success in the political arena with the election of President Ronald
Reagan. As this dissertation demonstrates, the conservative legal movement has now caught up
with the political success. The Federalist Society Network has populated the legal arena with its
people and its ideas. Specifically in the area of agency fees for union and voting right this
mission was accomplished. Arguments that were once rejected by the courts, and by society were
pushed into the mainstream by the Federalist Society Network.
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